Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

Kishore Mahbubani
Robert M. Cutler
Maurice Friedberg

JULY-AUGUST 1984

LENINISM IN GRENADA

Jiri and Virginia Valenta

SOVIET ECONOMY:

Structural Imbalance

Boris Rumer

Limits of Reform

Fyodor I. Kushnirsky

Church and Peace in East Germany

Pedro Ramet

Notes & Views

China's Media

Jörg-Meinhard Rudolph

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Problems of Communism

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Cover: Revolutionary graffiti and bullet holes mark the wall at Fort Rupert in St. George's reputed to be the spot where Maurice Bishop and close colleagues in Grenada's New Jewel Movement were slain by factional rivals on October 19, 1983. Photo by Alex Webb/MAGNUM.

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Problems of Communism

Articles

Leninism in Grenada
Jiri and Virginia Valenta

Evidence from the documents captured in Grenada suggests that the New Jewel Movement led by Maurice Bishop was committed to a full-fledged Leninist transformation of the island, including the establishment of one-party rule, state control of the economy, and close ties with the Soviet bloc. Factionalism developed, however, and there are signs that Moscow may have been implicated in the violent October 1983 coup led by Bishop's more doctrinaire rival, Bernard Coard.

Structural Imbalance in the Soviet Economy
Boris Rumer

The Soviet economy suffers from severe structural deformities that defy easy solution: imbalances between money and goods, between development of extractive and of advanced industries, between manpower resources and their utilization, and between transport requirements and capabilities. Lacking the political will or motivation to deal with these problems, the present leadership is unlikely to reverse the country's economic slowdown.

The Limits of Soviet Economic Reform
Fyodor I. Kushnirsky

Examination of the systemic dilemmas that undermined and eventually reversed the 1965 Soviet economic reforms suggests that the tentative reform program introduced under Yuriy Andropov and endorsed by Konstantin Chernenko holds little promise. Without genuine managerial responsibility for property, and barring establishment of real market relationships, even well-intentioned modifications of economic performance indicators inevitably lead to new economic maladjustments and the need to revert to more restrictive methods of planning and management.

Church and Peace in the GDR
Pedro Ramet

In its "work for peace," the Evangelical Church in East Germany has carved out for itself a position at "critical distance" from the communist government and has attracted many adherents of the independent peace movement in the GDR. This de facto alliance has caused the GDR to vacillate between repression and tolerance, as the regime attempts both to preserve its monopoly of power and to respond to domestic criticism.

* * *

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Notes & Views

China's Media: Fitting News to Print
Jörg-Meinhard Rudolph

A guiding principle of public print media in the People's Republic of China is to "report the good, not the bad." The intent is to propagate and legitimate the policies of the Chinese Communist Party. But to be truly effective, propagandists must have access to objective, substantive information. Such access is provided through a system of internal publications whose distribution is closely controlled.

* * *

Essay-reviews

Cambodia: Myths and Realities
Kishore Mahbubani

Some recent writing on Cambodia draws a false distinction between the oppressive Pol Pot regime and the almost equally oppressive Heng Samrin government currently in power. The latter, headed by former Khmer Rouge cadres, is a puppet regime controlled by Vietnam, which continues to occupy and even to colonize the country.

Economic Issues in East-South Relations
Robert M. Cutler

The international trading behavior of the East European members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) over the past decade has diverged more and more from that of the Soviet Union, especially in trade with the less-developed countries. This trend reflects not only different political, economic, and legal perspectives on relations between industrialized societies and the Third World, but also individual national efforts to gain practical advantage in an increasingly competitive world market.

Russian Culture in Western Trust
Maurice Friedberg

Three waves of Russian intellectuals fleeing the mental serfdom of the Soviet state have found asylum in the West. This hemorrhage of talent contributes to the anemia of Soviet cultural life, even as it enriches intellectual and artistic creativity in the West—particularly in the United States, which is now a rival center of Russian culture.

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Leninism in Grenada

Jiri and Virginia Valenta

The US and East Caribbean forces' invasion of Grenada on October 26, 1983, focused attention on the problems of the Caribbean Basin. The factors contributing to the Grenadian revolution of 1979 and to its downfall four years later will long occupy analysts, whose initial interpretations of the nature of Grenada's government exhibited a striking variation. Some argued that Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement (NJM) was a typical Third World radical regime; others emphasized the regime's Marxist-Leninist character. There was further disagreement about the authenticity of the latter; but by now it is difficult to deny either the NJM's attempts at Leninism[1] or its extensive political, ideological, and above all military ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba. Both are richly documented in the voluminous secret files discovered in Grenada after the invasion.[2] Regardless of one's opinion about that invasion, these documents are a windfall for scholars in providing an unprecedented glimpse into the inner workings of an aspiring Third World Leninist regime and its relations with more established such regimes elsewhere.[3]

This study uses the Grenada documents and the authors' interviews in Grenada and Barbados with business and labor leaders, journalists, and politicians, including former NJM officials, to analyze the NJM revolutionary regime, its relationships with other communist countries, and its dissolution. We address the following questions: (1) What factors conditioned the emergence of the New Jewel Movement, and how did it assume power? (2) How did the movement regard itself, and how did it go about the socialist transformation of society; what new structures and policies did it introduce? (3) To what extent did the New Jewel Movement become a Leninist party? (4) What were the NJM's connections to the USSR and Cuba and to other communist states? (5) How did the internal power struggle and the October 1983 anti-Bishop coup develop; what role did the Soviets and Cubans play in these events; and what were the consequences? (6) What are the lessons of Grenada for other radical new regimes in the developing world, and for Soviet and Cuban policies toward them?

[1]Here we use the term Leninism as opposed to Marxism-Leninism. It was Lenin, not Marx, who developed the concepts of vanguard party, dictatorship of the proletariat, democratic centralism, and proletarian internationalism that are the building blocks of the political system adhered to and propagated by the Soviet Union.

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[2]The documents thus refute the view that Moscow was providing mainly moral support to Grenada. For an example of this view, see Cole Blasier, "Comment," in Alan Adelman and Reid Reading, Eds., *Confrontation in the Caribbean Basin: International Perspectives on Security, Sovereignty, and Survival,* Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984, pp. 268–74.

[3]Only twice before have Western scholars had access to comparable sets of documents. Merle Fainsod analyzed Soviet decision-making based on a unique collection of original materials captured by German troops in Smolensk. Later, based partly on documents of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, several other scholars analyzed internal politics and Soviet decision-making during the crisis of 1968. See Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1958; H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976; Galia Golan, *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: Communism in Crisis, 1962–68,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971; and Jiri Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision,* Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.

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Establishment of the NJM Regime

Grenada's size, history, and socioeconomic conditions provided a rich medium for revolution. Because of its minuscule size (only 133 square miles), the island could easily be taken over by a small but well-organized and disciplined force—which is precisely what happened in March 1979, when about 40 armed men launched the coup that overthrew the government of Prime Minister Eric Gairy. In the economic sphere, while Grenada is blessed with a tropical climate and fertile soil, it has less infrastructure and fewer public services than, for example, neighboring Barbados. In the social sphere, the predominantly rural population of the country, made up primarily of descendants of African slaves and of indentured laborers from the West Indies, was characterized until 1979 by a rigid stratification of classes based on color and education. It was extremely difficult for blacks to cross the line separating them from the lighter-skinned and better-educated elite.[4]

Class rigidity, coupled with a Spanish-French-British colonial heritage and plantation economy, in turn conditioned an authoritarian political culture in which democratic traditions never became entrenched among the politically unaware, impoverished masses. History and social organization have accustomed the people of Grenada to entrust government to leaders possessing the dual qualities of "boss man" and savior.[5] In the last few decades they looked first to the black politician Gairy and later to the lighter-skinned, London-educated Maurice Bishop to fill this role.

More than anyone else, Gairy established the conditions that made the revolution possible. Although he and Bishop were political antagonists throughout the 1970's, Bishop and the younger Gairy of the 1950's had much in common. At that time Gairy was a radical politician who set up a rurally based trade union and (like Bishop at a later stage) organized island-wide strikes and demonstrations. As a result of these disturbances, the British navy intervened in the capital of St. George's in 1951 to restore order, and Gairy was arrested.

After 1951, Gairy gave up violent tactics and switched to electoral politics. Subsequently his Grenadian United Labor Party won six consecutive elections.[6] When Grenada acquired full rights of internal self-government in 1967, Gairy became prime minister. Once in power, however, Gairy reverted to political violence and intimidation. His brutal reign, often likened to that of "Papa Doc" Duvalier in Haiti, was perpetuated by a paramilitary group known as the Mongoose Gang.[7] Nevertheless, even under Gairy's rule some important socioeconomic changes were occurring, such as the replacement of the old "plantocracy" by farmers of small and medium-sized estates.[8] Eventually, Gairy's oppressive rule and bizarre behavior antagonized most of his following in the rural areas. Worsening socioeconomic conditions set the stage for the popularly supported NJM takeover in 1979.

The leftist New Jewel Movement had come into being in 1973, when two radical groups, the Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education and Liberation (JEWEL) and the Movement for the Assemblies of People, merged and adopted a socialist manifesto.[9] The manifesto, an interesting amalgam of various socialist theories (with large doses of Tanzanian Christian socialism), proclaimed "People's Assemblies as the new form of government."[10] Gairy's secret police and night ambush squads forcibly suppressed strikes organized

Note on Documentary Sources

As of April 1984 the US government has released several series of documents captured in Grenada (cited in footnotes as Grenada Documents). Each series, consisting of NJM Political Bureau and Central Committee minutes, secret agreements with communist countries, letters, diaries, personal papers, and reports from the Grenadian embassy in Moscow, is indexed in dozens of "logs." Unfortunately, the packets are not yet properly sorted, some are unnumbered, and a few are not entirely legible. Other documents have yet to be released.

A brief, very preliminary evaluation of some of the documents was published by the US Department of State and Department of Defense on Dec. 16, 1983, under the title *Grenada: A Preliminary Report*. Michael Ledeen and Herbert Romerstein, both of Washington, DC, are compiling and editing another volume of the documents that will be published soon.

[4]Michael G. Smith, *Stratification in Grenada*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1965. Here we also benefited from the excellent analysis of Aaron Segal, "Background to Grenada: When the Social Scientists Invaded," *Caribbean Review* (Miami, FL), Fall 1983, pp. 40–44.

[5]See "The Grenada Documents. The Bitter Epic Struggle for the Isle of Spice," special supplement to the Barbados newspaper *Nation* (Bridgetown), February 1984. The *Nation*'s analyses between 1979 and 1983 are indispensable, in our judgment, for any student of the Grenadian revolution.

[6]For a detailed discussion, see Archie Singham, *The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1968. Here we also benefited from interviews conducted in Grenada.

[7]"The Grenada Documents . . .," supplement to the *Nation*, loc. cit., p. 9.

[8]See the excellent analysis of Anthony P. Maingot, "Options for Grenada: The Need To Be Cautious," *Caribbean Review*, Fall 1983, pp. 24–28.

[9]For background on the NJM, see ibid., pp. 25–26; and V. S. Naipaul, "An Island Betrayed," *Harper's* (New York), March 1984, pp. 61–72.

[10]Manifesto of the New Jewel Movement (no date); see also Maingot, loc. cit., p. 26.

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A sign painted on a street in St. George's, Grenada, during the four-year rule of the New Jewel Movement on that Caribbean island.

—Alex Webb/MAGNUM.

by the NJM, and, in 1973, its leader Bishop was severely beaten. The following year, in a demonstration known as Bloody Monday, his father Rupert was killed.

After Grenada was granted independence on February 7, 1974, the New Jewel Movement concluded a tactical electoral coalition (the People's Alliance) with the conservative Grenadian National Party and the United People's Party. In general elections held in 1976, the People's Alliance won 48 percent of the vote, but only six seats in parliament. Three of those seats went to NJM leaders: future prime minister Bishop; Unison Whiteman, future minister of foreign affairs; and a relative newcomer to the New Jewel Movement, Bernard Coard.

Dissatisfied with Gairy's presumed manipulation of the 1976 elections, the New Jewel Movement organized trade unions, and some leaders began to push for radicalization of the movement. Coard, in particular, advocated a shift to "scientific socialism" and Leninization of the party. To promote this goal he organized a study group, the Organization for Educational Development and Research, which constituted almost a separate branch of the party. Some of the NJM's founding members sensed a bid by Coard to take over the party as early as 1977; some actually left the party because of a subsequent trend toward Leninization. A solid enough core remained, however, to mount a successful takeover of the capital on March 13, 1979.

The NJM's seizure of the True Blue army headquarters and the only radio station in Grenada, while Gairy was out of the country, was expertly planned and executed. Bishop himself was already a friend and admirer of Fidel Castro, and it is possible that the NJM revolutionaries were assisted or trained either by Cu-

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bans or by Cuban-trained comrades from Guyana.[11] Most Grenadians were probably unconcerned about this connection; having long since become dissatisfied with Gairy, they wholeheartedly embraced the charismatic Bishop. As the distinguished Grenadian journalist Alistair Hughes put it, the people "went Bishop, not socialist."[12]

The NJM leadership, though, did aspire to Leninism, in both the institutional and the ideological sense. This emerges most clearly from the documents in which members of the Politburo, including both Bishop and Coard, on many occasions reaffirm their Leninist credentials as a way of legitimizing their actions or rebutting their critics—a type of esoteric communication typical of both aspiring and mature Leninist regimes. The documents also suggest that the Grenadian leaders hoped (and were encouraged by the Soviets and the Cubans) to model their revolution on the example of other communist countries, particularly Cuba in the late 1960's and 1970's, that had successfully completed the transformation to Leninism and joined the "socialist commonwealth." Despite serious tactical differences and, later, a fierce power struggle, members of both the Bishop and the Coard factions shared this commitment, concurring that it was necessary to initiate a socialist transformation of Grenada.

Cultural and historical differences notwithstanding, Grenada in 1979–83—like Cuba in 1962–69 and Eastern Europe in 1945–53—underwent an analogous first stage of socialist transformation, in which the main task of the aspiring Leninist party was to decisively eliminate "reactionary" political and economic forces. From the available documents it is clear that the NJM leadership saw itself as engaged in a heroic struggle against such forces. To be successful, they believed their party had to build new Leninist structures in a hierarchy of command able to respond to unexpected challenges from external and internal enemies of the revolution. Typically, during this period, party-created and party-directed mass organizations assume key roles in the political mobilization of the population. The premium is on ideological consciousness, moral incentives, and mobilization of large strata of the population to join in the struggle. Institutions of coercion like the secret police and armed forces become symbols of "vigilance" against real and imaginary forms of internal and external subversion. "Fraternal assistance" from like-minded foreign parties and governments is solicited in the struggle. Thus, the NJM had three objectives for Grenada: (1) to build a socialist society; (2) to build a vanguard party around Leninism's pyramidical ruling principle of democratic centralism; and (3) to adhere to proletarian internationalism, ideological shorthand for alignment with the USSR, Cuba, and other communist countries.

Socialist Transformation

Although the NJM had a radical economic program from the start, several factors contributed to the regime's further radicalization. One such factor may have been a lack of tact on the part of some US diplomats dealing with the new Bishop government in early 1979. The pace and extent of socialist transformation was also influenced by some Grenadian leaders, especially the doctrinaire Coard, who wanted to accelerate the process. Nevertheless, the change proved to be laborious and slow because of difficult local conditions, and probably also because the NJM leadership had learned from the experience of Cuba and other communist countries that too rapid a disengagement from capitalism could strain the economy at home and burden one's allies abroad.

The economic bases of Grenada are tourism and agriculture (and some agro-industry), particularly the traditional exports of cocoa, bananas, nutmeg, and mace, which are the largest earners (35 percent) of foreign currency. Agricultural laborers, who number approximately 6,000 (of 90,000–100,000 inhabitants), were supposed to become the labor force of future agro-industrial plants still on the drawing board. The Grenadian economy was to be diversified, but, in the words of one NJM Central Committee resolution, "development and modernization of agriculture hold the key to winning the peasantry to socialism and the transformation of the countryside along socialist lines."[13] Accordingly, new jingles, in the mode of socialist realism, extolled the role of the People's Revolutionary Government in socialized agriculture:

To get manure
Is now quite easy
Since the PRG has provided subsidy.

Contrary to the provisions of the NJM's 1973 manifesto about decentralized village assemblies, newly established mass organizations such as the Agriculture and General Workers Union and the Production

[11] Authors' interviews in Barbados and Grenada, Feb. 23–27, 1984.
[12] Authors' interview with Alistair Hughes in St. George's, Grenada, Feb. 24, 1984.
[13] Central Committee Resolution on Agriculture (undated), Grenada Documents, Log No. 100310.

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Farmers Union were created to assure centralized party supervision over agricultural production. But the nationalization of fisheries and cocoa industries was hampered by the need to keep the island afloat financially from month to month, by mismanagement, and by the poor quality of some equipment donated by communist countries.

Tourism was a lesser source of foreign currency, and (unlike in Eastern Europe during the late 1940's and early 1950's) it was not curtailed but rather encouraged. In part, the controversial new airport under construction at Point Salines was meant to encourage a greater influx of tourists to what Bishop hoped would become a "socialist paradise" in the Caribbean. However, while some tourists continued to come to the beautiful beaches of Grenada, there was a decline in the number of long-term visitors from Western countries. As for trade with the communist world, the large increase expected from the establishment of a State Trading Corporation had not materialized as of 1983—in part because of high transportation costs and in part because of Soviet and East European economic difficulties.

Although Grenada kept a mixed economy, the state sector became dominant. The central government's planning and allocation role increased gradually but consistently through all sectors of the economy via a newly established Marketing and National Import Board and also, after July 1983, a new Ministry of State Enterprises. Other such organizations included the state-controlled National Commercial Bank, established to regulate financial institutions, and the Grenada Resorts Corporation, in charge of the island's various hotels. To expedite the transformation process, pressure was exerted on private industry and commerce through seizures and through taxation and other laws. The private sector, though increasingly embattled, was tolerated as long as it served the revolution. Had the NJM remained in power, in time it probably would have established a state monopoly on foreign trade,[14] nationalized most private industry, and collectivized the bulk of agricultural production.

In the beginning, NJM efforts to improve the living conditions and general lot of the masses resulted in a substantially expanded public sector (primarily services), reduced unemployment (from 40 percent under Gairy to 33 percent by 1982), and some drop in illiteracy through the activities of a Center for Popular Education. To motivate the Grenadians to increase productivity, the regime coined slogans and erected huge banners and billboards resembling those in communist countries. Rallies and marches were organized to awaken "social consciousness" and productivity. Poems, similar to those written in Eastern Europe in the early 1950's, carried the same message:

So youthman, sister woman
Co-operate, organise unite, be wise
Then we go cleanup this land!
There's no number one priority otherwise
But to positively awake and consciously arise
Giving our enemies a true surprise.
Forward on!
We want active youth participation
In a social transformation!

FOOD, FOOD
Plant more FOOD
No traitor, no destabilizer
We'll allow to intrude.[15]

But such means of mass mobilization became unpopular with Grenadians as the revolution progressed into its fifth year and economic conditions stagnated or worsened, regardless of leadership promises.

The Vanguard Party

The New Jewel Movement, which originated as a loose coalition of diverse socialist elements, was gradually transformed into a Leninist-type party that functioned through a full-fledged Political Bureau (or Politburo) and Central Committee (CC), both chaired by Prime Minister Bishop. Coard's powerful faction in the NJM leadership insisted on strict adherence to Leninist principles: democratic centralism, i.e., party management based on obedience of all lower bodies to higher bodies; collective decision-making, i.e., obedience to the Central Committee majority; and criticism and self-criticism.

Shortly after seizing power, Bishop replaced Grenada's constitution with a series of People's Laws. In each of the six parishes of Grenada the NJM established People's Councils in an attempt to manage community issues. Members were to be elected from councils elected in each sizable village. Eventually the NJM planned to set up a National People's Assembly

[14] Position paper "On Possible Establishment Of A State Trading Corporation for Effecting Grenada's Trade With The Socialist Countries," (undated), ibid., Log No. 100013.

[15] "What We Must Do" by Garvin Stuart, and "More Food" by Haleem Abdulwali, in Renalph Gebon, Ed., *Tongues of the New Dawn: An Anthology of Poems*, St. George's, Festival of the Revolution, Mar. 10–13, 1981, pp. 33–34, 54–55.

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A 1981 march in Grenada's capital, St. George's, commemorating the death of Rupert Bishop, father of New Jewel Movement leader Maurice Bishop.

—Alex Webb/MAGNUM.

with deputies elected from the parish assemblies. In 1982 the NJM appointed a constitutional commission to produce a draft of a "people's democracy constitution."

To advance the political transformation, the NJM leadership sought to build mass organizations modeled on prototypes found in communist states, e.g., a National Youth Organization, National Pioneer Movement, National Women's Organization, Workers Committees, and so on. Participation in these organizations was strongly encouraged, and extensive contacts with counterparts in communist countries were developed. In this as in other matters, the New Jewel Movement actively sought the help of foreign instructors in building Grenada's vanguard party.

As in other Leninist states, party members held the most important positions in both government and mass organizations. The party ensured the obedience of the armed forces and internal security organs by appointing supervisors from NJM ranks to their directorates. As a result, in spite of the seeming chaos preceding the death of Bishop in October 1983, the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (PRAF) was said to be still following Central Committee directives.[16]

The New Jewel Movement also took control of all media, including the established *West Indian* newspaper—which became the NJM's main propaganda organ, the *Free West Indian. The Grenadian Voice,* a mimeographed newspaper published by a group of Grenadians (including Alistair Hughes) who had opposed the former Gairy government, was suppressed. Meanwhile, the NJM began to publish a party newspaper, *The New Jewel.* The various social organizations listed above also started their own newspapers under party supervision.

To further reinforce one-party rule, the NJM instituted effective coercive mechanisms. Gairy's 65-man army was disbanded immediately after the coup. Whereas Gairy had ruled with the assistance of the Mongoose Gang, the New Jewel Movement governed with the help of the PRAF, numbering about 2000; the Ministry of the Interior; and the People's Militia. These organizations, while preparing to fight external "counterrevolutionaries," also engaged in harassing internal opponents. Though some of their activities may have seemed comical to outside observers (particularly the military exercises that ended with large motorcar parades about the island), they were feared

[16]Authors' interview with George Louison, St. George's, Grenada, Feb. 26, 1983.

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by those kept under "heavy manners"—slang for the harsh treatment accorded suspected dissidents. Punishment varied from dismissal from one's job, to arrest, preventive detention, imprisonment, and in some cases reportedly even execution. During the four and one-half years of Bishop's rule an estimated 1,000 persons (roughly 1 percent of the population) were detained at one time or another, most for political reasons. As of January 1982 the list of persons in permanent detention included 183 names, and the actual total was probably higher.

By this time, officials at the Ministry of the Interior had begun to sort out the population of the various parishes, designating them either as "our forces" or "enemy forces," with the latter subdivided into groups classified as "very dangerous," "dangerous," "less dangerous," and "petty bourgeois." They also assessed "past and present counterrevolutionary activities" of the populace.[17] The New Jewel Movement also began to assess the religious situation in Grenada and to combat the influence of the Catholic Church, with the assistance of the Americas Department of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC). The Grenadian Interior Ministry, under the leadership of chief of counterintelligence Keith Roberts, monitored "the key middle class elements" with ties to foreign diplomats and all foreign visitors who remained in Grenada longer than four weeks, including all students at the medical school in St. George's as well as the "mood and movement of the school hierarchy and professors."[18]

The first to incur the wrath of the revolution were Gairy's supporters. Next came NJM supporters or members opposed to the Leninization process, along with other "anti-socialist elements" such as Rastafarians, who were originally tolerated. Last to be accused of "counterrevolutionary" tendencies were Bishop himself and his faction in the Central Committee, who were "heavy mannered" in the extreme—illustrating the proposition that revolutions tend to devour their own.

Surely there was great naiveté, confusion, and ineptitude in the Grenadian leadership. Nevertheless, as surviving Politburo member George Louison told the authors, all of the leaders of the New Jewel Movement were constantly learning from the experience of "fraternal parties" during their travels in Cuba, the USSR, Eastern Europe, and North Korea. The recorded discussions of NJM leaders in the Politburo and Central Committee confirm that they studied the examples of other communist parties and radical developing countries, and wielded those examples skillfully in their debates. Indeed, they used esoteric Leninist vocabulary and ideological justifications not only in conducting party business but at times even in private settings.

To some NJM leaders, like Bishop, the Leninist vocabulary may have seemed a bit alien, at least for a time; to others, it appeared to be the only mode of political communication. Bishop's speeches were origi-

The late Maurice Bishop, leader of the revolutionary New Jewel Movement regime on Grenada, seen at the Organization of American States headquarters in Washington, DC, during a visit to the US in June 1983, four months before his death in a factional coup.

—Atlan/SYGMA.

[17] Undated area-by-area report (stamped "secret") on political situation in Grenada, Grenada Documents, Log No. 102604.

[18] Report of the delegation to Grenada from the Cuban Communist Party's Americas Department (Aug. 13-24, 1982), ibid., Log No. II; and plan of CI (counterintelligence) Operations, ibid., Log No. 104968.

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nally devoid of the class analysis and similar rhetoric found in the speeches of Coard and his supporters. In Bishop's speeches there was rather an emphasis on the rights of women, children, and the peasantry (not the working class), and on the need for food, housing, and health care. However, even Bishop's speeches acquired a more ideological ring after mid-1981.[19]

Just as Bishop's addresses at times seemed to avoid Leninist code words and formulas, so his behavior showed some disregard for democratic centralism. Certainly Bishop's opponents accused him of violating this principle when he opposed the majority CC decision to divide leadership responsibilities with Coard, with Bishop continuing as prime minister and Coard assuming the role of chairman of the Central Committee. A crucial resolution of the PRAF Branch of the New Jewel Movement, passed on October 12, 1983 (several days before Bishop's death), unambiguously stated that "based on the fundamental Leninist Principle of democratic centralism," the decisions of the NJM Central Committee "have the force of law and form the basis of [the] activity and conduct of all party bodies and of every single party member." Members further pledged that they would never "allow cultism, egoism, the unreasonable and unprincipled desires of one man or a minority to be imposed on our Party."[20] As one of Bishop's opponents stated, "the only problem at the CC was that Maurice would not conform to democratic centralism."[21] Another opponent asked:

Will we institute democratic centralism for all? Will the Minority submit to the Majority? Will there be one discipline binding on all or will it be for everyone except the leader? Will we practice criticism and self-criticism frankly and openly as demanded by Comrade Lenin or will the CC be intimidated by one man?[22]

When Bishop refused to go along with the reorganization of the party leadership proposed by the Central Committee, his opponents insisted on "cold-bloodedness" and "Bolshevik staunchness," as will be shown below.

Proletarian Internationalism

The Bishop regime's interest in cultivating close ties with foreign communist states was fully reciprocated by the Soviet Union. The documents captured in Grenada clearly show that in spite of the country's minuscule size and of repeated Soviet statements that the Caribbean Basin was "very distant" and not a "priority area,"[23] both Soviet and Cuban involvement in Grenada gradually increased and in some areas went far beyond what was indicated in published Soviet, Cuban, Grenadian, and other Caribbean sources. Soviet ties with Grenada served three kinds of objectives: political-ideological, military-security, and, to a much lesser extent, economic.

Ideology and politics. The Soviet Union's most important objective in the Caribbean Basin is political, namely, to encourage and support "anti-imperialist" (i.e., anti-American) forces. The most vigorous forms of support are given to those regimes classified as revolutionary: fully developed Leninist regimes like Cuba, or those following the path toward socialism such as Grenada and Nicaragua. The growth of political-ideological ties between Grenada and the Soviet Union and its allies was manifest in the relatively large number of officials (and intelligence operatives) from the USSR and other communist countries discovered in Grenada at the time of the US intervention—including about 47 Soviets alone. This is a considerable number, considering that the Soviet embassy had been set up only in November 1981, with the arrival of Soviet Ambassador Gennadiy Sazhenev and the installation of wire services by the official Soviet news agency, TASS.

As early as 1981, the Soviet press spoke of Grenada's "progressive social transformation" and referred to the NJM as the "political vanguard."[24] Yet Soviet spokesmen, exercising their usual caution, referred to the NJM regime (along with those in Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan) as "progressive," "anti-imperialist," "national-democratic," or, at most, "on the path toward socialist orientation"—that is, not yet fully Leninist. One Soviet analyst went a step further in describing both Grenada and Nicaragua in terms of *novaya ... narodno-demokraticheskaya gosudarstvennost'* (new ...

[19]Here we are indebted to Carl Henry Feuer for his perceptive analysis, "Was Bishop a Social Democrat?" *Caribbean Review*, Fall 1983, pp. 37–39.

[20]Resolution of the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces Branch of the New Jewel Movement, Oct. 12, 1983, Grenada Documents, Log No. 100103.

[21]See the third installment of a letter written by Grenadian trade union leader and Bishop friend Vincent Noel to members of the NJM Central Committee two days before Noel's and Bishop's deaths, *The Grenadian Voice* (St. George's), Feb. 11, 1984. We have benefited throughout from this newspaper which, in its present form, came into being after the US-OECS intervention. The editor is Leslie Pierre, to whom we are indebted for the insights he shared with us during several interviews in Grenada.

[22]Minutes of the Extraordinary General Meeting of Full Members of the NJM, Sept. 25, 1983, published in *Caribbean Review*, Fall 1983, pp. 14–15, 48–58.

[23]Undated memo from the Grenadian embassy in Moscow on NJM relations with the CPSU, Grenada Documents, Log No. 102329.

[24]See, for example, K. Kochaturov, "Changes on the Island of Spices," *Pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 17, 1981.

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popular-democratic statehood),[25] an expression like the one the Soviets used in the late 1940's for the East European regimes that soon became Leninist. The generally cautious terminology probably reflected Moscow's guarded expectations—conditioned by unpleasant experiences with other radical Third World regimes and by Cuba's arduous path toward Leninism—and desire to set apart the regimes that embody the most mature form, described as "developed socialism": the USSR itself, the countries of Eastern Europe, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cuba. But even if Grenada was not yet considered part of the "socialist commonwealth," by 1982 some Soviet officials had begun to treat the New Jewel Movement as a "fraternal" (Marxist-Leninist) party. Some lower level officials in Moscow even called the NJM a "communist party" in conversations with Grenadian Ambassador W. Richard Jacobs and Counsellor Bernard Bourne.[26]

While the NJM was informally considered a "fraternal party," it was not treated on the same level as the Nicaraguan junta. The Soviets often adopted a "protective" attitude toward Grenadian diplomats in Moscow, explaining that their relations with the NJM should not be conducted on the highest level so as not to provide the United States with a pretext to "further squeeze Grenada." Since Nicaragua was already under attack from the United States, according to Soviet officials, it was necessary to express Soviet support for Nicaragua on a higher political level. Other reasons perceived by Grenadian diplomats for the Soviets' lower public profile in dealing with Grenada were its smaller size, lesser importance, and perhaps some residual confusion on the part of CPSU officials about the ideological orientation of the NJM. For example, Soviet officials could not understand the NJM's continued membership in the Socialist International.[27]

Formal relations between the NJM and the CPSU began with the visit of Deputy Prime Minister Coard to the USSR in May–June 1980, in the wake of supportive lobbying by the Communist Party of Cuba and the Workers' Party of Jamaica.[28] After gathering considerable information about the NJM and observing indications that the revolution was taking hold, the Soviets decided to make a formal commitment to Grenada during the visit of Prime Minister Bishop to the USSR in July 1982. According to the important secret agreement of July 27, 1982, the CPSU and NJM agreed to cooperate in ways similar to those pursued by the Soviets in dealing with other "anti-imperialist," "socialist-oriented" countries in the Third World. In line with a "common commitment ... to scientific socialism," the agreement stated that "inter-party cooperation is a most important basis" for the development of relations between Grenada and the USSR. According to six of the seven main points in this accord, Soviet relations with Grenada would be handled mainly through party channels, though the agreement also provided for the "all around development of inter-state relations and ties between mass organizations." The agreement required the CPSU and the NJM to "extend and deepen" cooperation "at all levels" and to "exchange experience in party work and party guidance" in the social, economic, and cultural development of the respective countries, "including regular exchange of information." It also provided for "consultation and exchanges of opinion on international matters."[29] Subsequently Soviet-Grenadian relations were indeed conducted primarily on a party-to-party basis; and Bishop and other NJM officials held unofficial talks with high-level Soviet officials during visits and stopovers in the USSR in 1982–83.

According to the CPSU–NJM accord, both parties agreed to cooperate in "training party and government cadres" and to develop contacts between the party presses and other mass media. The Soviets, who were originally "bewildered" that no work had begun on construction of a party headquarters for the NJM, were to assist in building one. This transaction, in which the Soviets were to reimburse the Cubans for material and technical support, offers a good example of the close Soviet-Cuban cooperation in Grenada.[30] The Soviets agreed to supply office equipment and cars as well. They also "pressed" the NJM into accepting a number of scholarships for Grenadian party officials (15 in 1982 alone). Other NJM members "with a higher cultural level" were to study at the Higher Party School of the CPSU Institute of Social Sciences along with counterparts from other revolutionary parties in the Third World. Fourteen

[25] A. I. Stroganov, *Latinskaya Amerika* (Moscow), May 1983, p. 134.

[26] Memo dated July 11, 1983, regarding relations with the USSR prepared by Grenadian Ambassador to Moscow W. Richard Jacobs and addressed to NJM Politburo members Bishop, Whiteman, Coard, and Ewart Layne, Grenada Documents, Log No. W.

[27] Memo from Bernard Bourne, Minister-Counsellor of the Grenadian embassy in Moscow, to Maurice Bishop dated July 20, 1982, ibid., Log No. 104262.

[28] On Cuba's role as "a champion" of Grenada's case in Moscow, see memo dated July 11, 1983, loc. cit. For a Jamaican Workers' Party offer of assistance in this regard, see a letter to Bishop dated Oct. 16, 1979, ibid., Log No. 104729.

[29] Agreement on Cooperation between the New Jewel Movement of Grenada and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, July 27, 1982, ibid., Log No. 102318.

[30] Handwritten notes from meeting between Hudson Austin and the Cuban Minister of Construction, dated June 28, 1983, ibid., Log No. 100003.

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Grenadians were enrolled there in May 1983.[31] Soviet officials also recommended that the NJM think seriously about establishing its own party school as a "top priority," and that it start sending teacher trainees to the USSR.[32]

Still other Grenadians were trained in Cuba, where the course of study included propaganda and foreign relations, particularly vis-à-vis other Caribbean nations. In 1983, Cuba was scheduled to receive 18 Grenadian party cadres for study and training in political indoctrination and propaganda techniques. Those selected for such training represented but a small fraction of dozens of Grenadians said to be studying in Cuba at the time of the US–Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) invasion. Finally, according to NJM agreements on cooperation with the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) and with the Bulgarian Communist Party, other Grenadians studied at the Karl Marx Party College in East Berlin, and ten were enrolled at the Academy of Social Science of the Central Committee in Sofia.

As provided by the work plan of the NJM's propaganda department, the propaganda organs of the USSR and other communist countries began to distribute "progressive materials" in Grenada for the purpose of "deepening the internationalist spirit and socialist consciousness of the Grenadian masses." This was aimed, among other things, at exposing "the evil and war-mongering policies of imperialism," promoting "the life of people under socialism," and highlighting "activities of progressive and revolutionary parties" in the Caribbean region.[33] There were, in addition, a number of Soviet civilian consultants and advisers attached to various Grenadian ministries (for example, the Ministry of Education) and other agencies.[34] A Grenadian-Soviet friendship society was formed.

The Soviets established still other organizational ties with the NJM through a newly established Grenada Peace Council (GPC), which became an integral part of the World Peace Council (WPC)—an organization

An American serviceman examines an arms cache and world map found in St. George's, Grenada, in October 1983. The poster of Fidel Castro on the wall reads (in Spanish, English, French, and Russian): "We Won't Forget You, Dear and Beloved Friends."

—Philip Jones Griffiths/MAGNUM.

supervised by the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In 1982–83, GPC representatives participated in a number of WPC meetings, including preparations for "A Week in Solidarity with Nicaragua" (December 1982) and the International Preparatory Committee of the World Assembly for Peace and Life [and] against Nuclear War convened in Prague (June 1983). Though the Soviet Peace Fund subsidized the travel of Grenadian officials on Aeroflot and on the Cuban airline Cubana, the Soviets apparently desired that travel between Grenada and Havana be paid by the Grenadian government.[35] The NJM's participation in the activities of the WPC was thus limited by Grenada's geographic remoteness and continuous financial difficulties. In fact, the Grenadian Peace Council was criticized at the WPC meeting in Lisbon on November 2, 1982, for insufficient "flow of information" and a continuously low level of activity. WPC Regional Secretary Hill Arboleda of Panama made the point that because of the paucity of information emanating from Grenada, the WPC-

[31] Report of Bernard Bourne on the work of the NJM Party Branch in Moscow, May 10, 1983, ibid., Log No. L; and Minutes of Organizing Committee, Apr. 18, 1983, ibid., Log No. 100718. See also a memo from Bourne to Bishop, July 20, 1982, Log No. 109242.

[32] Report by Grenadian Ambassador Jacobs on his meeting with Oleg P. Gaidum (identified as acting rector of the CPSU Party School in Moscow), May 23, 1983, ibid., Log No. 104262.

[33] Work Plan and Guidelines for the NJM's Propaganda Department, Grenada Documents (no number given).

[34] See a recollection of V. Alikperov, senior scientific associate of the Azerbaydzhan Scientific Research Institute of Pedagogical Sciences in Baku, in N. Barskiy, "They Came Back to Baku from Grenada," *Bakinskiy Rabochiy* (Baku), Nov. 15, 1983.

[35] Memo from Bernard Bourne to the Grenadian Peace Council, Nov. 6, 1982, ibid., Log No. 102640.

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controlled media were not yet able to publish an article on the Grenadian revolution.

In 1983, the NJM concluded various new agreements with the Communist Party of Cuba, providing for closer and more regular cooperation between those two parties than between the NJM and the CPSU—including "regular meetings and exchange of experience between the different departments and secretaries of both parties." According to one secret agreement, the PCC and the NJM were to "coordinate the positions of the governments of Cuba and Grenada at international events, conferences, and agencies where they participate, in attention to the political, economic and social interests of both Parties."[36] Bilateral relations were also advanced by the Grenada-Cuba Friendship Society. The NJM, which saw itself as a bridge between the PCC and leftist parties in the English-speaking Caribbean, participated in other "anti-imperialist" projects with Cuban party officials, such as meetings in Grenada (partly funded by Havana) of representatives from nonaligned nations. The NJM even took part in (and was appointed to the secretariat of) the Libyan General Congress of the World Center for Resistance against Imperialism, Zionism, Racism and Reaction.[37]

Security. Another Soviet objective in the Caribbean Basin is of a military and intelligence nature. Moscow seeks to develop military ties with revolutionary regimes in that region so as to accomplish what Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov described, in a 1983 conversation with his Grenadian counterpart Major Einstein Louison, as "raising the combat readiness and preparedness" of progressive forces facing a threat from imperialism. Ogarkov specified the conditions favorable to this goal: "Over two decades ago there was only Cuba in Latin America; today there are Nicaragua and Grenada, and a serious battle is going on in El Salvador."[38] Though the Soviets proceeded very cautiously, so as not to provoke the United States, they probably desire in the long run to secure access elsewhere in the Caribbean to military and intelligence facilities of the sort they now have in Cuba.

The captured documents demonstrate that the Soviets gradually upgraded Soviet military aid to Grenada. Indeed, military aid actually preceded ideological recognition of the NJM. Even before the first formal arms agreement, signed in Havana on October 27, 1980, the Soviet Union and Cuba provided 1,000 automatic rifles, and Nicaragua provided 2,000 uniforms. The "top secret" 1980 agreement between the USSR and Grenada, for 1980–81, provided for deliveries of "special and other equipment"—"free of charge of delivery," as with two subsequent agreements—valued at 4.4 million rubles.[39] (Interestingly enough, this agreement was concluded before the US presidential election, suggesting that the choice of leaders in Washington was not the critical issue for either the Soviets or the Grenadians.) Cuba was to act as the intermediary in the Soviet arms transfers; though two Soviet coast guard boats were sent directly to Grenada in 1983, weapons and ammunition were sent almost exclusively through Cuba. The Soviets delivered their ware by sea to Cuban ports, whence it was transported on Cuban ships to Grenada. Once at their final destination, the arms were carried in the darkness of night to hidden depots throughout the island.[40]

The "special equipment" listed in the first agreement included 12 mortars, 24 anti-tank grenade launchers, 54 machine guns, 1,000 submachine guns, 18 anti-aircraft mounts, and other weapons, communication devices, ammunition, logistical equipment, and spare parts. Article 3 of the agreement called for the training in the USSR of Grenadian servicemen to ensure their mastery of this new equipment. There was also a stipulation that Grenada not sell or transfer the arms to third parties without Soviet consent. The agreement further obliged Grenada to preserve the secrecy of the terms and implementation of the accord.

A second major Soviet military aid agreement was signed in Havana on February 9, 1981, for arms shipments to take place between 1981 and 1983. The Soviets again used the euphemism of "special and other equipment,"[41] whose value went up this time to 5 million rubles. The agreement provided for the delivery of eight armored personnel carriers, two armored reconnaissance and patrol vehicles, 1,000 submachine guns, and a variety of other armaments and munitions; engineering, communications, and transport equipment; and other materials. Included were

[36]Cooperation and Exchange Plan between the Communist Party of Cuba and the New Jewel Movement of Grenada for 1983, ibid., Log No. 100016.

[37]Report on the General Congress of the World Center for the Resistance of Imperialism, Zionism, Racism and Reaction, ibid., Log No. 103025.

[38]Memorandum of conversation between Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces Marshal Nikolay V. Ogarkov and Chief of Staff of the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces of Grenada Major Einstein Louison, Mar. 10, 1983, ibid., Log No. 100008. Louison was in the Soviet Union for training at the time.

[39]Agreement between the Government of Grenada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on deliveries from the USSR to Grenada of special and other equipment, Havana, Oct. 27, 1980, ibid., Log No. 000190.

[40]Authors' interview with an official of the East Caribbean Security Forces.

[41]Protocol to the Oct. 27, 1980, Grenada-USSR agreement on arms deliveries, Havana, Feb. 9, 1981, Grenada Documents, Log No. 000193.

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12,600 complete sets of uniforms, apparently designed for an army of 6,300 men. Also included were spare parts and training and auxiliary equipment in the amount of nearly 1 million rubles.

A third "top secret" arms agreement, valued at 10 million rubles,[42] was concluded between the USSR and Grenada in Moscow on July 27, 1982, for the period 1982–85. Included were an additional 50 armored personnel carriers, 60 mortars, 60 anti-tank and other heavy guns, 50 portable rocket launchers, 50 light anti-tank grenade launchers, 2,000 submachine guns, and small arms, communications and engineering workshops, and other equipment.

The 1982 agreement also included, for the first time, "civilian" equipment for Grenada's expanding Ministry of the Interior. The ministry and the People's Militia were to receive 20 light anti-tank rocket launchers and 50 submachine guns, plus "special instruments" such as infrared viewers, videotape recorders, tape recorders, cameras, "PTU–47" television systems, and other equipment designed for clandestine intelligence gathering. The Grenadians also requested mini-microphones and accessories for bugging purposes.

Another interesting feature of the 1982 agreement was that it provided not only for the training of Grenadian servicemen at Soviet military schools but also, in Article 3, for their training in Grenada by Soviet military and security "specialists and interpreters." The government of Grenada was to provide Soviet personnel with "comfortable living accommodations," "all municipal utilities, medical services, and transport facilities for the execution of their duties," and "meals at reasonable prices at the places of their residence," all without "any taxes and duties." No such privileges were spelled out for the Grenadian military personnel in the USSR.

Future plans for greater Soviet military involvement in Grenada are suggested by Article 4 of the new agreement. According to this section the USSR would periodically send a group of Soviet advisers to Grenada to plan technical assistance for an equipment and vehicle repair shop, a command-staff school, and storage facilities and roads. An additional agreement was reached in November 1982 to send a team of Soviet specialists to Grenada for 15 days to assist with these tasks. According to Marshal Ogarkov, the Soviet Union was going to send a team of military experts to Grenada in 1983 to "conduct studies related to the construction of military projects." Ogarkov also indicated that although Grenada's additional request for military aid beyond the 1982 agreement was officially handled by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense "would exercise some

[42]Agreement between the Government of Grenada and the Government of the USSR on deliveries from the USSR to Grenada of special and other equipment, Moscow, July 27, 1982, ibid., Log No. 000191.

Soviet-type amphibious armored personnel carriers captured on Grenada in October 1983.

—US Army photo.

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control on the solution."[43] US forces found yet another secret agreement, still unsigned and dated 1983, for the delivery of "special and other equipment" valued at 5.4 million rubles over the period 1983–86. Included were two patrol gunboats, spare parts, tools and accessories, 3,000 more uniforms, and 12,000 rounds of ammunition.[44]

In accordance with the agreements, Grenadian officers were sent for military training in the USSR. In late 1982 there were 15 Grenadians studying at Soviet military schools, and an additional 20 were expected to arrive in 1983. Some officials of the Ministry of the Interior were also trained in the USSR in intelligence and counterintelligence. The decision to train the latter resulted from a discussion between Grenada's defense minister, General Hudson Austin, and Vladimir Klimentov, very likely the Soviet KGB chief in Jamaica—and a follow-up request to then KGB chairman Yuriy Andropov. Two other influential senior officers trained in the Soviet Union, Lt. Col. Liam James and Lt. Col. Ewart Layne, would later be key players, along with Austin, in the anti-Bishop conspiracy—about which more later.[45]

Like the USSR, Cuba granted training scholarships to Grenadian military personnel (12 for 1982). In accordance with a secret written agreement, Cuba maintained 27 permanent military advisers in Grenada supervised by a Cuban working inside the Grenadian Ministry of Defense (with access to communications facilities), plus a dozen or so additional advisers sent for short terms of two to four months. Unlike the Soviets, the Cubans did not insist on special living arrangements; they specified only "fresh foodstuffs," "necessary transport means," "means of personal hygiene," and "a small stipend for each advisor."[46] By 1982 the Cuban presence in Grenada consisted of a small contingent of military advisers, a number of overt and covert agents and civilian workers, and several hundred construction workers (many of them armed) building the runway at Point Salines.

There is no evidence that the controversial airport there was planned primarily as a military base; it was designed mainly for tourism. But the nearby double-fenced facilities occupied by the Cubans, called "Little Havana" by some, was operated like a military camp. The complex, containing oil and water storage tanks, barracks stocked with guns and ammunition, and a hospital, had direct access to the airport. Plans for a second "Little Havana" were in the making. Grenadians were not allowed inside the complex, contributing to resentment among the Grenadian workers.[47] It appears that the airport itself was to have some military purpose after its official opening, scheduled for March 13, 1984. This is suggested, among other things, by an entry in the diary of Liam James. As early as March 1980 he recorded that the "airport will be used for Cuban and Soviet military." Initially it probably would have served as a facility for Soviet reconnaissance aircraft and as a refueling stop for Soviet and Cuban transports bound for Angola.[48]

The captured documents show that Moscow was eager to have the Grenadians begin work on another project in 1983—a Soviet-sponsored satellite station. Like the airport, the station was mainly designed for civilian use, but it could also have served military purposes. However, the Grenadians wanted to postpone the project until fiscal 1984 because of concern that it might interfere with completion of the airport.[49]

There was a division of labor in communist security assistance to Grenada, following the pattern established earlier in Africa. The Cubans provided the manpower; the East Germans, technical and military or internal security equipment and highly qualified technicians; and the Czechoslovaks, explosives, ammunition, and automatic rifles. The East Germans also upgraded Grenada's telephone system. After Bishop's trip to Pyongyang in April 1983, North Korea agreed to supply arms worth US$12 million (including thousands of rifles and 50 rocket launchers), two coast guard boats, and uniforms. There was also a military agreement with Bulgaria, and even Vietnam concluded an agreement with Grenada to train 20 military officers. (Those Grenadian students had to delay their departure until September 1982, since Vietnam was unwilling to provide transportation and the Grenadian

[43] Memorandum of conversation between the Soviet and the Grenadian chiefs of staff, loc. cit.

[44] Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of Grenada on deliveries from the Soviet Union to Grenada of special and other equipment (unsigned, dated 1983), ibid., Log No. 103866.

[45] Austin, a Bishop supporter until shortly before the October 1983 coup, was the warden at Richmond Hill Prison under Gairy. After he was fired by Gairy he joined the NJM, and during the March 1979 coup personally commanded the successful raid on the army barracks. Austin subsequently became a member of the NJM Politburo and minister of defense. In the latter capacity he, like his nominal subordinates James and Layne, developed a close working relationship with various Soviet officials.

[46] Protocol of Military Collaboration between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada (no date), Grenada Documents, Log No. 000194. See also the analysis by Nestor D. Sanchez in *Caribbean Review*, Fall 1983, pp. 21-23, 59.

[47] Authors' interviews in St. George's, Grenada; and Minutes of the Political-Economic Bureau, Aug. 10, 1983, Grenada Documents, Log No. 100282.

[48] The entry from James's diary for Mar. 22, 1980, is in Grenada Documents, Log No. Y. It is instructive to recall that during the Soviet-Cuban airlift to Angola in 1975, Barbados served as a refueling stop for two weeks, until vociferous complaints in the Miami press resulted in a rerouting through Guyana.

[49] Handwritten notes from a meeting between Hudson Austin and the Cuban Minister of Construction, loc. cit.

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government was apparently so broke that it could not afford to send them earlier.)

The documents suggest that all this security aid to Grenada was designed, in addition to the potential access to Grenadian officers and facilities it provided the donors, for a more immediate military purpose: to build by 1985 a sizable Grenadian armed force of four regular and 14 reservist battalions.[50] Since arms transfers were scheduled through 1986, US forces recovered fewer arms than indicated in the agreements. The weapons recovered in Grenada, however, were already sufficient to equip about 10,000 men.

Economics. Economic objectives play a minor role in Soviet strategy in the Caribbean Basin. Soviet-Grenadian economic cooperation progressed between 1979 and 1983, but not as much as did military-security relations. Economic aid to Grenada was clearly not proportionate to the aid given Cuba, and was aimed primarily at reinforcing Soviet political objectives.

Still, Grenadian officials consulted frequently with Soviet Gosplan (State Planning Committee) officials and CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) experts on various aspects of economic cooperation. Gosplan offered a training course to several NJM officials, led by a permanent secretary of the Grenadian Ministry of Construction, Michael Prime. The NJM, for its part, actively sought long-term markets in CMEA countries. The Soviet Union, East Germany, and Bulgaria agreed to purchase, at stable prices and steady intervals, such vital Grenadian export commodities as cocoa, nutmeg, and bananas.[51] The Sovi-

[50]Request for Military Assistance to the People's Revolutionary Forces of Grenada from the Armed Forces of the USSR, July 2, 1982 (unsigned), Grenada Documents, Log No. 102174.

[51]For data on Soviet economic aid for 1983–85, see Summary of Prime Minister's meeting with Soviet Ambassador, May 24, 1983, ibid., Log No. 103913. Also see Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement between Grenada and the USSR, May 1980, ibid., Log No. 103866.

On GDR aid to Grenada, see Nazim Burke's *aide memoire* on the visit to Grenada of the GDR delegation (Aug. 13–20, 1983), ibid., Log No. F. Also see memo of W. Richard Jacobs, July 11, 1983, loc. cit.

Processing of nutmeg, one of Grenada's principal export commodities.

—Abass/SYGMA.

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ets also granted Grenada several million dollars worth of foodstuffs and construction materials, and supplied dozens of vehicles and machines on deferred payment terms. In addition, they offered miscellaneous other credits and donations, and upgraded Radio Grenada from a one-kilowatt to a 75-kilowatt station capable of broadcasting to foreign audiences. A Soviet An-26 transport aircraft was to be outfitted in 1983 for the special use of the Grenadian leadership, with spare parts stored in Cuba under the supervision of Soviet specialists in that country. The East Germans delivered dozens of trucks and other vehicles to Grenada, mainly for use by various government ministries. Though most assistance from the North Koreans was military, they also agreed to provide assistance with agricultural equipment and fishing boats, and to construct a national sports stadium for 15,000 people. North Korean advisers were supposed to begin work in Grenada by the end of 1983.

Not all of the equipment received from communist sources was of great value, because of poor quality, mismanagement, or both. For example, of the ten fishing boats donated by Cuba, Bishop reported that only two were working and that even those could "collapse any time"; as a result, the National Fishing Company "lost about sixty percent of its revenue."[52] There is also no evidence that the Soviets provided funding for the controversial Point Salines airport complex. Most of the grants and loans for this and several other public works projects came from Libya, Cuba, Canada, Iraq, Syria, the OPEC fund, and the European Economic Community. Colonel Qadhafi was personally addressed by Bishop in a September 1983 letter as "the last remaining hope for providing the necessary financing to complete the international airport" in time for its scheduled opening in March 1984.[53] Likewise, there was no indication that Moscow would fully finance water supply or seaport development projects recommended by Soviet technicians. Nor, apparently, did the Soviets commit themselves to supply 20,000 tons of free fertilizer, as the Grenadians requested.[54] Thus the USSR was unable or unwilling to provide much help in transforming Grenada into a socialist paradise in the Caribbean.

In fact, meetings of Grenada's committee of economic ministers were spent, among other things, haggling about the scarcity of money and the need for short-term loans from OPEC banks.[55] The gravity of Grenada's financial situation was suggested by the government's aforementioned inability even to pay for foreign travel by mid-level NJM officials. Facing overall liquidity problems, Bishop seriously proposed in the summer of 1983 that Grenada copy the example of Cuba and Suriname "in keeping two sets of records in the banks." Subsequently the Grenadian Politburo decided to invite Cuban and Nicaraguan experts to train Grenadians "in the readustment of the books."[56]

Altogether, the Soviet Union and its allies had accumulated a substantial political and security if not an economic investment in Grenada by mid-1983. When it then appeared that this investment might be jeopardized by leadership rivalries and policy shifts on the island, the Soviets—though apparently not the Cubans—began to maneuver to protect their position in the developing Grenadian internal power struggle. The violent outcome seemed briefly to work in Moscow's favor, until it was forcibly reversed by the joint intervention of the United States and Grenada's more immediate neighbors. An understanding of this dramatic sequence of events requires a closer look first at the internal dynamics of the island's bitter factional contest, and then at Soviet and Cuban policies during the approaching revolutionary dénouement.

Internal Power Struggle

It was against the backdrop of political uncertainty and serious economic problems that high-level internal tensions surfaced in Grenada in September 1983. There seems to have been no single issue that precipitated the factional conflict. Rather, the documents suggest that it was the generally shared feeling in the NJM Politburo that the revolution was failing, coupled with the personal ambition of Bernard Coard, that triggered the power struggle.

The NJM leadership had begun to worry about a looming crisis in the summer of 1983. The reports of the Central Committee plenary sessions of July 13–19, 1983, expressed concern about "the slow pace of party development along Leninist lines."[57] The minutes of another, extraordinary CC meeting held a month later suggest that a number of Politburo members had concluded that the revolution in Grenada

[52] Minutes of Politburo Meeting on September 15, 1982, Grenada Documents, Log No. GG.

[53] *Letter from Maurice Bishop, Sept. 26, 1983, ibid., Log No. R.*

[54] Summary of Prime Minister's meeting with Soviet Ambassador, May 24, 1983, loc. cit.

[55] Minutes of Meeting of Committee of Economic Ministers held on May 9, 1983, Grenada Documents, Log No. 100719.

[56] Minutes of the Political-Economic Bureau, Aug. 3, 1983, ibid., Log No. 100283.

[57] Central Committee Report on First Plenary Session, July 13–19, 1983, ibid., Log No. 100243.

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was facing a "dangerous crisis." Among those who commented was Austin, who claimed that the masses were in a "state of demoralization," and Selwyn Strachan, Minister of National Mobilization in charge of propaganda, who believed that "sections of the party had begun to rebel against the higher organs" and that this "silent rebellion" could turn into "open rebellion" unless drastic measures were taken. Liam James added that this was "the *beginning of the disintegration of the party*" (emphasis in original). Complaints from Cuban and East German party officials along these lines were specifically mentioned.[58] Even Bishop agreed that the party faced the "threat of disintegration."[59]

The systemic crisis in Grenada was accompanied by a factional struggle between Bishop and Coard. Both men possessed loyal followings. On one level, the Bishop-Coard conflict was one of personalities: the spontaneous and charismatic Bishop versus the calculating and ascetic Coard. Coard, in obvious reference to Bishop, would speak about Politburo members coming to the CC meetings "hands and minds swinging." But while Coard was apparently able to impress NJM and "fraternal country" bureaucrats (as well as some visiting American scholars), Bishop retained his immense appeal to broad segments of the Grenadian masses, in spite of the mounting crisis.

On another level, the NJM power struggle was ideological and political. Coard and his supporters were impatient with the pace of socialist transformation. Apparently, Bishop, Unison Whiteman, and George Louison, with long-term objectives similar to Coard's, favored a more gradual approach. (One might recall that Bishop and Whiteman were the founders of the NJM, which in the early 1970's was socialist but not Leninist.) The Bishop-Coard relationship worsened after October 1982, when Coard resigned from the Politburo and the CC.[60] He was, however, able to arrange the ouster of Bishop Politburo allies Vincent Noel and Kenrick Radix. Coard also retained his important job as Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the economy and finances; one of his deputies supervised the payrolls of the PRAF and the Ministry of the Interior. Coard's manipulation of PRAF salaries, amounting to bribery, is said to have accounted at least in part for his success in coopting the officer corps against Bishop as the political struggle mounted in late 1983.[61]

Three officers played conspicuous roles in the political assault on Bishop at the NJM Central Committee meetings in September 1983: Lt. Col. Layne, a political supervisor of the armed forces; Lt.. Col. James,

Key Players in the Grenadian Power Struggle (September–October 1983)

THE ANTI-BISHOP COALITION

1. Bernard Coard, Politburo member (until October 1982) and Deputy Prime Minister.
2. Lt. Col. Liam James, Politburo member and party supervisor of the armed forces.
3. Lt. Col. Ewart Layne, Politburo member and Minister of the Interior.
4. Leon Cornwall, ambassador to Cuba and later chief of the armed forces' Main Political Administration.
5. Phyllis Coard, wife of Bernard Coard and head of the National Women's Organization.
6. Selwyn Strachan, Politburo member in charge of ideology and agitprop.
7. Chalkie Ventour, Politburo member.
8. Gen. Hudson Austin, Politburo member, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Communication and Public Works (joined anti-Bishop group in the fall of 1983).

THE PRO-BISHOP MINORITY

1. Maurice Bishop, Politburo member, Central Committee chairman, and Prime Minister.
2. Unison Whiteman, Politburo member and Minister of External Affairs.
3. George Louison, Politburo member and Minister of Agriculture.
4. Fitzroy Bain, leader of union of agricultural workers.

[58]Minutes of Emergency Meeting of NJM Central Committee, Aug. 26, 1983, ibid., Log No. 100319.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Apparently, Coard resigned because he felt that was his only real choice at the time. The alternatives would have been either to tolerate the "slackness," which was unacceptable, or to introduce "Leninist measures," which would have precipitated "personality clashes" with Bishop. See Minutes of the Meeting of the Central Committee, Oct. 15, 1982, ibid., Log No. 01. After the resignation, Bishop reportedly believed that Coard was contemplating suicide; Bishop's stated reason for requesting that the chief of counterintelligence follow Coard was to ensure Coard's own safety. See the second installment of a letter by Vincent Noel to the members of the Central Committee of the NJM, *The Grenadian Voice*, Feb. 4, 1984.

[61]Authors' interviews in Bridgetown, Barbados, and St. George's, Grenada, February 1984.

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

Grenadian Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, a former NJM Politburo member who figured prominently in the coup that overthrew Maurice Bishop.

—Owen Franken/SYGMA.

Minister of the Interior in charge of police and intelligence operations; and Major Leon Cornwall, a former chairman of the National Youth Organization who belonged to Coard's secret "educational" cell. Cornwall, significantly, had just returned from his ambassadorial post in Cuba, where he was treated rather shabbily;[62] the Cubans apparently preferred to deal directly with Bishop and other more senior NJM leaders. Cornwall's return from Cuba and subsequent secret appointment as chief of the Main Political Department of the armed forces were integral parts of the anti-Bishop plot. The mastermind behind the operation, however, was Coard himself. Coard's Jamaican-born wife Phyllis, who was said to be as brilliant and as doctrinaire as her husband, was another major conspirator.

The minutes of the Central Committee's fateful sessions of September 14–16 show that the anti-Bishop coalition—actually a majority of the Politburo—accused him of vacillating between "petit bourgeois–opportunist" and Leninist policies. All agreed that there was a deep crisis in the party, though they disagreed sharply about how to resolve it. However, the Coard faction rapidly turned the session into an anti-Bishop cabal that showed every sign of having been orchestrated in advance.

The attack on Bishop began with James's proposal to alter the agenda. As the agenda was shifted to the "state of the party and revolution," Layne led a carefully prepared attack on Bishop that was strongly supported by Politburo members Cornwall, James, Strachan, and Chalkie Ventour. The basic charges aimed against Bishop were (1) "right opportunism," allowing the party's deterioration into a "social democratic" party, and failing to fashion it into a "Marxist-Leninist vanguard"; and (2) inability to "tighten" Grenadian relations "with the World Socialist Movement, especially Cuba, the USSR, and the GDR." Layne, who perhaps knew something Bishop did not, argued that Grenada's relations with these countries were "becoming more and more complex."[63] Cornwall was a bit more specific. According to him, the NJM had to explain its internal problems to "fraternal parties" because "they already know the problems that we experience now"; if NJM members kept silent, their counterparts abroad would "see us as jokers."[64] In fact, as Cornwall revealed, the fraternal parties were already "accusing [the NJM leadership] of instability." "Sister Phyllis" phrased the problem in Leninist jargon: "The international support of the working class is lessening."[65] She also criticized the leadership's "idealism" and "voluntarism."

The solution proposed by Cornwall was that the Grenadian party should be built by "drawing [on] the experience of other countries"; among other things, Grenadians should "start working on a party constitution" and "develop commissions for different areas of work." In particular, he stressed the recommendations of a commission entrusted with studying the experience of the Soviet Union and Cuba. Strachan sup-

[62]From the documents it appears that on at least one occasion Cornwall's residence telephone and the telephones, telex, and electricity at the Grenadian embassy in Havana were disconnected after Cornwall failed to pay his phone bill. Minutes of the Political Bureau, June 22, 1983, Grenada Documents, Log No. 100291.

[63]Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee of the NJM, Sept. 14–16, 1983, ibid., Log No. 000123, pp. 3–4.

[64]Ibid., p. 28.

[65]Ibid., pp. 9 and 16.

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ported James and Layne by arguing the need to transform the NJM along Leninist lines and pinpointing "ideological development as key to the development of the party." James added that the Central Committee and the whole party must study the work of "Brutens" (presumably Karen N. Brutents, a leading Soviet International Department ideologist on and liaison official with the Third World).[66] This proposal was strongly seconded by Phyllis Coard.

The turning point came when James proposed remedying NJM difficulties by creating a collective leadership. The prime minister's functions would be divided, with Bishop continuing his work among the masses and in foreign affairs, and Coard taking responsibility for party work (including chairmanship of the Organizational Commission of the Central Committee). This was an old trick that James may have learned from his Soviet contacts or from the study of Soviet and East European politics, where division of responsibilities often precedes demotion. The plan was thus for an incremental erosion of Bishop's power.

The other members of the conspiracy quickly assented to James's proposal, supporting their position with analogies from communist countries. Strachan claimed that the unitary leadership of Fidel Castro (with whom Bishop was often compared) was unique because the Cuban leader was "always reflecting and thinking,"[67] the obvious implication being that Bishop was lacking in these qualities. James extolled the collective leadership of the Nicaraguan junta; Cornwall used the same example. Layne also supported the proposal, referring to the East German example of two parties (presumably the Communists and the Social Democrats) joining, under Soviet tutelage, in the SED in 1946. (A poor model, indeed, but nobody protested.) Later on, Layne invoked yet another example supporting the switch to a "scientifically decided form of leadership": the division of labor between political commissars and military officers in the USSR. According to Layne, this system worked, and indeed helped to defeat "counterrevolution." James pointedly warned that failure to implement the plan for dividing responsibility between Coard and Bishop would be tantamount to "right opportunism."[68] Given their ready recourse to Leninist terminology and historical data, it is possible that both Layne and James had reviewed the Soviet and East European experience with Coard, if not with their Soviet bloc contacts, before the meeting. Indeed, during the meeting Bishop noted, perhaps sarcastically, that he was struck "by the levels of thought and preparation of comrades as evident in their various contributions."[69]

By this point a few Politburo members had heard enough. Minister of Agriculture George Louison defended Bishop, observing that the Central Committee was "still capable of leading." Accused by the anti-Bishop conspirators of "disturbing" the proceedings for "opportunistic reasons," Louison characterized the argument about his own "right opportunism" with a scatological expletive.[70] He failed to see how joint leadership could benefit the NJM. Louison then argued correctly that in other communist states in which one person heads the government and another directs the party, the former is normally subordinate to the latter—the clear implication being that the proposal for collective leadership was a ruse designed to subordinate Bishop to Coard. Another Politburo member, Minister of External Affairs Unison Whiteman, also disagreed with the joint leadership model and suggested a compromise whereby Coard would become Bishop's deputy.

Bishop, in response to his critics, cited the example of the CPSU but drew a different lesson, reminding his colleagues that they must be careful in applying ideological labels too quickly. He warned about disunity, and asked his colleagues for more time to reflect on the operational aspects of the proposed joint leadership (and perhaps also to devise some countermeasures). When it came time to vote, Bishop abstained along with Whiteman and union leader Fitzroy Bain; Louison voted against the proposal; and the remaining members voted in favor. (Austin arrived late and did not vote.) Bishop was in the minority, much as Nikita Khrushchev had been during the Soviet leadership crisis of June 1957. The question was now whether, like the Soviet leader, Bishop could outmaneuver his opponents at the Central Committee level and transform a hostile Politburo majority into what Khrushchev had called a mere "arithmetical majority."

The next few weeks provided the answer, and it was not in Bishop's favor. Unfortunately for Bishop, the Central Committee in Grenada seems to have had only seven additional members, besides the eight who were also on the Politburo; most were now opposed to their former leader. Bishop's actual removal from power was probably prepared in early October, when he and his closest Politburo supporters Louison and Whiteman were in Hungary and Czechoslovakia negotiating economic aid. (Leaving the country while the

[66] Ibid., pp. 20–21, 25.
[67] Ibid., p. 18.
[68] Ibid., pp. 27-30, 33.
[69] Ibid., pp. 10–11 and 33.
[70] Ibid., p. 33; authors' interview with George Louison, Feb. 26, 1984.

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power struggle was unresolved was a crucial tactical error on Bishop's part.) While there, Bishop was able to negotiate a deal for three electrical generators and a hydroelectric power station from Czechoslovakia, and for some agricultural aid from Hungary. He was apparently unable, however, to regain the confidence of the Soviets. During and just after his trip, when he was said to be under the strong influence of Louison (who was "poisoning his mind," according to Coard's faction), Bishop became convinced that the proposal for joint leadership was actually a plot. His authority at home had visibly declined; this was obvious on October 8, when only one Politburo member was on hand to greet him at the airport. A record of conversations after Bishop's arrival indicates that he and his supporters had begun to worry about the "mood in the party for blood"—what some Coard supporters, like Politburo member Chalkie Ventour, were referring to as an "Afghan solution" or "Afghan line,"[71] should Bishop reject joint leadership. The reference, of course, was to the bloody December 1979 coup in Afghanistan in which President Hafizullah Amin was killed; it was all the more ironic since Bishop's regime was one of the few that had voted in 1980 against UN condemnation of the original, Soviet-sponsored "Afghan solution."

Bishop lost the second round in the fray when he unsuccessfully argued his case at a Central Committee meeting on October 12, during which some members kept brandishing their weapons. Bishop's opponents accused him of showing contempt for the Leninist principle of democratic centralism in his unwillingness to submit to joint leadership. Layne quoted a long passage from an ideological pamphlet to demonstrate that Lenin would have disapproved of Bishop's behavior. The Central Committee adopted a formal resolution in favor of restructuring the party leadership, which would have effectively sealed Coard's control over the party machinery. On the same day, the PRAF branch of the NJM, controlled by James, Layne, and Cornwall, adopted an anti-Bishop resolution. Unlike Khrushchev, who was able to reverse the Politburo decision at the Central Committee level with the help of the military and security elite, Bishop had lost his power base among these two vital groups, now allied with Coard. The attempts by Bishop supporters to mobilize elements of the People's Militia and to rally support for him in the PRAF failed. That night, according to witnesses, the emotionally strained Bishop was unable to sleep, as tension mounted between both factions on the island.[72]

On October 15, 1984, a new CC meeting was held and James led yet another attack on Bishop, citing his continued defiance. Bishop was expelled from the party, disarmed, and confined to his house without telephone service. Bishop supporters George Louison and Kenrick Radix were confined at Richmond Hill Prison. This was followed on October 17 by Strachan's public denunciation of Bishop and announcement that Coard would succeed him as prime minister. However, this measure was postponed because of the manifest displeasure of the large crowds listening to Strachan's announcement.

Thus, while the majority of the Central Committee had turned against Bishop, the masses had not. On October 19, "Bloody Wednesday," a mob of at least 10,000 people (about one-tenth of all Grenadians) led by Bishop's loyal friend and Politburo member Unison Whiteman, liberated Bishop and several of his supporters. Some in the crowd took the exhausted Bishop (who had refused to eat for fear of being poisoned) to Fort Rupert, while others waited for him to make an appearance at Market Square. At the fort, the crowd would have had access to radio equipment, telephones, and arms, so the Coard coalition faced the prospect of an armed popular uprising in support of Bishop. Indeed, if the socialist transformation of 1979–1983 had been a revolution from above, this appeared to be a real revolution from below: the leader and the masses versus the Coard clique and the officer corps; the populist versus the totalitarian Leninist regime; the people versus the party.

At this point, in the opinion of the winning anti-Bishop coalition, the crisis called for "casting all emotions aside," in other words, violence if need be. Coard and his followers apparently meant to follow the example of fraternal parties in dealing with "counterrevolutionaries." Even Austin, who had joined the Coard conspiracy only in late September, now saw the conflict as a continuation of the "constant struggle" of Leninist forces against "right opportunists" in 1903–24 in Russia, 1921 in Mongolia, 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and 1980–81 in Poland.[73] Coard—whom Louison described as always "ready to go for the jugular"—and his supporters ordered the PRAF to attack Fort Rupert, which it pro-

[71] References to the "Afghan line" are in Noel's letter to the Central Committee as published in *The Grenadian Voice*, Feb. 4, 1984; and in a report about the Oct. 12, 1983, meeting of the Politburo and Central Committee, Grenada Documents, Log No. 000149. This was confirmed by authors' interviews.

[72] Noel's letter to the Central Committee, loc. cit.; authors' interview with Louison in Grenada, Feb. 26, 1984.

[73] See report on the Oct. 12, 1983, meeting of the Politburo and Central Committee, loc. cit.; also see report on the meeting of Sept. 26, 1983 (portions illegible).

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ceeded to do with three of its Soviet-supplied armored personnel carriers. Bishop and his followers could have tried to defend their position; but by this point Bishop, physically weakened and emotionally strained, had no heart for an all-out civil war.

In the unresisted attack—Bishop reportedly told his people not to fire—many demonstrators were killed. Bishop and some of his supporters, including Whiteman, Bain, and Bishop's companion Jacqueline Creft (Minister of Education, Youth and Social Affairs) were allegedly lined up against a mural depicting Che Guevara and shot.[74] Louison, who was in prison at the time, was told that the orders to kill them were given by Coard's supporters in the Central Committee. As Bishop and his comrades were shot, a white flare was fired from Fort Rupert as a signal to Coard, who was in his residence on another promontory on the opposite side of the city. Meanwhile Layne was heard to chant, "Central Committee's order given; the Central Committee's order is obeyed."[75]

In the new leadership a prominent role was played by PRAF conspirators Cornwall, James, Layne, and erstwhile "Bishop-worshipper" Austin. Coard, the mastermind of the anti-Bishop conspiracy, kept out of sight and allowed Austin, who was extremely popular in the armed forces, to appear as the main actor. Coard apparently figured that this would get the masses to follow. He probably also anticipated some support from the Soviet Union, for there are indications that Moscow was not unhappy about the latest turn of events.

An "Afghan Line"?

There is still no clear evidence about the extent of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the NJM power struggle of September–October 1983. We have at our disposal crucial NJM documents, but obviously lack the archives of the CPSU and the PCC. Nevertheless, what evidence we do have suggests that Soviet officials knew about the Bishop-Coard rivalry and, unlike the Cubans, very likely sought to aid the anti-Bishop conspirators in their efforts to demote him. At any rate, they made no move to help the embattled Bishop. The Soviets were undoubtedly suspicious of Bishop's independence, suggested by his belated attempts (apparently not coordinated with Moscow) at

General Hudson Austin, member of the Politburo of the New Jewel Movement and Grenada's Minister of Defense and of Communication and Public Works, seen in civilian clothes with a member of the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces.

—SYGMA.

rapprochement with the United States, and of his poor Leninist credentials, suggested by his unwillingness to abide by the NJM Central Committee decision to impose collective leadership. Surely the Soviets would have felt more at ease with the ideologically more compatible *apparatchik,* Bernard Coard.

As past masters of factional politics and close observers of the Grenadian scene, the Soviets must have been well aware of the intensifying power struggle on the island. Moreover, the Soviets generally prefer to deal with various cliques in a collective leadership, rather than with charismatic or headstrong individual communist leaders like Josef Tito, Enver Hoxha, Mao Zedong, Hafizullah Amin, and perhaps at times even Fidel Castro. Often Soviet control is maintained by playing competing groups against each other or, if necessary, even by keeping them at each other's

[74] Authors' interviews in St. George's, Grenada, February 1984. Anthony Maingot's interview sources, however, suggest that Bishop and his comrades were shot in a jeep on the way to the hospital. Private communication to the authors.

[75] See interview with George Louison by Bernard Diederich, *Caribbean Review,* Fall 1983, pp. 17–18.

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throats. Although analogies with Grenada (like all analogies) are necessarily imperfect, rival leadership factions have frequently been manipulated to Soviet advantage, particularly during crisis situations (such as occurred in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979, and Poland in 1980–81).

In the Grenadian case, circumstantial evidence suggests that the Soviets had established a "back channel" to Coard's faction quite early on. Coard's own personal relationship with Moscow is suggested by the fact that it was he who led the first two high-level NJM visits to the USSR, in 1979 and 1980; he also attended the 26th CPSU Congress in 1981 and the funeral of Leonid Brezhnev in 1982. Furthermore, when the Soviet leadership agreed to receive five members of the NJM leadership for a vacation in the USSR, those who were nominated and who apparently went to the USSR in the summer of 1983 were Coard, his wife, and their three children.[76] Phyllis Coard is said to have been friendly with the wives of Soviet advisers in Grenada. In addition, of the three military officers most actively involved in the struggle against Bishop, Layne and James had both studied in the Soviet Union, and Cornwall reportedly maintained extensive contacts with his counterparts there. Austin, too, had close ties with Soviet military and security officials, and had led a high-level Grenadian delegation to Moscow in November 1981. The Soviets most probably shared this faction's hostile attitude toward "right opportunistic" trends in the NJM.

It is quite likely, as noted, that the Soviets had become disenchanted with Bishop for another, related reason. The turning point in Bishop's relations with Moscow appeared to be June 1983, when he visited the United States with a delegation that included a few members of the Grenadian private sector. Afterward, Bishop admitted that he had tried to convince some US officials of the "need to normalize diplomatic and state-to-state relations,"[77] and vowed that he would continue to strive toward that goal. The captured NJM briefing notes and memorandum concerning Bishop's meeting with US National Security Affairs Adviser William Clark and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam likewise refer to a Grenadian proposal to establish diplomatic relations. Bishop subsequently remarked that he and senior American officials had agreed that the content of their meeting should "remain secret" and that therefore he was not "at liberty to disclose the details";[78] apparently there was a second, off-the-record meeting between Bishop and US officials.[79]

At least one Soviet foreign ministry official, Chief of the First Latin American Countries Department Vladimir Kazimirov, indicated displeasure that the Soviets were not properly informed by Grenadian diplomats about the Bishop visit. When Kazimirov asked about the nature of Bishop's meeting with Clark, he was told by the Grenadian ambassador that "thus far the results are confidential." Kazimirov implied that it would have been courteous to inform the Soviets about the intention of the visit.[80] The Soviets were probably similarly disturbed by Bishop's effort to conduct a dialogue with neighboring capitalist Caribbean states. Given the traditional Soviet paranoia about the loyalty and orthodoxy of socialist allies, the Soviet leadership had sufficient reason to lose confidence in Bishop.

Soviet reservations about Bishop were clearly apparent during his last foreign tour, a month before the coup. Reports about the unexpected cancellation of a visit to Moscow were later denied by Louison, who noted that Bishop did stop briefly in Moscow for a change of planes and unofficial consultations with Soviet officials at Vnukovo Airport.[81] But by then the Soviets must have known about the mounting power struggle in Grenada. Had they really wanted to help Bishop, they would have scheduled an official visit or extended him some other dramatic form of political or economic support. Whether or not Soviet officials were actively involved in the anti-Bishop coup a few weeks later must, as noted, remain a matter of speculation.

When the coup took place, the Soviets, unlike the Cubans, did not eulogize Bishop and his supporters. Later the official Soviet account in the leading party theoretical journal *Kommunist* talked vaguely about a "tragic turn of events" caused by "the differences within the party." Not only did the Soviets fail to admonish Coard; they still have not admitted that Bishop's death was the result of a conspiracy, attributing it

[76] See a reference to the Coard family's vacation in the Soviet Union, in Summary of Prime Minister's meeting with Soviet ambassador, May 24, 1983, Grenada Documents, Log No. 103913.

[77] Report on a press conference of Maurice Bishop in Prague, *Rude pravo* (Prague), Oct. 6, 1983.

[78] CANA (Bridgetown), June 9, 1983, transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-LAM*), June 10, 1983, p. S/5.

[79] Handwritten notes which appear to be memoranda of the meeting between Bishop, US National Security Affairs Adviser William Clark, and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam, Grenada Documents, Log No. A; and briefing notes of another meeting with Clark, ibid., Log No. 105300.

[80] Memo of W. Richard Jacobs, July 11, 1983, loc. cit. So far the available evidence suggests that while Bishop did not consult Moscow about his visit to Washington, he was advised on how to deal with the press and various US organizations by Gail Reed, wife of Cuban Ambassador Julian Torres Rizo. See her undated letter, Grenada Documents, Log No. DD.

[81] Authors' interview with George Louison in Grenada, Feb. 26, 1984.

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rather to "an armed clash in one of the districts of St. George's."[82] More recently the Soviet newspaper *Izvestiya* published a letter from Cornwall (dated November 18, 1983), ostensibly smuggled out of the jail in St. George's where he remained a prisoner as of April 1984. The letter refers to Coard and other members of the anti-Bishop faction as "Grenadian patriots" awaiting execution.[83] Such unusual publicity, apart from its propaganda value, may indicate where Moscow's support was and still resides.

It appears that Castro, by contrast, tried to boost Bishop's prestige and morale just before his return to Grenada from his foreign tour in September 1983. After receiving a cold shoulder in Moscow, Bishop was reportedly warmly received in Havana, where he made an unscheduled stop on his way home. Bishop was said to have spent two extra days in Cuba, during which Castro gave a reception for him attended by no fewer than eight Cuban Politburo members.[84] This angered the Coard faction, which charged that Bishop had taken internal NJM business to Cuba in an attempt to use his friendship with Castro to retain power. The Cuban leader, for his part, seems to have viewed Grenada's internal conflict mainly as an unfortunate clash of personalities. Indeed, Castro probably favored Bishop partly for personal reasons, since the two were friends and shared a certain charismatic approach to leadership. Still, it would be wrong to exaggerate Soviet-Cuban tactical differences over the handling of the October 1983 crisis in Grenada. There is no record of a sustained Cuban attempt to intervene on behalf of Bishop's political standing during the final phase of the coup.

What Castro did do, once the anti-Bishop coup took place, was try to save the fallen leader's life, asking for "generosity" in a letter to the NJM Central Committee on October 15. Castro described Bishop as the "central figure" of the Grenadian revolution and "the object of great sympathies and respect," and warned that "even explaining the events to our people will not be easy."[85] The Cuban leader also reportedly put through a last-minute telephone call to Austin in a futile effort to prevent Bishop's execution. On October 19, Castro promptly lamented the deaths of Bishop and his group, whom he described as "dignified and honest" leaders. As one of Coard's supporters put it, the Cubans took "a personal and not a class approach," and thereby helped create "an atmosphere for speedy imperialist intervention."[86]

In fact, Castro's mistrust of the new leaders may have been one reason for the largely symbolic nature of Cuba's military assistance to Grenada following Bishop's death. But another, more compelling reason was Cuban and Soviet awareness of the diversion toward Grenada of a US naval task force originally destined for Lebanon, which was reported by the US media.[87] This interpretation is supported by Castro's own public hint that he had advised Austin and Layne about the diversion in a message to Cuban personnel in Grenada, noting that the Cuban presence on the island was "too small to be taken as a factor of military importance in the face of a large-scale invasion." In Grenada, as opposed to Angola or Ethiopia, the idea of sending reinforcements was "unthinkable" because "the US squadrons and aircraft carriers were moving" and Cuba had "no means of transportation to send reinforcements." The Soviet Union was unwilling to repeat an airlift of Cuban troops of the sort it had helped to stage in Africa; and anyway, as Castro explained, "no matter how many reinforcements we send, they could not compare to the naval and air forces deployed by the United States."[88]

Castro did send Col. Pedro Tortolo Comas and some 150 to 200 seasoned Cuban soldiers (possibly disguised as construction workers) to command the symbolic resistance of the Cubans stationed in Grenada. The last-minute transfer could account for the American failure to estimate correctly the number of Cubans on the island; the original estimate was 250–300, but by the time of the invasion there were over 700 Cubans in Grenada. Some may have arrived on the ship *Vietnam Heróico,* which remained outside St. George's harbor during the critical week to serve as a communications link, as it had in Angola. While the Cubans were thus prepared for a possible intervention, they did not anticipate its timing.[89] This may explain why the airstrip at Point Salines was not blocked; it may be that the Cubans were expecting reinforcements. But the Soviets were in no position—for reasons of logistics as well as of prudence in the face

[82] D. Murav'yëv, "Grenada—Victim of U.S. Imperialist Aggression," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 16, November 1983, pp. 109–11.

[83] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Jan. 12, 1984.

[84] Reported by Strachan to Noel; see third installment of Noel's letter to the Central Committee, *The Grenadian Voice*, Feb. 11, 1984. Louison, in his interview with the authors, and Castro, in a letter to the NJM leadership on Oct. 15, 1983, (Grenada Documents, Log T) denied that Bishop had discussed Grenada's internal situation, but the evidence suggests otherwise.

[85] Letter dated Oct. 15, 1983, from Castro to the NJM Central Committee, Grenada Documents, loc. cit.

[86] See handwritten note on Cuba's response written by one of Coard's supporters, Oct. 21, 1983, Grenada Documents (no number given).

[87] See, for example, "US Marines, Ship on Way to Grenada," *Virginian Pilot* (Norfolk, VA), Oct. 22, 1983.

[88] See Castro's press conference about Grenada, Havana Television, Oct. 26, 1983, in *FBIS-LAM*, Oct. 26, 1983, pp. Q/1–14.

[89] Authors' interviews in Barbados and Grenada, February 1984.

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of direct American intervention—to back up a Cuban effort, or to uphold the post-coup regime themselves. Instead, the Soviet response was limited chiefly to a display of anti-American sentiment during the October Revolution anniversary parade in Moscow.[90]

Postscript

Unlike the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Soviet and Cuban involvement in Grenada did not present an immediate threat to US interests. Nor is there conclusive evidence that Grenada had become a depot for large concentrations of Soviet arms designed for future use in Latin America. Nevertheless, in the years ahead such threats could have become a reality, at which time it would have been much more difficult to effect a reversal. The Soviets made a significant though guarded commitment to Grenada, according it a special revolutionary status. They also sent a considerable number of weapons to strengthen the NJM against internal and external threats.

The resulting arsenal had already made the Grenadian armed forces a factor to be reckoned with in the West Indian environment. Grenada's army could have threatened the country's small neighbors; this, at least, was the overwhelming consensus of OECS members. Some of the countries in question have no armed forces at all, while others have armies of less than a few hundred. Even Jamaica has a smaller army than the one under construction in Grenada, though the former's population is 20 times as large. Furthermore, though Grenada did not have Soviet military bases at the time of the US-led invasion, one cannot exclude the possibility that it might have become a component of Soviet military planning and a bridge to revolutionary forces elsewhere in the region, as Cuba has in the last quarter-century.

But the NJM crisis of October 1983 derived initially from internal problems. Newly installed Leninist regimes, with their emphasis on military buildup, ideological mobilization, economic controls, democratic centralism, and "Bolshevik staunchness," tend to produce the kind of popular disenchantment and factional bloodshed witnessed recently on the island. The Leninist experiment introduced in Grenada was also a poor fit for local conditions. To some observers, in fact, the attempt to introduce a Leninist regime into the unlikely environment of the Caribbean appeared theatrical and absurd. They overlook the equally incongruous transplant of Leninist structures into such seemingly inhospitable environments as Catholic Poland, democratic Czechoslovakia, and, most important, Caribbean Cuba.

Of course, the East European regimes might not have survived, either, were it not for the continuous threat of Soviet military intervention to keep orthodoxy on track. In the case of Grenada, however, "proletarian internationalist" ties with the USSR and Cuba were unable to contain the internal crisis and subsequent power struggle. On the contrary; arms supplied by the USSR and other communist countries became a destabilizing factor, serving not to defend the revolution's original leaders but rather to destroy them.

The Grenadian episode thus demonstrates that Third World leaders dependent upon the USSR, much like leaders of communist countries at the Soviet periphery, cannot be assured of continuing Soviet support. Deviation or perceived offense can be the pretext for removal. Outside the immediate Soviet sphere, moreover, even a mortal challenge from "imperialism" does not automatically ensure Moscow's protection. What happened in Grenada thus has troubling implications for the Nicaraguan and even for the Cuban governments. Castro, in the final analysis, could count only on his own forces to defend revolutionaries elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin; he may now be wondering about Soviet backing for Nicaragua, or for Cuba itself in case of a direct conflict with the United States. Unlike its behavior at its own periphery or in remote regions of Africa, the Soviet Union is much less able or willing to support pro-Soviet regimes in the American "backyard"—particularly when Washington is willing to protect its interests there with military force.

[90]There were, however, unconfirmed reports that the Soviets did provide some token assistance to the Grenadian armed forces. For example, the third-ranking Soviet official on the island was said to have been apprehended as he was chauffered about in an air-conditioned Mercedes pinpointing the US positions at the airport during the early stage of the invasion; there were also reports of anti-aircraft fire from the Soviet embassy during those first hours.

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Structural Imbalance in the Soviet Economy

Boris Rumer

When Leonid Brezhnev took over management of the Soviet economy from Nikita Khrushchev in 1964, the national income was growing at an annual rate of over 9 percent. Eighteen years later, he left Yuriy Andropov a far less dynamic economy—one growing at around 3 percent a year. The same slowdown is evident in industrial production: in Khrushchev's last year the growth rate was 7.3 percent, but by 1982 this had declined to just 2.9 percent.[1] Data on labor productivity are no better: growth rates declined sharply in the industrial sector and even became negative in the agricultural sector. So too for investment: the rate of investment has dropped inexorably, with a falling-domino effect throughout the economy—declines in the vital construction industry, in metal production, and in transportation.

Official statistics are ambiguous on the question whether Andropov's brief tightening of the screws did much to reverse the downward trend.[2] In light of this ambiguity, it seems better to examine less aggregated indicators of Soviet economic performance and to do so over somewhat longer time spans than just the most recent year. In Table 1 (on page 25) I have provided average annual growth rates for production of certain industrial manufactures for the period 1981–83 (the first three years of the current 11th five-year plan) and for 1976–78 (the comparable period of the 10th five-year plan). These data demonstrate a consistent slowing trend in the growth rates for Soviet industry.

The slowdown of Soviet industrial development is not only quantitative, but qualitative. The decline in the rate of growth is more rapid for the electronics industry than for the Soviet economy as a whole.[3] Soviet industry is becoming increasingly stagnant technologically. The number of new equipment models introduced in 1983 was 6 percent less than in 1978.[4] Moreover, the transportation network cannot keep up with the needs of the economy: the average annual rate of growth of all freight shipments (excluding by air and by gas pipeline) fell from 4.6 percent in 1976–78 to 1.6 percent in 1981–83.[5]

In his first major speech as general secretary, at the November 22, 1982, Central Committee plenum, Andropov highlighted the mounting problems of the Soviet economy.[6] He singled out disequilibria in the development of primary and advanced industry, declining growth of labor productivity, wasteful use of resources, problems in feeding the population, and difficulties with transport. During his brief 15-month tenure as general secretary he tried to address these problems by a variety of partial measures such as a public crackdown on poor labor discipline and the firing of incompetent economic officials.

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[1] *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1964—hereafter, annual issues of this statistical source will be referred to simply as *Narkhoz*, with the relevant year indicated), Moscow, Statistika, 1965, pp. 129, 575; and *Narkhoz 1982*, pp. 111, 379.

[2] A 3.1 percent increase in national income was reported for 1983. See *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 29, 1984. Whether this reflects an acceleration or a deceleration of growth depends on what growth figure one uses for 1982, the 2.6 percent reported in *Pravda*, Jan. 23, 1983, or what I believe to be the more credible figure of 3.5 percent reported in *Narkhoz 1982*, p. 379.

[3] *Narkhoz 1978*, pp. 36, 121, 154–56; *Narkhoz 1982*, pp. 40, 152–53; and *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 6, 1984, p. 8.

[4] *Narkhoz 1978*, p. 94; *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 6, 1984, p. 7.

[5] *Narkhoz 1978*, p. 297; and *Planovoye khozyaystvo* (Moscow), No. 12, 1983, p. 3.

[6] *Pravda*, Nov. 23, 1982.

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In his last public speech (on August 15, 1983), Andropov warned a meeting of party veterans of the need for more profound "changes in planning, management, and the economic mechanism."[7] It looked as if the General Secretary might be contemplating a major reform—one that would threaten the vested interests of party and state apparatuses. The response from these groups was swift and unprecedented: two days later, Nikolay Baybakov, the 73-year-old veteran chairman of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), declared in a press conference that the Soviet economy was basically healthy and required no major organizational changes. He spoke of the need for increased centralization rather than expanded managerial prerogatives and explicitly said that managers would not be allowed to fire workers, a statement contradicting the spirit of the much-expected economic reform and Andropov's measures directed at improving work discipline.[8] This marked an unprecedented rebuttal of a party chief for expressing his intentions to introduce economic reform.

Whether Konstantin Chernenko or some subsequent party leader will have more inclination, time, or power to tackle the problem of reform remains an open question. If he does not, the prospect is for increasing economic difficulties. But even if some leader contrives some ingenious way of reconciling the requirements of economic change with the interests of the entrenched political structure, the Soviet Union's economic problems are so complex and interlinked as to defy easy solution. The failings outlined by Andropov in November 1982 reflect profound disproportions in the larger economic structure that have been developing for decades. Only well-planned, consistent attacks on these disproportions offer a hope for averting a mounting economic crisis.

Table 1: Average Annual Growth Rates for Selected Soviet Industrial Products, 1976–78 and 1981–83[a]

(in percent)

Product	1976–78	1981–83
Electrical energy	5.0	3.0
Oil (including gas condensate)	5.0	0.8
Steel	2.4	1.1
Synthetic resins & plastics	7.5	3.7
Automobiles	3.1	0.0
Tractors	4.6	1.6
Cement	1.4	0.8
Fabrics	1.4	0.2
Shoes	2.0	0.0

[a] Growth in real physical terms, not monetary value.

SOURCES: *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSR v 1978 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1978), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1979, pp. 142, 144, 146, 153, 161, 162, 170, and 174; *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSR v 1980 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1980), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1981, pp. 154, 156, 158, 163, 171, 178, 182; and *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 6, 1984, pp. 7, 8.

Nikolay Baybakov, Gosplan chairman, who contradicted late General Secretary Yuriy Andropov's views about the need for serious reforms in the Soviet economy.

—SOVFOTO.

Supply, Demand, and Market

A central structural flaw (incidentally, one *not* addressed by Andropov) in the Soviet economy is the chronic imbalance of money and material resources. In the years 1976–80, wages and salaries grew by 28 percent, while consumer production was growing only 21 percent and retail trade only 22 percent. Over the

[7] Ibid., Aug. 16, 1983.
[8] Ibid., Aug. 18, 1983

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same period, personal savings grew from 91 billion rubles to 156 billion rubles.[9] This critical and chronic imbalance has a severely debilitating effect on product quality (consumers must accept shoddy goods or none at all) and on labor morale and productivity.[10]

An even more bizarre consequence is the emergence alongside the centralized, planned economy of its very antithesis—a quasi-market economy. This shadow "second economy," which responds to unsatisfied demand and uses its own exchange equivalents and prices, is large and growing, accounting for a significant (if unrecorded) part of the Soviet gross national product.[11]

The second economy is very closely related to the corruption against which General Secretary Andropov railed. This phenomenon has infected not only the bureaucracy, but the whole population. Everyone from plumber to government minister derives illegal rewards through the theft of state goods and services. Those concerned about fighting corruption might well recall the aphorism of the mythical Koz'ma Prutkov: "Look to the root." Corruption is inherent in the persistent disproportion between consumer goods and disposable income.

Unofficial market relationships play a strangely contradictory role in the contemporary Soviet economy—on the one hand, eroding the very principles upon which the official economy is based; on the other, helping to keep that economy viable. The market economy functions at the lower levels to correct the clumsiness, exaggeration, and plain blunders by the economic leadership. To be sure, the Soviet economy is buoyed by abundant natural resources, a huge capital plant, considerable scientific and technological potential, a large and educated work force, and some access to Western credits and know-how. Nevertheless, the durability and flexibility of the Soviet system depend to a considerable extent on the continued operation of the very market forces that the Soviet leadership condemns ideologically. The Kremlin cannot dispense with the underground market so long as it refuses to address the imbalance between money and goods in the Soviet economy.

Sectoral Imbalances

Looking at the planned portion of the Soviet economy, one finds a hypertrophied development of extractive and primary industries. These account for more than half of the country's gross social product. They consume up to 40 percent of all fixed capital and labor resources and more than 27 percent of all capital investments.[12] As shares of the total volume of industrial output, the production of extractive and primary industries has tended to increase, while the output of the manufacturing industries has declined.[13]

This fundamental tendency reflects the Soviet economy's almost exclusive reliance on its own natural resources. In terms of reserves of many important mineral resources, and the volume of their extraction, the Soviet Union occupies the leading position in the world. Moreover, the growth rate for mineral extraction in the Soviet Union exceeds that for the rest of the world taken as a whole.

To sustain and accelerate this growth rate in the extractive sector (which not only satisfies the increasing demand of the Soviet economy, but also supports an expanding export trade in raw materials), it has been necessary to divert ever greater proportions of capital resources away from manufacturing. Crucial here is the fact that in the USSR the extraction of raw materials and fuel places a far higher demand on capital than does manufacturing. According to contemporary Soviet data, capital investment to increase production capacity by 1 million rubles costs 4 million rubles in the case of extractive industries, but just 0.7 million in the case of manufacturing industries. Extraction costs have been growing rapidly and are expected to continue to do so.[14]

The rising costs in the raw material and fuel sectors are linked with the declining quality of many forms of mineral resources currently being exploited. The steel industry offers a good example of this. In contrast to the steel production of other developed industrial nations, the Soviet steel industry uses its own iron-ore deposits and does not import iron ore. Although the Soviet Union has 50 percent of the world's known iron-ore reserves,[15] these are distinctly inferior in quality and hence can only be exploited at signifi-

[9] *EKO* (Novosibirsk), No. 2, 1982, pp. 76–78; and *Narkhoz 1980*, p. 408.

[10] These linkages were observed already in the 1960's by Soviet economist Ivan Malyshev. See the citation in *EKO*, No. 2, 1982, p. 76.

[11] For an assessment of this phenomenon, see Gregory Grossman, "The 'Second Economy' of the USSR," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September–October 1977, pp. 25–40.

[12] *EKO*, No. 3, 1976, p. 32.

[13] *Promyshlennost' SSSR* (Industry of the USSR), Moscow, Statistika, 1957, p. 13; *Narkhoz 1980*, p. 124; and *Narkhoz 1982*, p. 113.

[14] To obtain additional production of 1 ruble in raw materials (on average for all extractive industries), it was necessary in 1960 to expend 2 rubles; in 1970, 3 rubles; and in 1980, 4 rubles. The trend is likely to continue. For example, expenditures for geological prospecting have been increasing by 10 to 15 percent each year. See *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 12, 1982, p. 65.

In this context, it is worth remembering that despite the enormous volume of oil and gas production in Western Siberia and the Soviet Union's huge known reserves of coal, systematic geological surveying and exploration of Siberia is just beginning. See *EKO*, No. 12, 1980, p. 16.

[15] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 12, 1982, p. 60.

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A scene from the Soviet steel industry.

—Semyon Raskin/MAGNUM.

cantly greater (and steadily increasing) cost. The iron content of the ore has declined sharply—from 50 percent in 1950 to 35 percent in 1980—and the proportion of ore requiring enrichment has risen in the same period from 37 to 87 percent. This has led to a sharp rise in capital expenditures—from 61 rubles per ton in 1966–70 to a planned 102 rubles per ton in 1976–80 (in adjusted prices).[16]

The maintenance and development of the mining-extractive complex are becoming ever more difficult as deposits in settled regions are exhausted and it becomes necessary to exploit deposits in remote areas of the north and northeast, where the infrastructure is undeveloped and can be built only at great cost. To this one must add enormous transportation costs.

In addition to heavy reliance on domestic resources, a second cause of structural imbalance between primary and advanced industry is the low technological level of the utilization and processing of the products of these industries—an inefficiency leading to increased demand. For example, although the USSR produces more steel than the US (42 percent more in 1980), production in the Soviet machine-building industry lags by 30 to 40 percent.[17] If machinery and equipment of equal capacity are compared, it turns out that the Soviet unit consumes 25 percent more metal than its American counterpart.[18] Altogether, per unit of national income, the USSR expends 50 percent more metal than the US.[19]

Matters are no different in the case of fuel utilization. Here, much depends upon the delivery system for providing energy to final users. Electrical energy is by far the most efficient means, as well as the one most adapted to contemporary technology. It is striking that in relative terms the growth rate of consumption of electrical energy has declined: whereas in 1950–70 the annual growth rates for the use of electrical energy exceeded by 80 percent the growth rates for consumption of fuel-energy resources as a whole, in 1971–1975 that figure had declined to 35 percent, and in 1976–1980 declined still further—to 15 to 20 percent. By contrast, in industrially developed countries this figure has over an extended period of time

[16] From calculations cited by Academician Aleksandr Tselikov in *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 8, 1979, p. 56.

[17] *EKO*, No. 3, 1976, p. 32; and *Narkhoz 1980*, p. 68.

[18] *EKO*, No. 12, 1982, p. 54. One Soviet commentary suggested that adoption of pressure processes to replace older cutting processes would reduce steel consumption in the metalworking industry by 25 percent, not to mention savings in machine tools and labor. See *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 2, 1982, p. 22.

[19] *Eko*, No. 3, 1976, p. 30.

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remained at the level of 70 to 100 percent. The share of electrical energy in total end-use consumption of energy in the USSR did not exceed 11 to 14 percent in the mid-1970's.[20] To achieve optimal use of mineral fuel resources it is essential that electrical energy be given an increasing role as an energy delivery system.

The predominance of extractive and primary industries is steadily increasing, and this has given a primitive cast to Soviet industrial production. The result, indeed, has been a vicious circle: the more that resources are diverted to maintaining and accelerating the production of raw materials and fuels, the less resources there are available for allocation to the development and production of the advanced industries; the more that advanced industries fall behind modern standards, the greater is the requirement of raw materials and fuels per unit of production and the higher is the demand for extraction of fuels and raw materials.

[20]See *Sibir' v yedinom narodnokhozyaystvennom komplekse* (Siberia in the Unified National Economic Complex), Novosibirsk, Nauka, 1980, p. 134; and A. Makarov and A. Vigdorchik, *Toplivno-energeticheskiy kompleks* (The Fuel-Energy Complex), Moscow, Nauka, 1979, p. 17.

[21]*Narkhoz 1980*, p. 338.

[22]See Boris Rumer, "Soviet Investment Policy: Unresolved Problems," *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1982, pp. 53–68.

Machinery and Labor Productivity

Expansion in extractive and primary industries at the expense of advanced industries has had an especially pernicious influence upon the growth of labor productivity. This influence is exercised through the inadequate development of machine-building. For example, in the allocation of investments for 1976–80, the growth rate for the oil industry was 4.6 percent, compared to just 0.4 percent for machine-building.[21] As I have described elsewhere,[22] this underinvestment has led to a slowdown in bringing on line new production capacity in the machine-building sector; a downturn in introducing new technologies; and an unprecedented decline in manufacturing of producer goods and machinery for the energy, metallurgical, chemical, petroleum, metalworking, and agricultural sectors.

The Soviet economy makes considerable use of manual labor, as shown in this scene from a road construction project near Minsk in 1979.

—Photoresearchers.

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The result has been an abysmally low level of mechanization of even the simplest tasks. Almost half of the workers in industry, more than half of the workers in construction, and more than 70 percent of the workers in agriculture and other branches of the economy are reportedly occupied with unmechanized physical labor.[23] According to one account, Soviet industry produces only 70 percent of the lifting equipment needed in the transportation system and only 30 to 35 percent of the loading/unloading equipment needed by storage and warehouse facilities.[24] Worse still, production of such equipment—in almost all forms—declined in the late 1970's.[25]

Against this backdrop, Andropov's labor discipline campaign seemed rather simplistic. This campaign only addressed such problems as alcoholism and absenteeism, which have been holding down labor productivity. It did not begin to address the gap between demand and supply of consumer goods, which diminishes the incentive role of money and wages and breeds indifference to work. Nor did it eliminate other problems such as the enormous production disruptions caused by inadequate supplies of raw materials and fuels.[26]

Even if discipline were the only issue in the slowing growth of labor productivity, disciplinary actions are particularly difficult to apply because of the apparent manpower deficit. What manager will apply the ultimate sanction of firing for alcoholism or absenteeism when he has no guarantee of being able to replace the fired worker? However, this Soviet labor deficit deserves closer scrutiny. The most common cause cited is demographic—a decline in the working-age population of the USSR in the 1980's. But in the broad economic perspective, the excessive use of unmechanized labor is a major factor. That, in turn, leads to undervaluing of skilled labor. In 1940, the salary of engineering and technical personnel in industry was more than twice that of common workers; by 1980, the differential had declined to a mere 14 percent. Moreover, fully one-third of youths who had completed a specialized secondary education end up doing unskilled work.[27] Enormous possibilities for raising labor productivity through education and training are thus squandered. Again, we see the crying need to raise the level of technology and mechanization—a need that is not being met because of the diversion of investment resources to primary and extractive industries.

Agricultural Production

In thinking of the Soviet emphasis on primary and extractive industries, one should not overlook agriculture. No end of Soviet leaders—from Stalin, to Malenkov, to Khrushchev, to Brezhnev—have vowed to put an end to the shortage of foodstuffs in the country, but the agricultural conundrum remains unsolved. Brezhnev devoted special attention to the effort. Beginning at the March 1965 Central Committee plenum, a stream of approximately 250 different resolutions (by this author's count) flowed forth from the Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers during Brezhnev's 18 years at the helm. Hardly any facet of rural life and agricultural production was left untouched by this inundation of decrees—any, that is, except the basic kolkhoz-sovkhoz system of farm management.

A key thrust to Brezhnev's agricultural policy was a sharp increase in capital investment in agriculture. Indeed, capital investment in the agro-industrial complex increased threefold between 1965 and 1980, with its share in total investment rising from 28 to 38 percent.[28]

Yet, the food problem continues to be grave. From numerous press reports there emerges a story of excessive exploitation of sown areas, neglect of fallow land, perennial shortages of fertilizers—in a word, an exhaustion of once-fertile soil. The cost of agricultural production has continued to grow—by more than 50 percent over the period 1965–80 (in constant prices). As a consequence, by 1980, one-half of all kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the USSR were losing money and were supported by subsidies from the state budget.[29]

The disparity between costs and proceeds on the Soviet farms is primarily to be explained by the price policies of the regime, which have frozen retail prices for most food products for more than two decades.[30] Government subsidies, in terms of procurement prices, have risen inexorably with the rising production costs. For example, according to USSR Minister

[23] *EKO*, No. 5, 1981, p. 13.
[24] Ibid., No. 1, 1981, p. 123.
[25] *Narkhoz 1980*, pp. 123, 170.
[26] According to one authoritative Soviet economist, in many enterprises fully one-third of labor time is lost because of such interruptions. See V. Belkin, "Balancing of Commodities and Money," *EKO*, No. 2, 1982, p. 76.
[27] *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 9, 1982, p. 61.
[28] *Finansy SSSR* (Moscow), No. 7, 1982, p. 4.
[29] Ibid., p. 6.
[30] It should be noted that the low prices have been maintained only for basic food products such as bread, meat, milk, and vegetables. In the case of nonessentials—e.g., coffee, delicacies, and liquor—the government has raised prices quite sharply. See, e.g., Fyodor Kushnirsky, "Inflation Soviet Style," *Problems of Communism*, January–February 1984, p. 49.

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of Finance Vasiliy Garbuzov, the state subsidies for purchasing and processing 1 kilogram of meat were increased from 2.2 times the retail price in 1980 to 2.8 times the retail price in 1983; for butter, the comparable movement was from 1.8 to 2.3 times the retail price.[31]

The economically irrational failure of the Soviet leadership to raise retail prices for staple foods has, of course, its political rationale. The Kremlin doubtless remembers the violent disorders that erupted in Novocherkassk after Khrushchev raised prices in 1962. Those disorders came after Khrushchev had sharply increased housing construction and done much to improve the consumer sector of the economy. Today, construction of housing has slowed, investment in social programs has reached postwar lows, and inflation has raised prices of other consumer products and services.[32] Moreover, the example of Polish public reaction to price increases must weigh on the Soviet leadership.

Still, the USSR is not Poland, and the Soviet populace has a much higher boiling point. Hence, it was perhaps not so surprising that Andropov showed some signs of contemplating an increase in retail prices on foodstuffs. He may have been testing the waters in a speech at a Moscow plant in early 1983, when he stated: "It is, of course, possible to adopt a policy of higher prices. But that step, as a general policy, is not really suitable for us. However, one must say that we do have certain distortions, discrepancies, and we must eliminate these."[33]

But price increases alone would not suffice to solve Soviet agricultural problems. The regime must either divert still more resources to agricultural investment (and there are limits to how much can be drawn from other sectors, e.g., defense) or make more efficient use of the resources currently being allocated. The present leadership clings to the inefficient system of kolkhoz-sovkhoz production and centralized planning and administration, while dabbling with old Khrushchevian palliatives.[34]

[31] *Finansy SSSR*, No. 7, 1982, p. 10.

[32] Rumer, "Soviet Investment Policy . . .," p. 55.

[33] *Pravda*, Feb. 1, 1983.

[34] The much-vaunted "food program" boils down to a Khrushchevian emphasis on developing of agro-industrial regions, with virtually nothing in the nature of decentralization of agricultural planning and management. See "The Food Program of the USSR for the Period up to 1990," *Pravda*, May 27, 1982.



Track-laying on the Baikal-Amur Mainline near Chita in April 1983. This project, one of the major undertakings of the current (1981-85) Soviet five-year plan, is designed to link the developed Soviet west with the important resources of the Soviet east.

—SOVFOTO.

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Transport and Regional Development

A further key imbalance in Soviet economic development has been the failure of the transportation system to keep pace with general economic growth. In the 1960's, for each 1 percent increase in the gross social product, the total length of the Soviet land transportation arteries increased by only 0.81 percent, and for 1971–75 the latter figure declined to 0.78 percent. Measured in terms of shipments, the difference is still greater: for each 1 percent increase in shipments (by railway, truck, or pipeline), the length of arteries increased by 0.85 percent in 1961–70, but by only 0.66 percent in 1971–75.[35]

The situation is especially serious in railway transportation as Andropov explicitly noted in his November 1982 speech. Shortly thereafter he sacked Railways Minister Ivan Pavlovskiy.[36] The railway system bears 56 percent of total freight (70 percent of all land freight),[37] but its capacity has lagged further and further behind its assigned burden in terms of both track and rolling stock. Ominously, in the second half of the 1970's there was even a decline in the production of locomotives and railway cars, presaging still worse times ahead.[38]

The overloading of the railway system, in turn, leads to excessive utilization of both lines and rolling stock and inadequate maintenance and repair. This, in turn, leads to a deterioration of railway service—reflected, for example, in a substantial decline in average daily distance traveled per train and in average train speed.[39] Other consequences are frequent breakdowns and interruptions in freight deliveries.

The widening breach between the existing Soviet transport network and the volume of shipping it is required to handle is in the final analysis due to the peculiar pattern of regional development in Soviet industry and, to some degree, to the geographical characteristics of the country. Of particular importance is the increasing spatial polarization between the extractive industries (in the eastern parts of the country) and manufacturing (in the west).

In formulating a development strategy for new regions, Soviet planners face a hard choice. One option is to shape the new area as a narrowly-oriented segment of a larger national economy, closely dependent on it. The second option is to design the new area to be relatively autonomous—that is, to give it a distinct functional completeness and sufficient degree of internal stability even while preserving its specialized role in the larger economic system. To date, the first alternative has always prevailed. In part, this reflects a conscious attempt to integrate the various regions of the empire in order to block aspirations of national republics for economic autarky. But that motive hardly suffices to explain Soviet policy toward economic development in eastern regions of the USSR, which are populated primarily by ethnic Russians, with only insignificant clusters of national minorities. Indeed, one would expect military-strategic considerations to impel Soviet strategists to create self-sufficient economic regions—a notion, in fact, that found some expression in earlier talk about "territorial production complexes."



Pipes are preheated before soldering during January 1983 construction on the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline in Urengoy.

Fabian/SYGMA.

[35] *Kommunist*, No. 17, 1979, p. 53.
[36] *Pravda*, Nov. 30, 1982.
[37] *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 9, 1982, p. 38.
[38] *Narkhoz 1980*, pp. 293–94, 170.
[39] Ibid., p. 297.

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But every argument based on political expediency invariably fades if it is a question of supplying some urgently needed raw material, rare metal, or fuel—be it Kolyma gold during World War II or Tyumen' oil and gas today. The Soviets pursue a narrow, profoundly exploitative policy, viewing the economy as little more than an immense pipe that siphons off resources from unsettled territories, often in blatant disregard for ecological concerns. But at the same time, this means that material support for this specialized economic activity must be supplied by other regions of the country. And, as new regions develop in the east and grow increasingly populous, their infrastructure lags behind and their demand for goods from other regions, usually those in the western portions of the USSR, becomes more extensive and diverse.

The key point here is that this regional interdependence is increasing precisely at a time when transportation is becoming a critical bottleneck in the national economy. And it is in the vital area of transcontinental freight shipments between Siberia and the western regions of the USSR that the railway system's condition is particularly serious. Suffice it to say that the rail network in Siberia amounts to only 10 percent of total rail lines in the USSR, while Siberia accounts for 17 percent of all freight shipments in the country.[40]

[40] *Sibir' v yedinom* . . ., p. 213.

Conclusion

This essay has pointed to some of the basic structural problems afflicting the Soviet economy. Only fundamental changes in the basic economic structure can lead to a resolution of the country's economic difficulties and reverse the course that is bringing economic slowdown. Such changes will require corresponding reallocation of resources—above all, of capital. Soviet leaders will have to make conscious decisions to discriminate against certain sectors of the economy in order to benefit others. Such shifts are not compatible with current practices with respect to the planning, organization, and management of the economy, or with the priority accorded to the accelerated development of the military machine. They also would inevitably require increased credits from the West and increased imports of Western technology, and hence political compromise. Finally, they would require extraordinary political unity among the top leaders, or a single leader in absolute control of the situation—neither of which currently exists.

The successor generation of Soviet leadership probably recognizes the futility of current economic policies, but they cannot yet penetrate the barrier formed by the old guard. In the meantime, the current leaders mark time and pronounce incantations over the abyss.

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The Limits of Soviet Economic Reform

Fyodor I. Kushnirsky

Soviet history is replete with attempts to improve economic performance. These efforts fall into three general categories: changes in planning techniques, organizational restructuring, and substitution of economic levers for command principles in management.[1] During different periods, emphasis has been placed on one or another of these categories, depending upon the perceptions of different leaders and the forces supporting them. In recent years, as the reservoir of relatively cheap factor inputs was exhausted, change in management principles emerged as the most popular remedy. This reflected a growing realization in the USSR that without help from an "invisible hand," i.e., some kind of a market mechanism, the all-too-visible hand of centralized economic planning and control will not work.

In the post-Stalin era, Nikita Khrushchev initiated the reform process by creating regional "councils of the national economy" *(sovnarkhozy)*. The goal was to bring management of industrial production closer to local centers of consumption and supply. However, this limited decentralization occurred only *within* the bureaucratic system and entailed no significant changes for production enterprises. These reforms were rescinded in 1964, with Khrushchev losing out to technocrats and partocrats, whose interests lay in brokering decision-making between the center and enterprises rather than in allowing the devolution of the center's power.

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Although the 1965 economic reform of Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksey Kosygin reestablished the principle of centralized planning and management, it did reduce the number of mandatory planned targets and devolved some decision-making powers to production enterprises. The reform was declared a great success at the outset, but positive evaluations gradually petered out. Eventually most of its decentralizing provisions were nullified, with the July 1979 resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers on planning and management administering the coup de grace.[2]

Yuriy Andropov, too, started his tenure with announcement of new reforms, and at the June 1983 Central Committee plenum, criticized his predecessors for trying to manage the Soviet economy by "irrational trial-and-error" methods. He announced his intent to impose economic "order" in the country on the basis of discipline, hard work, and sanctions against those who did not support common goals.[3] In July 1983, a joint resolution of the party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers outlined an experiment to be conducted by five ministries in the years 1984–85, aimed at achieving "additional measures to expand the rights of industrial production associations and enterprises in planning and economic activity and to increase their responsibility for the results of their work."[4]

[1] These are important distinctions. For example, the introduction of computers into the Soviet economy—highly publicized in both East and West—falls into the first category, i.e., addresses the area of planning and control, not the fundamental weaknesses of the command economy. I have discussed this whole subject at greater length in *Soviet Economic Planning, 1965–1980*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982.

[2] "Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers of July 12, 1979, on Improving Planning and the Economic Mechanism," *Planovoye khozyaystvo* (Moscow), No. 9, 1979.

[3] *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 25, June 1983.

[4] Ibid., No. 31, July 1983.

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Since succeeding Andropov in February 1984, Konstantin Chernenko has tabled his own proposals for handling economic problems. At the February 1984 Central Committee plenum he spoke of a "serious restructuring" *(perestroyka)* of the Soviet economy, while stressing that it should be carried out "responsibly."[5] Despite this somewhat equivocal formulation, he has apparently approved continuation of the experiment outlined in July 1983.

What may we expect from the latest Soviet economic experiments? Will they increase productivity and efficiency? Most important, can the principles of the Soviet command economy be combined with limited self-determination on the part of production firms? The short answer is No. To address these complex questions, it is instructive to review the fate of past such attempts at reform.

Analyzing Past Failures

The objectives of the current Soviet experiments are nothing new: to raise incentives and, as a result, productivity. Why did the earlier attempts fail? Might the new experiment find more successful instruments? Or, as many believe, is it the economic system, and not the selection of instruments, that is at fault?

Many have pointed out weaknesses of the Soviet system, but these weaknesses are often viewed stereotypically, especially in the West. One stereotype is the idea that different economic systems should be approached in the same way as different cultures, i.e., that any economy possesses both positive and negative attributes. In this view, arguments that the Soviet model is inefficient can be countered by arguments that other economies are not ideal either, and that if evidence exists that the Soviet economy performs extremely poorly, then something must be wrong with the specific methods of planning or management, i.e., with the implementation of the model rather than with the model per se.

Another stereotype stems from the idea of possible convergence of economic systems. From this perspective, decentralization of the Soviet economy is viewed as movement in the right direction, i.e., toward market socialism. Conversely, centralization hurts the Soviet economy. But if centralization is irrational, why do the Soviets strengthen it? The standard answer is that bureaucrats and partocrats seek to secure their positions and decision-making powers at the expense of enterprise-level initiative.

These and similar stereotypes have been employed to explain the failures of Soviet economic experiments, in particular the most publicized of them—the 1965 reform. That reform was viewed positively because one of its intentions was to reduce the number of centrally-planned targets and to give enterprise managers more freedom in planning. In attempting to explain its failure, observers have argued that the reform was sabotaged by conservative forces, that the Soviets were not consistent in carrying it out. In this vein, one group of observers stated: "... in the course of time, the reforms have been turned into mere administrative levers inserted by the bureaucracy into the planning process. None of the weaknesses which the reforms were to remedy has in fact been overcome, and enterprise autonomy has been increasingly restricted."[6] Such explanations ignore the very real possibility that the reform itself might have been ill-designed and that the decision by the authorities to turn away from the reform provisions was a necessity. Only scrupulous and detailed analysis can determine which way causality flowed. I have examined this issue elsewhere in considerable detail,[7] but the following brief comments may help to sketch out which problems the reform intended to solve and which problems it brought about.

There are six targets of prime importance in Soviet economic plans—production, technological change, investment, labor, finance, and material supply. The 1965 reform reduced the number of planned indicators for three of these—namely, production, labor, and finance. The following indicators were declared mandatory for industrial enterprises: in the case of production—sales revenue, physical output targets for key products, and quality indicators; in the case of labor—the total wage bill; in the case of finance—profit, profitability, and payments to and allocations from the budget. Within these constraints, enterprises were free to plan their own detailed product mix, labor productivity, employment, average wages, and costs. Let us look at developments in each of the three major areas on which the reform focused.

Production indicators. In the first honeymoon years of the 1965 reform, industrial enterprises were able to shape production so as to attain significant increases in sales revenues and profits, and there was an attendant surge in managerial bonuses. Managers took advantage of less stringent requirements for product assortment by choosing to produce goods that

[5] Ibid., No. 8, February 1984.

[6] *Prospects for Soviet Economic Growth in the 1970s: Main Findings of NATO Symposium*, Brussels, 1971, p. 20.

[7] Kushnirsky, op. cit.

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consumed larger quantities of inputs or were otherwise more expensive to produce—all costs that could be passed on to purchasers through the pricing mechanism.

Although one might argue that it was in the interests of enterprises to raise sales revenues, and that any selection of product mix that led to this end was justified, such an increase was not really the goal of the reform. Since prices are not set by market forces in the Soviet Union and do not reflect consumer preferences, the new product assortments that the reform induced, in part unintentionally, did not benefit society. Instead, the result tended to be what planners called "growth without growth," i.e., growth in money terms rather than in the actual volume of products manufactured.

More serious, there were thousands of broken delivery contracts and numerous complaints of inadequate supply. As a consequence, in 1974 a new approach to the evaluation of production performance was approved by the Council of Ministers, linking bonuses to fulfillment of delivery contracts.[8] However, this departure from the spirit of the 1965 reform was difficult to implement since it was often suppliers, not managers, who were at fault. For this reason, ministries were authorized to discriminate among different cases and to determine punishments depending on the severity of the violation.

Faced with persistent difficulties in balancing output in physical and in money terms, Gosplan in 1980 added new production specificity in its methodological instructions for drafting economic plans. Up to 85 percent of all industrial products now have to be listed explicitly in national economic plans—a proportion two to three times as great as in the late 1960's.[9] The attention paid by the 1979 resolution on planning and by Gosplan in the 1980's to problems of meeting production plans in terms of assortment, and not just in monetary terms, indicates a continuing need for substantial improvements in this area.[10]

[8]For the details of the new approach tying incentives to delivery contracts, see D. Ukrainskiy, "Sales Revenue and the Responsibility of Enterprises for Delivery Contracts," *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 5, 1974.

[9]*Metodicheskiye ukazaniya k razrabotke gosudarstvennykh planov ekonomicheskogo i sotsial'nogo razvitiya SSSR* (Methodological Instructions for Drafting State Plans for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1980. On the steady increase in the proportion of products for which output was planned in physical terms, see D. Ukrainskiy, "Planning of Output in Physical Terms," *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 10, 1980.

[10]The 1979 resolution, loc. cit. In 1982, Gosplan organized a conference of its leading experts on improving the planning of assortment targets. Contrary to custom, the substance of this Gosplan discussion was published in *Planovoye khozyaystvo* (No. 7, 1982, pp. 76–87). The new priorities are reflected even in the titles of articles—e.g., L. Busyatskaya, "Output in Physical Terms Is the Most Important Plan Indicator," ibid., No. 4, 1983. Such a title was unheard of 10 years ago.



A woman shopper examines the selection offered at a Soviet shoe store.

—Martine Franck/MAGNUM.

Labor and wages. Regarding labor aspects of the 1965 reform, the decision to drop average wages and employment from the list of mandatory targets was a mistake from the outset, given the political leadership's wish to control and regulate the distribution of income throughout society. With only the constraint on total wage bills remaining, enterprises could raise average wages by cutting employment. This created inequities because different industries possessed varying opportunities to do so. Military industries and heavy industries were at a particular advantage in this respect because of their more generous wage funds and lax controls on employment levels.

The growth of average wages also quickly widened the already great gap between wages and the supply of consumer goods in the Soviet Union. Attempts to accelerate the output of consumer goods produced poor-quality goods that sat on the shelves at trade organizations, and ultimately had to be discounted or written off. This only added to the discrepancy between national income distributed and national product utilized in the economy.

To counter the increased shortages and inflationary pressures, planning authorities soon tightened their control over average wages.[11] The combination of mandatory limits on total wage bills and on average wages meant stricter control over employment as well. But since wages were still allowed to fluctuate within

[11]For details on the problem of controlling wages in the 1970's, see Kushnirsky, op. cit.

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stipulated limits, the new controls were not equivalent to direct regulation of employment.

Fluctuations in employment also affected labor productivity—measured as the ratio of output to employment. Nominally, productivity grew rapidly in the first years of the 1965 reform due to the corrections in product mix discussed above. But as controls over production assortment and average wages stiffened, it became more difficult for enterprises both to surpass plans of output in value terms and to raise productivity. In 1973, a labor productivity indicator was made a mandatory part of enterprise plans.[12] The 1979 resolution on planning and management promoted this to one of the chief indicators—along with the fulfillment of delivery contracts and improvement in product quality—used to evaluate the performance of enterprise managers.[13]

Direct planning of productivity growth was also necessary for another reason. According to planning theory, output per employee should grow faster than the average wage. It is easy to predict such a trend on paper, but real-life relationships are more complicated. The enterprise can raise labor productivity by increasing output and by reducing employment. Such a reduction does not necessarily have to be in absolute figures—for example, it can occur when growth in employment lags behind growth in output. Many factors, some of which are external to the enterprise, restrain productivity growth via increases in output. On the other hand, absolute or relative drops in employment may lead not only to increased productivity, but also to increased average wages. Indeed, the latter often increase more rapidly than the former, because enterprise managers are under strong employee pressure to raise wages to the allowable ceiling. Taking into account all the above circumstances, planners returned to mandatory regulation of wages, productivity, and employment.

Finances. The third major area of reform in 1965 was in enterprise finances. Cost has been a controversial indicator of national economic plans. For a long time, Gosplan employed a standard scheme for computing cost reductions based on a variety of factors—technological innovation; improvements in management, productivity, and working conditions; growth of output; shifts in product mix; and change in factors specific to the production process. Although the 1965 reform excluded cost reduction from the list of mandatory targets, enterprises still had to submit substantiated proposals for cost reduction. But since incentive funds were not tied to those reductions, the level of costs began to rise.

As noted above, contrary to the intentions of the 1965 reform, enterprises frequently benefited from higher costs. For example, when sales revenue is a chief success indicator affecting incentive funds, the enterprise can raise the indicator by buying more expensive inputs. This results—other things being equal—in a larger value of intermediate product, and, as a consequence, larger sales revenue and bonuses. Similarly, if the enterprise switches from total sales revenue to net value of output as its performance indicator, it will select products with a high cost of processing, thus increasing net value added. Furthermore, when profit is chosen as a success indicator, the answer is still not clear-cut. It is true for a single product that the lower the cost, the higher the profit. But an enterprise deals with a mix of products. It may prefer a product with a lower rate of profit but a higher ratio of profit to the cost of processing. If material inputs are more expensive in the latter case, it does not matter from the enterprise's perspective.

These considerations show that the Soviet enterprise may benefit from higher production costs or, at least, be indifferent regarding the level of costs. This is aggravated by the policy on pricing of new products: the standard formula sets the price of a product proportionate to its cost, thus encouraging the enterprise to raise costs.[14]

Since various incentive measures have failed to reverse the trend of rising costs, new incentives were introduced in the 11th Five-Year Plan (for 1981–85) to encourage conservation of metals and energy.[15] But, instead of relying solely upon incentives to do the work, planners have moved to cut down on the supply

[12]See A. Bachurin, "Improvement of Plan Indicators and Criteria," *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 3, 1976.

[13]See text of resolution, loc. cit.

[14]Such an approach to pricing may seem irrational, but this is the only approach that Soviet planners find verifiable and workable. On this, see Fyodor I. Kushnirsky, *Price Inflation in Soviet Machine Building and Metalworking*, Delphic Associates, Falls Church, VA, 1983.

[15]All recent Soviet publications on the use of material inputs refer to a resolution of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers of June 30, 1981, on new provisions for saving raw materials, fuels, energy, and other material inputs (see, e.g., V. Palyutin, "Conditions for the Effective Use of Material Inputs," *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 10, 1983). The year before, the Central Committee had adopted a resolution specifically calling for savings of metal in machine-building and construction (see A. Tselikov, "Ways of Saving Metals in Machine-Building," ibid., No. 1, 1981). In accordance with these resolutions, the Council of Ministers has introduced special incentives for saving inputs in industry in 1983–85. The most important of these makes the level of material expenditures per ruble of output a new indicator for formation of bonus funds (along with labor productivity, product quality, and fulfillment of delivery targets, as provided by the 1979 resolution). Starting in 1983, enterprise incentive funds will increase or decrease depending upon the relationship between the actual level of material expenditures and an upper limit set in the plan (see Palyutin, loc. cit.).

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of these inputs to industrial enterprises in direct proportion to planned targets for saving.[16]

Lessons of the reform. This review of measures relating to the planning of production, labor, and costs was designed not to demonstrate that the reform measures were either right or wrong, but to show that in instances when Soviet planners have stipulated a revised set of leading economic indicators, and tied incentive funds to them, other indicators have moved in undesirable directions. Specifically, delivery contracts were not met, labor productivity declined, and costs grew. Planners found that, once again, only direct regulation could bring an improvement for any individual economic indicator. This sequence, rather than some wish by planners to turn the clock back (which should not, of course, be totally excluded), was, in my view, the chief cause of the retreat from the 1965 reform. This was not, however, the interpretation that surfaced in the post-Brezhnev USSR.

A "Confidential" Critique

Whenever there is a changing of the guard in the Kremlin leadership, Soviet economists get a golden opportunity to express their views more openly than at other times. What is interesting, however, is that the discussions appear to be carefully orchestrated, playing only selected themes. For example, when the *sovnarkhozy* were established, it was the right time to explore the problem of consumer welfare and, in particular, the sad state of housing in the Soviet Union.[17] At the outset of the 1965 reform, it was popular to throw verbal stones at local authorities who failed to implement designated new technical policies, or otherwise slowed down technological change.[18] In 1983, the topic was mismanagement by bureaucrats who cared more about their lucrative jobs than about their responsibilities. A salient example of the last was the "Novosibirsk paper"—a supposedly "confidential" document that became available to Western correspondents in Moscow in the summer of 1983.[19]

The paper's frank discussion of the weaknesses of the Soviet socioeconomic system received much publicity in the West. I will analyze only that aspect of the discussion which deals with decision-making powers in the Soviet economy and thus is important for our topic. Perhaps most startling is the opinion expressed in the study that the existing system of economic management has been characterized by a weakening of the powers of Gosplan, representing the state interests, and by a parallel decline in the powers of the lower entities, i.e., production associations and enterprises. If all these powers have diminished, which ones have gained?

The paper posits as beneficiary the intermediate level of management—i.e., the ministries and administrations. According to its author, the growth in their power resulted in departmentalism, disproportions in the economy, and the growth of economic activity outside the formal economic structure. Is it really true that the ministries, credited by the creators of the 1965 reform with saving the Soviet economy from falling apart under the pressure of local interests, had by 1983 become the culprit in the failure of the economy?

It is true that some enterprise funds, for example the fund for science and technology, have been centralized under the management of ministries. However, even in the days when those funds were ostensibly allocated to enterprises separately, their spending was controlled by the ministries. The same may be said of the incentive funds.[20] Thus, from the perspective of an enterprise, little has actually changed.

There is even less justification for the Novosibirsk paper's suggestion of a shift in power from Gosplan to the ministries. Judging from my own experience in the Gosplan system, there was a tremendous growth in that institution's powers in the 1970's. During this period, it strengthened its influence in annual planning,

[16]On decreases in the supplies of metals and other material inputs and on complaints of ministries regarding this development, see Tselikov, loc. cit.; E. Matveyev, "Toward Effective Use of Material Resources," *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 6, 1982, and M. Shkabardnya, "Branch-of-Industry Management under Contemporary Conditions," ibid., No. 7, 1982. This measure, while presumably forcing enterprises to reduce the wasting of valuable inputs, could lead to a further slump in Soviet economic growth.

[17]The problems in housing and in the food and light industries were discussed in the Soviet press at the time. See, e.g., A. Sharov, "Housing Construction in the Sixth Five-Year Plan," ibid., No. 3, 1957. The author indicated that in 1956–60 it was planned to build *twice* as much housing as in the previous, 1951–55 period. The lack of material incentives in the Soviet system was explicitly analyzed in E. Manevich, "Material Incentives and Some Problems of Wages in the USSR," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 1, 1959.

[18]Ye. G. Liberman, *Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production*, New York, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1971.

[19]The analysis here is based on the substance of the paper as published in *The New York Times*, Aug. 6, 1983, and on the leaked copy of the Russian original. Western and Soviet *samizdat* sources indicate that the paper was written by Tatyana Zaslavskaya, a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences working at the Novosibirsk Institute of Economics and Organization of Industrial Production.

[20]On the centralization of the fund for science and technology, see the 1979 resolution on planning, loc. cit.

Incentive funds (the bonus fund, the social fund, and the development fund) are distributed among the enterprises according to unified principles approved for each branch of industry. The ministries control compliance with the principles and the spending of the funds by their subordinate enterprises. Each ministry puts aside a portion of the total fund fixed for its enterprises by Gosplan, thus creating centralized reserve funds. See *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 7, 1972, p. 22.

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where most inputs are allocated and appropriations are made—this despite the initial intent of the 1965 reform to concentrate Gosplan's efforts on long-term planning and to devolve to the ministries the task of annual planning. Far from dispersing control of resources among ministries, Gosplan actually increased its supervisory role, especially in the distribution of metals and energy (as noted above). Moreover, Gosplan's functions were broadened from planning to direct monitoring of the performance of ministries, industrial production associations, and enterprises in meeting plan targets.[21]

An explicit demonstration of the relative strength of Gosplan and the ministries took place during the drafting of a project for an Automated System of Planning Calculations (ASPR) in the 1970's. In discussing Gosplan's projected role in the computerized system, specialists at the ministry level argued that the ministries should process information submitted by enterprises, with the resulting data serving as the inputs into the Gosplan system. The designers of the system argued that Gosplan should obtain data directly from enterprises: this would ensure greater reliability of data and would secure Gosplan's control of the decisions made by ministries. The second approach won, advancing Gosplan authority significantly.[22]

One could cite many more examples of the shift of power from the middle level of management to Gosplan, but of even more significance have been the shifts in decision-making from Gosplan and the USSR Council of Ministers, on the one hand, to the apparatus of the party Central Committee, on the other. The party apparatus has always exercised considerable control over economic activity in the Soviet Union, but

[21] At the conference of experts cited in fn. 10 above, Gosplan department head Ukrainskiy complained that Gosplan had to perform planning for the ministries because the latter had abdicated responsibility for much of the job and actually were seeking to get Gosplan more involved (loc. cit., pp. 77–78). This is ironic, since the instructions, the list of indicators, and the forms for drafting the plan flow each year from Gosplan to the ministries, not in the opposite direction.

[22] As N. Lebedinskiy, the director of the ASPR project, wrote in "ASPR: An Important Instrument of Planning" (*Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 9, 1977, p. 9), the sources of ASPR information are statistical reports and data from ministries, departments, and *enterprises*. Gosplan lacks branch-of-industry institutes such as exist under the ministries. In many instances, these institutes had to carry out the projects of automated planning calculations both for their ministry and for the relevant departments of Gosplan. Some of these projects, in whose evaluation I participated in the 1970's, were rejected for—among other factors—undercutting Gosplan's supervisory and control functions.

The machine room of Gosplan's Main Computer Center in Moscow in 1971; statistical data flowing to this center help Gosplan oversee the operation of the Soviet economy.

—SOVFOTO.

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in the Brezhnev era it began to monitor even day-to-day operational decisions.[23]

The recommendations of the Novosibirsk paper—to increase the prerogatives of Gosplan and of enterprises, at the expense of the ministries—are like trying to have one's cake and eat it too. Liberalization of controls over the enterprises is a popular proposal among economists and engineers; the nod toward Gosplan is a gesture aimed at a Soviet leadership that is not about to expand the rights of enterprises unless the state's firm control is secured. But will such shifts help the Soviet economy?

The New Economic Experiment

The July 1983 Central Committee/Council of Ministers resolution represents yet another reform experiment, to be conducted in 1984–85 in five selected ministries—two all-Union machine-building industries (heavy and transport machinery, and electrotechnical) and three republic-level industries (food industry in Ukraine, light industry in Byelorussia, and local industry in Lithuania). Although the new experiment was widely considered to be Andropov's answer to the expectations of reform, I believe that it was directly linked to the provisions of the 1979 resolution on improving economic mechanisms and would have been undertaken even if Brezhnev had not died. Thus, in his inaugural speech as first secretary at the February 1984 Central Committee plenum, Brezhnev's protégé Chernenko agreed to continue the undertaking, which he termed "a large-scale economic experiment to increase the rights and responsibility on the part of enterprises."[24] To emphasize the fact that the new leadership supports the move, the Soviet press has intensified its efforts to publish methodological instructions and other materials on the experiment in 1984.

A general analysis of the 1983 resolution reveals considerable changes in the computation of enterprise incentive funds—the bonus fund, the social fund, and the development fund—and in the way that enterprises will be authorized to spend them. Enterprises participating in the experiment are to be more actively involved in "all stages of planning," which should be translated as meaning that planners will be obliged to listen more carefully to the proposals of those selected enterprises.

The idea behind the new experiment is basically the same as that of the 1965 reform: to give managers a freer hand in solving planning and managerial problems within the constraints imposed by central authorities. But, where the 1965 reform altered the criteria of enterprise performance in an attempt to make them more adequate, the 1984–85 experiment will be aimed at making the existing ones workable.

No fundamental changes in current practices are foreseen with respect to the production plan. The leading success indicator will still be sales revenue, corrected for the proportion of delivery targets successfully met. The delivery contract requirement was, as noted above, stipulated in a 1974 resolution. However, it was not until 1978 that the new principle was actually applied, the delay reflecting disagreement on how to punish managers for reneging on contracts. If planners had stuck to the letter of the law, *all* managers would have been deprived of bonuses because they all fail to meet one or another delivery contract. However, violations can be caused by exogenous factors—for example, inadequate supply. Also, there was disagreement over specific punishments, since small-scale violations and large-scale violations obviously merit different penalties. Ultimately, ministries were allowed flexibility to make decisions on a case-by-case basis, which resulted in different interpretations of the rules and numerous complaints.[25] Finally, in 1982, unified tables were approved for the reduction of bonuses in proportion to the magnitude of nondelivery. The money value of delivery contracts not met was subtracted from sales revenue. Moreover, all managerial bonuses for meeting other plan targets were made contingent on meeting delivery contracts.[26] Although the 1983 resolution does not mention any exceptions from the rule of punishment, the reality of Soviet economic life will probably necessitate some flexibility in dealing with managers who otherwise perform well.

Most of the other indicators for the enterprises participating in the 1984–85 experiment do not differ

[23] An observer could perhaps estimate the increase in the emphasis on economic problems in Brezhnev's speeches from the 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966 to the 26th CPSU Congress in 1981. During that period, the economic departments of the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee and of the republic party central committees were strengthened. Gosplan departments have reported to the apparatus of the Central Committee the results of economic planning not only at its final stage, but at intermediate stages as well. This led to much closer cooperation between experts of the government and of the party apparatus on economic issues. (I draw this conclusion from my personal, informal observations as a participant in the planning process.)

[24] *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 8, February 1984.

[25] On the evaluation of enterprise performance in meeting delivery targets and on complications that arose after the provision was implemented in 1978, see M. Gorshkov, "On Estimating the Value of Output," *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 8, 1980.

[26] See V. Rzheshevskiy, "The Use of Incentive Funds for [Economic] Stimulation," ibid., No. 3, 1983.

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A Soviet manager, Ivan Dyomin, General Director of the BelavtoMAZ production association, pictured at a May 1979 session of the Technical Council of the truck-manufacturing association.

—SOVFOTO.

from those employed in planning for all other industries. These include indicators for improving product quality, for putting production capacities into use, and for achieving profits and cost reductions. The main difference under this experiment is in computing wage bills and incentive funds. The intent is to tie wages and bonuses to the results of enterprise operations and to search for methods of manipulating appropriate funds to increase labor productivity. These relate to the Soviet practice of normative planning.

Normative planning is the way in which Soviet planners have tried to tie wage bills to output targets. Norms (*normativy*) employed in calculations are based on predetermined ratios of total wages to output. Although normative planning was introduced in the mid-1970's and was explicitly mandated by the 1979 resolution, it is not clear to the authorities what consequences it will actually have. One problem of possible concern is that this approach means that an enterprise's wage bill is not fixed, but changes with the total value of production. Hence, the experiment will be conducted on a limited scale and initially only in 1984–85. In my view, its purpose will be to address several important methodological questions: (1) by what indicators should output be measured? (2) which methods should be employed for computing norms? and (3) what mechanism can be used to correct inadequate norms?

The first question was ostensibly answered by the 1979 resolution, which determined that final outputs must be measured as the *normative net value of output*. However, some reservations still exist. Normative net value of output has two components: wages plus social insurance deductions, and profits. While wages reflect the effort of the enterprise, profits—as a function of prices—do not, i.e., they are exogenous. The formula of pricing in the Soviet Union incorporates profits into a product's price as a proportion of total costs. Thus the more labor-intensive a production process, the less favorable the enterprise's situation with regard to the size of its total wage fund.[27]

[27]The methodology for computing the net value of output is illustrated in Kushnirsky, op. cit., pp. 27–28. The norms for net value of output are very imprecise. As with other success indicators in the past, use of this approach can artificially render some products profitable and others unprofitable. To secure a profit, the producer can overstate his labor inputs, a maneuver difficult for the State Price Committee to uncover. These and other problems are discussed in P. Balashov, "Normative Net Value of Output and the Delivery Plan," *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 28, July 1983.

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The 1984–85 experiment is meant to determine the precise means for calculating the wage-bill norms. According to the 1983 resolution, the total wage bill of an enterprise will be computed as a base value plus an additional fund as a function of the increment in normative net value of output.

The problem of correcting inappropriate norms is a serious one. The 1983 resolution stipulates that, once set, the norms for wages and net value of output will remain constant for the duration of the 1984–85 experiment, in order to create incentives for lowering production costs and to protect the enterprises from reductions in wage norms initiated by the ministries or Gosplan. But there is no guarantee that the experiment will stimulate the optimal allocation of resources. After all, the norms are set by people who, try as they may, cannot substitute for market forces. Moreover, even assuming that the norms are ideally set, if they are not updated they can become an obstacle to technological change. This is because, with gradual advances in mastering the production process, the proportion of wages in fixed net value of output declines. The residual, which is the proportion of profits, will therefore increase if normative net value of output does not vary. Under these circumstances, an enterprise will be better off manufacturing the same product as long as possible. Only if the wage *norm* gradually declines can this indicator make an obsolete product unprofitable.

The approach to calculation of bonus funds under the experiment is similar to that for wage funds. Bonus funds will deviate from a base value, taking into account the planned targets for leading indicators: sales revenue, fulfillment of delivery contracts, quality change, productivity growth, cost reduction or profit increase, and improvements in bringing production capacities on line. The method of calculation will differ for different industries, the aim being to reduce the number of indicators affecting planning for a given industry. (I am personally skeptical of this approach. As explained above, the dropping of a particular indicator has meant neglect of that aspect by managers and the ultimate reinstatement of the given indicator by planners.)

According to the 1983 resolution, enterprises under the experiment are to have greater leeway in the distribution of wages and bonuses among employees. If an enterprise realizes a saving of part of its total wage bill, the savings will no longer have to be returned to the state budget. Instead, the enterprise will be allowed to pay up to 24 percent of base wages in additional money to workers who occupy key positions and who improve their skills, and up to 50 percent in extra pay to engineers and other white-collar employees. Prior approval by the ministry will no longer be needed for providing incentives to workers who acquire more than one skill, or who engage in different occupations.

Enterprises participating in the experiment will be allowed to include bigger markups in their wholesale prices for new products. It will no longer be necessary to get central approval for temporary prices; the decision will rest with the respective ministries (this measure will further boost wholesale prices).

Certain provisions of the reform particularly affect research and development (R&D) institutes. These will be entitled to more generous funding from their ministry's fund for science and technology. Designers and technical experts who introduce high-quality products will be rewarded with larger bonuses than at present. The 1983 resolution also hints at new hiring policies for R&D institutes, aimed eventually at encouraging smaller, more productive staffs. (Those familiar with the working of Soviet R&D establishments will agree that underemployment is a characteristic of such institutes.) However, there remain numerous unanswered questions in this regard: to what extent will average wages be decontrolled? what will be the mechanisms and criteria for laying off excess workers? and how will those laid off be relocated? These are, of course, questions affecting not only those enterprises under the experiment, but the Soviet economic system as a whole.

Prospects

Looking ahead, by what criteria should one judge the success or failure of the latest Soviet reform experiment? More important, assuming that enterprises in the ministries carrying out the reform over the period 1984–85 meet their target, what changes would occur in the Soviet economy if all enterprises became subject to the reform's provision? We can only speculate on the second question, and the first is not that easy to answer either.

The ultimate goal of the Soviets—to turn out more products and to improve their quality—would seem to make it simple to judge the success of the experiment. But, since other industries may also grow—independently of the experiment—one should know what growth rates would be sufficient to declare the experiment a success. Further, even if sufficiently higher growth rates result, it still will not be clear which factors, endogenous or exogenous, were responsible.

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The fact that enterprises under the experiment will be in a privileged position further complicates the identification of those factors. To a manager of the Soviet enterprise, a privileged position means, above all, getting priority in matters of supply. The Soviets have experience in assigning priorities to different projects, especially in construction. Projects of highest priority are often declared "objects of the Central Committee," with corresponding privileges in receiving supplies, investment resources, and other funds. Because a large number of enterprises are taking part in the 1984–85 experiment, each of them cannot receive the exclusive attention of the Central Committee, but their needs will still get priority consideration. The Council of Ministers, Gosplan, and the ministries possess some reserves for unforeseen contingencies. Moreover, other suppliers will risk punishment if they do not meet the terms of delivery to enterprises covered by the Central Committee's experiment.

The human factor should also be taken into account in analyses of special events or campaigns in the Soviet Union. Thus, employees participating in an experiment getting national attention expect to receive, along with higher wages and salaries, additional gains from social funds and priority access to new housing. Trade organizations will also contribute to such an experiment by making available goods in short supply.

All of these and other factors will become confused with the experiment's provision, making it difficult to evaluate its real impact. But if we do not insist in identifying the nature of different causes, I believe that, on balance, the 1984–85 experiment will meet its goals and, barring unexpected political developments, will probably be declared a success in late 1985 or early 1986.

However, success for the experiment is only part of the story: the ultimate goal is to improve the performance of Soviet industry as a whole. One recalls not only the impressive improvements initially registered by the 1965 reform, but also the fact that when all ministries were involved and no enterprise enjoyed the privileged conditions just outlined, complications emerged and performance lagged.

But let us assume for the moment that the 1984–85 experiment proves an exception to this pattern. Under what conditions might the incentive provisions of the latest reform successfully work for the Soviet economy? Technically, the mechanism of expansion in production is similar to the multiplier effect. If the stimuli work, labor productivity grows and enterprises turn out more products. As a result, all will enjoy increased supplies, which, in turn, will lead to further

Part of the labor force of the huge ZIL Auto Works in Moscow.

—SOVFOTO.

expansion in production. To judge whether this multiplier will work, we should look at possible constraints.

If one industry is to expand, other industries must deliver greater quantities of intermediate products to it according to the input-output links. However, when all industries are expected to grow, the constraints imposed by raw materials will become decisive. Therefore, how well incentive provisions will work in all industries will depend upon the ability of extractive industries and agriculture to increase output. Assuming that existing reserves of metals and energy will make a moderate expansion possible, agriculture will still remain a stumbling block. Unless the agricultural

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problem is solved, increases of output and wages in some industries may lead to further disproportions in the Soviet economy. Planners have attempted to maintain many balances to compensate for the lack of market forces in the USSR. Ever-growing savings not matched by the supply of goods and services indicate that the attempts to balance wages and the output of consumer goods have failed. As contributing factors, planners usually cite programs to raise wages in various industries and regions of the country, to increase incomes in low-paid occupations, and to introduce new and augment some existing pensions.[28]

The problem of wages growing faster than consumer-goods production explains the presence of three consumer-goods ministries in the 1984–85 experiment. But if the output of agriculture—which provides many of the raw materials utilized in these industries—does not grow, these ministries will be able to expand output only at the expense of similar ministries in other republics. The new experiment will place additional burdens on a supply system that already operates in conditions of perpetual shortages. In such a situation, one encounters the paradox that the greater the output, the greater the shortages.

Another problem can emerge if the 1984–85 experiment succeeds in its goal of raising labor productivity: the possibility of substantial layoffs in major industries. A similar dilemma surfaced with the 1965 reform. Although manpower shortages are considered by many a major obstacle to economic growth in the USSR, Soviet authorities know full well that underemployment exists in many industries. However, despite permanent regulation of settlement, employment, and training, the government has not had lasting success in channeling manpower to specific labor-short regions in the east and north or to unattractive industries, such as construction and chemical production (where paroled prisoners have been employed).[29] Existing wage differentials have not outweighed such considerations as climate, accessibility of food and housing, and easier life. Neither benefits offered by organized recruitment nor drastic reductions in job opportunities in western and southern regions will suffice to meet this demand, because of the low alternative cost of not being employed in the Soviet Union. Those who cannot find jobs in the west and south will not necessarily move to the east; instead, they will find many ways to circumvent the relevant legal problems, especially if they are engaged in the second economy. Faced with the possibility of unemployment or expansion of the second economy, party authorities will probably block any visible layoffs associated with the current experiment.

In sum, the reform will be hampered by restrictions on layoffs and shortages of inputs. If agriculture fails to meet demands for more inputs and consumer goods, the authorities will be forced to impose limitations on the growth of average wages. This will undercut normative planning of wages, which anticipates higher wages with higher output. Normative planning of wages will face other setbacks, too. For instance, it will come into conflict with the supply system. When wage bills of enterprises are planned in accordance with their output, and not the number of personnel, enterprises will move to raise wages by increasing material inputs. But since the supply system attempts to regulate outputs taking into account demands for inputs and their opportunity cost, some enterprises will be turned away empty-handed. In combination with the restrictions on layoffs, this will require emergency funding of enterprises that fall short on their wage bills due to dropping output. When the number of such cases becomes significant, the normative planning of wages will be either abandoned or applied only on a limited scale.

This scenario outlines the reasons why the economic experiment of 1984–85 will stop halfway, just as the 1965 reform did. The causes are something quite different from planners' obscurantism. I have first-hand knowledge of Soviet planners and have considerable respect for their attempts to improve the Soviet economy.

However, I see no clear-cut solution for the Soviet Union's economic problems. Although many analysts stress the necessity to decentralize decision-making in the Soviet economy, I would take the unpopular stand of suggesting that this will be of no avail unless production units are made responsible for the national resources that they utilize. Such a decentralization of economic responsibility is inseparable from the fundamental problem of property ownership. At this point in time, I cannot imagine that Soviet leaders will initiate the risky business of revising property rights in their economic system.

[28] On the gap between incomes and the consumption component of Soviet national product, see, e.g., Yu. Peshekhonov, "Labor Productivity and Consumption Funds," ibid., No. 46, 1983. The author mentions massive payments to the population from the public consumption fund in the 1970's, indicating that in 1976–82, these payments grew much faster than did labor productivity. He further indicates that a long-term trend of additional payments and perquisites not accompanied by sufficient production of consumer goods can result (translate: has already resulted) in imbalances.

[29] To the Soviet public, these paroled prisoners are known as *khimiki* ("chemists," i.e., those sent to chemical enterprise construction). By the end of the 1970's, industrial construction had peaked, and in the 1980's a decline set in, presumably reducing demand for parolee labor.

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Church and Peace in the GDR

Pedro Ramet

The German Democratic Republic (GDR) has a well-deserved reputation for ideological orthodoxy and mimetic loyalty to Moscow.[1] Its ruling Socialist Unity Party (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands,* or SED), so the argument runs, has done better than most East European communist parties in establishing an effective political monopoly.[2] Yet, since early 1982, a de facto alliance between an independent peace movement and the Evangelical (Lutheran) Church has developed in the GDR. Moreover, the church has shown itself capable of defying the SED without—thus far—experiencing a deterioration in its relatively favorable situation. Why has the church supported the oppositionist peace movement and adopted an openly critical stance toward regime policies? How has the regime reacted? What are the short-term prospects for the entente between the church and the opposition in the GDR? These are the questions addressed in this article.

Church and State, 1949–78

It should be noted that the religious situation in the GDR differs in some important respects from that in the rest of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. For one, the GDR is the only communist country with a Protestant majority.[3] More important, despite the post–World War II division of the German nation, the Evangelical Church retained an all-German institutional structure until 1969. This gave the church additional resources and made a communist policy of harassment more difficult. Due both to this consideration and to the initial Soviet readiness to negotiate about Germany's political future,[4] it was not until mid-1952 that the SED introduced a Stalinist program, including the Soviet model on religious policy. This policy aimed at eliminating church influence in society. Thus, while the SED had recognized the legitimacy of church-sponsored youth organizations in 1947, these were later declared to be illegal rivals to the SED's youth organization and encountered systematic obstruction after 1952. After January 1, 1953, religious instruction in schools was often hindered and gradually shrank. In 1954, the authorities introduced the *Jugendweihe* (youth initiation) as an atheist substitute for the church sacrament of confirmation (normally administered in early adolescence). Supposedly voluntary, the *Jugendweihe* was actively promoted and by 1958 had made a decisive breakthrough among the youth of the GDR. The functioning of the church press was also obstructed.

In the early years of the GDR's existence, the SED strove to consolidate its rule, to neutralize institutional

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[1]On East German foreign policy, see Melvin Croan, *East Germany: The Soviet Connection*, Washington Papers, No. 36, Beverly Hills, CA, and London, Sage Publications, 1976, esp. pp. 1–13.

[2]Kurt Sontheimer and Wilhelm Bleek, *The Government and Politics of East Germany*, trans. by Ursula Price, London, St. Martin's, 1976, passim; Hartmut Zimmermann, "The GDR in the 1970's," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1978, pp. 7–8; Max L. Stackhouse, "The Religious Situation in the German Democratic Republic," *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe* (Philadelphia, PA—hereafter *OPREE*), Vol. 1, No. 1, February 1981, p. 1; and David Childs, *The GDR: Moscow's German Ally*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1983, pp. 156–63.

[3]In 1946, out of a total population of 17 million in the Soviet zone of occupation, 15 million were members of the Evangelical Church, and 1.75 million were Catholics. In March 1983, the Evangelical Church claimed 7.7 million believers, while the Catholic Church numbered 1.2 million adherents. See Otto Luchterhandt, *Die Gegenwartslage der Evangelischen Kirche in der DDR* (The Present Situation of the Protestant Church in the GDR), Tübingen, JCB Mohr, 1982, p. 3; and *Archiv der Gegenwart* (Bonn-Bad Godesberg), June 29, 1983, p. 26770.

[4]Sontheimer and Bleek, op. cit., p. 21; and Adam E. Ulam, *The Rivals*, New York, Viking Press, 1975, passim.

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

East German high-school students are congratulated at a secular youth initiation (Jugendweihe) *ceremony in Berlin's Congress Hall on April 1, 1972 (Easter Saturday). The new initiates hold a copy of the Constitution of the German Democratic Republic.*

—ADN-ZB via EUPRA.

rivals, including the churches, and to isolate the Evangelical Church in the GDR from its West German sister church. Already in 1950, a "peace movement" was established in hopes of drawing Christian clergy and laity into active collaboration with the government. Uncooperative priests were imprisoned and, by the mid-1950's, some 70 clergymen were behind bars.[5] A 1958 agreement by the West German Evangelical leadership to provide religious care in the newly established West German army allowed the SED to attack the "NATO Church" and to pressure the East German Evangelicals to distance themselves from this agreement by declaring their loyalty to the GDR and its program of socialist construction. In the view of the SED, this was a tangible step toward the attenuation of links between the East German and West German branches of the Evangelical Church.[6]

The efforts of the East German regime to break completely the institutional links between the Protestant churches of the two Germanys were crowned with success on June 10, 1969, when a Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR was established.[7] By this action, the Lutheran and Reformed churches of the GDR withdrew from their institutional association with their West German counterparts. Shortly thereafter, Bishop Albrecht Schönherr, first chairman of the Evangelical Federation in the GDR, declared: "It is not our intention to be the church *against* socialism, nor the church *beside* socialism; we want to be the church *in* socialism."[8] Although the Evangelical Church had reconciled itself to working within the framework of the GDR in the 1960's and 1970's, its leaders continued to speak out, albeit cautiously, on various political questions, such as the exodus of East Germans to the West, collectivization of agriculture, and especially on military service. As early as 1962, when the SED introduced universal military conscription, the Evangelical Church took the side of conscientious objectors. Through a series of public and private statements, it succeeded in obtaining in September 1964 the creation of a construction soldiers service as an alternative to regular military service, though the church could not prevent the regime from discriminating against veterans of the construction units when it came to university admissions and career advancement.[9]

The Lutheran tradition of putting individual conscience above institutional discipline complicated the SED's policy toward the church, insofar as it meant that church-state accommodations worked out with the leadership of the Evangelical Federation might be repudiated by provincial hierarchies or even by the lower clergy. For example, while Bishop Mitzenheim, chairman of the Conference of Church Leaderships in the GDR (and recipient of the GDR's Fatherland Order of Merit in gold), was overtly cooperating with the regime in hopes of improving conditions for East German Christians, the other bishops would not follow his lead. On the contrary, on September 27, 1961, they issued a 10-point declaration on freedom and service of the church, in which they disavowed the collaborationist party, the East German Christian Democratic Union (CDU), renounced any obligation to promote socialism, insisted on their right to speak out on social

[5]Trevor Beeson, *Discretion and Valour: Religious Conditions in Russia and Eastern Europe*, rev. ed., Philadelphia, PA, Fortress Press, 1982, pp. 212–13.

[6]Sontheimer and Bleek, op. cit pp. 123–24.

[7]Luchterhandt, op. cit., p. 16.

[8]Albrecht Schönherr, at a church synod in Eisenach (1971). Quoted in Schönherr, "Opportunities and Problems of Being a Christian in a Socialist Society," in Norbert Greinacher and Virgil Elizondo, Eds., *Churches in Socialist Societies of Eastern Europe*, Concilium Series Vol. 154, New York, Seabury Press, 1982, pp. 47–48.

[9]Luchterhandt, op. cit., pp. 15, 83–84.

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

The March 6, 1978, meeting of East German state and church leaders in the office of party and state leader Erich Honecker. Clockwise from far left (excluding two persons with their back to the camera) are: Rudi Bellman, Chief of the Department of Church Affairs of the party Central Committee; Paul Verner, party Secretary and Politburo member; Honecker; Heinz Eichler, member of the presidiums of the National Front and of the Volkskammer (East Germany's parliament); Hermann Kalb, Deputy State Secretary for Church Affairs; Manfred Stolpe, Deputy Chairman of the Conference of Evangelical Church Directorates; Christina Schultheiss, member of the Executive Committee of the Conference; Bishop Werner Krusche, Chairman of the Conference; and Bishop Albrecht Schönherr, former Chairman of the Conference.

—ADN/Bildarchiv Jürgens.

issues, and pointedly rejected the temptation offered by Walter Ulbricht to merge the church's interest in human welfare and peace with the SED's interest in socialist humanism and proletarian internationalism.[10]

Despite Bishop Schönherr's slogan of "church in socialism" and the East German CDU's opinion that the thoroughly coopted Russian Orthodox Church might constitute an appropriate model for the East German Evangelical Church, there were clear limits to the SED's ability to draw the Evangelical Federation into an alliance. In February 1971, Paul Verner, a member of the Politburo, had incautiously told the East German CDU that

the clergy and laity are called to further strengthen the German Democratic Republic in service and testimony, to preserve peace and to put every single person to good use.... The church representatives ... should make it clear in their official functions and in the church organs that the Church cannot stand either between the capitalist front and the socialist one, or in "critical distance" to their state.[11]

Two weeks later, Bishop Schönherr used the occasion of an official state reception to make clear that the state's position as outlined in Verner's speech was unacceptable. Schönherr stated that the church would never resign itself to the status of a "cult" church; that religious life encompassed much more than religious services; and that the church intended to maintain an active part in discussing the social issues of the day.[12]

[10]Ibid., pp. 17–18.

[11]Quoted in ibid., p. 32.

[12]Reinhard Henkys, "The Church in the German Democratic Republic," in Paul Lendvai, Ed., *Religionsfreiheit und Menschenrechte* (Religious Freedom and Human Rights), Graz, Verlag Styria, 1983, p. 172.

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Despite such reservations, the Evangelical Church and the SED regime achieved a kind of "concordat" in 1978, signaled by a meeting between SED General Secretary Erich Honecker and church leaders on March 6 of that year. Honecker pledged at that time to end discrimination against Christians in education and employment, and to lift obstacles to church construction projects. In the wake of that meeting, the Evangelical Church was allowed to take up construction and renovation of church buildings. In May 1981, the church was able to dedicate the first fruit of its construction program—a church and community center in Eisenhüttenstadt, called "the first socialist city in the GDR," because it had remained entirely churchless since being built in the 1950's.[13] Restrictions on broadcasting religious programs were also eased. While religious services had always been broadcast on radio on Sundays at 7:30 a.m., after 1979 there were also monthly radio programs with church news and information. Six television programs annually, scripted by the Evangelical Church itself, were permitted.[14] More than 30 religious periodicals now appear regularly in the GDR, of which five are regional weeklies published by the Evangelical Church (though by and large they limit themselves to noncontroversial topics).

Understandably, the Evangelical Church has been reluctant to endanger the relatively propitious modus vivendi worked out in 1978, and has repeatedly distanced itself from the perception that it opposes the regime. The church, said Bishop Werner Krusche of Magdeburg in 1976, seeks to occupy "the narrow space between opposition and opportunism."[15] This same sentiment was echoed by Bishop Werner Leich of Thuringia in March 1983 when he declared that the church in the GDR is neither a "camouflaged government party nor a camouflaged opposition party."[16]

[13] *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA—hereafter *CSM*), Mar. 21, 1980, p. 7; and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt-am-Main—hereafter *FAZ*), May 30, 1981, p. 9.

[14] Beeson, op. cit., p. 198.

[15] Quoted in Gisela Helwig, "Between Opposition and Opportunism: On the Situation of the Church in the GDR," in *Deutschland Archiv* (Cologne), June 1976, p. 578.

[16] Quoted in *Frankfurter Rundschau* (Frankfurt-am-Main), Mar. 3, 1983, p. 2, as trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter FBIS-EEU), Mar. 7, 1983.



The 1981 consecration of the new building of the Evangelical Church in the East German city of Eisenhüttenstadt.

—Evangelisches Publizistisches Zentrum.

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But, as Verner had made clear in 1971, the SED recognizes no space between opposition and opportunism and has no patience for the idea of "critical distance." It was therefore not surprising that, despite its accommodation with the government, the church should gravitate toward opposing government policies.

A Critical Distance

The central issue in church opposition to SED policies has been peace. Since the GDR regime describes itself as a "peace movement," deviance from regime norms is, by definition, an act against peace. The church's conception of peace differs from that of the state in two important respects: (1) the church believes that truly stable *international* peace is inseparable from *internal* peace in the states themselves, and by "internal peace" the church understands a broad toleration of multiple worldviews in which human rights are respected and safeguarded; and (2) the church considers it necessary that the SED abandon its hostile characterization of the West in the media and schools, turn away from "education in hatred," and give true information about its military policy and politics. Indeed, already in 1978, Bishop Krusche, who served as chairman of the Federation of Evangelical Churches from September 1981 to November 1982, explained the differences in perception:

The churches have their own peace policy to pursue.... The churches are forces for peace only as long as they safeguard their freedom, so that they do not become estranged from the real interests of the nation, ... so that they do not therefore become merely the foreign policy tools of their respective states.[17]

Discrimination against those who substituted service in construction units for regular military service provoked church recriminations against the GDR government as early as 1966. Yet the church's engagement in peace policy at cross purposes with the regime should really be dated from 1978, when the SED introduced obligatory premilitary instruction for youth of both sexes in all schools in the 9th and 10th grades. School texts and classroom instruction were revised at the same time to sharpen hostile stereotypes of the West and thus to further Honecker's program of *Abgrenzung* (demarcation) from West Germany. In order to foster military discipline among the population, the regime sought "to introduce military elements into all other subjects from math and chemistry to literature, music and sport."[18] In 5th grade sports classes, for instance, students are instructed in the use of hand grenades.[19] It is even possible that the regime's olive branch to the church in March 1978 was extended so as to "neutralize" the church before launching the new premilitary training programs in September.

If so, the regime miscalculated. At its national conference on June 14, 1978, the Evangelical Church Federation protested that the planned educational changes would deepen "friend/foe thinking" and, in an open rebuff to the regime, charged that the new policy could only endanger peace. The church reaffirmed its opposition to premilitary instruction in the schools at its synod in Berlin-Weissensee in September 1978,[20] and proposed that the regime replace military training in schools with "peace education" *(Friedenserziehung),* by which the church understood an education in the duty of obeying one's conscience and in the stimulation of independent thinking on moral questions—scarcely an approach congruent with the SED's program. In May 1981, the SED issued a decree extending premilitary instruction to the 11th grade and making it obligatory to participate in a hitherto voluntary 12-day summer training camp. The Evangelical Church deplored what it termed these "tendencies toward a militarization of social life in the GDR" and the reorientation of the school curriculum to support that militarization.[21]

The increasingly critical stance of the Evangelical Church leadership since 1978 has been due, to some extent, to both lay and clerical pressures from below.[22] One of the first demands (in 1972) for the institution of a civilian service in environmental protection as an alternative to military service came in an open letter to Honecker from alienated construction-unit soldiers.[23] By the summer of 1981, demands for a "social peace service" were widespread. Yet, the

[17]Quoted in Luchterhandt, op. cit., p. 79.

[18]Childs, op. cit., p. 190.

[19]*Die Welt* (Hamburg), Nov. 6, 1981.

[20]*FAZ*, Sept. 27, 1978, p. 1.

[21]Ibid., Aug. 26, 1981, p. 2; *CSM*, Sept. 4 and 12, 1981; and *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Nov. 16, 1981, p. 63.

[22]Klaus Ehring and Martin Dallwitz, *Schwerter zu Pflugscharen* (Swords into Plowshares), Hamburg, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1982, p. 96.

Already in 1968, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had produced widespread revulsion among East German youth, and the burgeoning rock music scene provided a forum in which a counterculture could develop. The banning of the outspoken rock group Renft Combo, in 1974, dampened but did not eliminate the political overtones in the rock counterculture. In fact, the roots of the unofficial peace movement in the GDR must be traced, in part, to the rock scene. Ibid., pp. 90–91.

[23]*Die Zeit* (Hamburg), Sept. 23, 1983, pp. 17–19, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *East Europe Report: Political, Sociological and Military Affairs* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS-EE*), Dec. 7, 1983.

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An East German youth rides a mini-tank during "Pioneer Maneuvers" in Dresden on August 20, 1982, in connection with a meeting of the official Pioneer youth movement focused on "socialist military upbringing."

—DPA.

Evangelical bishops did not support this initiative until three lay workers of the church in Saxony had drawn up an appeal for a social peace service to substitute for both regular military service and uniformed construction-unit service (whose work was on overtly military projects) and had obtained some 5,000 signatures from all over the GDR. By the end of November 1981, all eight regional synods of the Evangelical Church had endorsed the social peace service proposal.[24]

In the 1970's the church had begun to address directly the concerns of young people. Church-sponsored discussions of sexuality, alcoholism, rock music, life in the Third World, life in the GDR, and the militarization of society became more common. In consequence, church services, once sparsely attended, are now often jammed, even in rural areas, as nonbelievers join believers to hear popular preachers.[25] Another aspect of this response from below has been the burgeoning of individual pressures designed to stiffen the posture of the church leadership vis-à-vis the regime. The best known protest, even today, was the self-immolation of Pastor Oskar Brüsewitz in front of his church in Zeitz in August 1976. Before setting himself on fire, Pastor Brüsewitz explained that he was taking his life to protest the timidity of the church leadership. Pastors Rolf Günther of Falkenstein and Gerhard Fischer of Schwanewitz followed suit in September 1978.[26] Subsequently, in

[24] *Rheinischer Merkur* (Bonn), Nov. 27, 1981; Peter Wensierski, "The Peace Movement in the GDR," in *Das Parlament* (Bonn), Apr. 30, 1983, pp. 3–15; *Die Zeit*, Sept. 23, 1983; and Ehring and Dallwitz, op. cit., p. 199.

[25] Interview with Stefan Heym in *Der Spiegel*, May 31, 1982, p. 100.

[26] Peter Hebblethwaite, "The GDR: Servant or Subservient Church?" in *Religion in Communist Lands* (Keston, UK), Summer 1978, p. 98; and Stephen R. Bowers, "Private Institutions in Service to the State: The German Democratic Republic's Church in Socialism," In *East European Quarterly* (Boulder, CO), March 1982, p. 79.

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February 1982, Rainer Eppelmann, an East Berlin pastor, created a stir with his open letter to Honecker reproaching the latter for the programmatic distribution of war toys in the GDR, the glorification of army life in the schools, the regular visits of kindergarten groups and school classes to barracks, the incorporation of grandiose military spectacles into all national holidays, and the continued discrimination against those professing pacifist convictions. He went on to appeal for the withdrawal of both US and Soviet troops and weaponry from the two Germanys and the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe.[27] His appeal was signed by several hundred East Germans, but the church hierarchy felt constrained to distance itself from Eppelmann's unilateral action. This caution on the part of the church leadership aroused indignation among participants at the February 1983 peace demonstration in Dresden, who accused the church of needlessly compromising with the state.[28]

As noted above, following the lead of the laity of Saxony, the Evangelical Church endorsed the idea of a "social peace service" and advocated it in its consultations with the government in 1981. A synod of the Evangelical Federation, meeting in summer 1981, demanded that the government recognize the *right* of East German citizens to substitute a nonmilitary social service for military duty. Klaus Gysi, State Secretary for Church Affairs, who had earlier warned the church that the separation of church and state signified that the church should abstain from interference in political questions, now called the demand "unacceptable."[29] The intransigence of the authorities toward demands that the pervasive militarization of public life be eased did not silence these demands. Quite the contrary. Specific issues, such as the substitution of social peace service for military duty, became subsumed in a broader demand—in which believers and nonbelievers joined—that the GDR authorities pursue less belligerent policies.

The Independent Peace Movement

There are actually four distinct spokesmen for "peace" in the GDR today. There is the official peace movement, known as the GDR Peace Council. The sole purpose of this organization is to popularize the decisions and policies of the regime. The logic of its position, as expressed recently by George Grasnick, is that under socialism

the aims of the foreign policy and the peace efforts of the governments coincide with the peace interests of the peoples.... The "independent peace movement" in the socialist countries ... thus really has nothing at all to do with the interests of the peace movement, with the peace tasks of our day.[30]

Second, there is the unofficial but regime-approved Christian Peace Conference, which has a membership of about 500 and whose views are close to those of the official Peace Council. Its position is often presented in *Standpunkt,* a monthly published by the pro-regime section of the Evangelical Church. A typical expression of its general attitude is an article by a Reverend P. Schrimpf in the June 1983 issue, which stated that "Christians have no special expertise in

Klaus Gysi, State Secretary for Church Affairs of the German Democratic Republic.

—EUPRA.

[27] *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Oct. 7, 1981.

[28] *Die Tageszeitung* (West Berlin), Apr. 12, 1983, trans. in *JPRS-EE*, May 26, 1983.

[29] *FAZ*, Feb. 24, 1981; *Die Welt*, Aug. 21, 1981; and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zürich—hereafter *NZZ*), Sept. 29, 1981, p. 4.

[30] *Neuer Weg* (East Berlin), Mar. 24, 1983, trans. in *JPRS-EE*, June 16, 1983.

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political questions; therefore there can also be no specific Christian peace policy."[31] This is an explicit repudiation of the position taken by Bishops Schönherr and Krusche and the Evangelical Church hierarchy in general.

Third, there are numerous "basic communities" and peace seminars organized within the Evangelical Church itself, usually at the regional or parish level. These seminars meet on church grounds for weekends or several days to discuss peace issues, such as "the language of peace," "nonviolent demonstrations," and "alternatives to military service." The oldest and best known peace seminar is held twice a year in Königswalde, Saxony, and is regularly attended by 400 to 500 persons.[32]

Fourth, there is the "independent peace movement"—known by its motto "Swords into Plowshares"—which has been closely associated with the Evangelical Church from the beginning but which remains a spontaneous, grass-roots movement without an organizational structure, officers, or spokesmen. It numbers 2,000 to 5,000 activists and is estimated to have perhaps 30,000 to 50,000 supporters.[33] Small groups of independent pacifists exist in East Berlin and numerous other East German cities. Thus, of the four "peace movements" in the GDR, one is official, one is regime-approved, and two are independent and overlapping; three of them are linked, in one way or the other, to the Evangelical Church.

By early 1980, the Evangelical Church was becoming more outspoken on broader political topics. In January 1980, the Evangelical Church Federation released a communiqué calling for international cooperation in what it termed a "destabilized world situation."[34] In February, the church went further and openly criticized the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, terming it inimical to peace.[35] And in the summer, the church remonstrated against "overly long belligerent reports" by East German media about Warsaw Pact maneuvers in the country[36]—which resulted in the confiscation by the authorities of an edition of the Evangelical News Service in September 1980. At that point, however, there was no independent "peace movement" as yet, and the church had not taken any decisive steps in the direction of creating a national peace forum.

Impetus for this step came from three sources. As already discussed, the militarization of education and of society as a whole evoked pressures from below. Second, the church itself had been caught up in the worldwide debate on human rights in the 1970's. Shortly after the GDR ratified the UNESCO convention on discrimination in education in September 1973, the church pointed to the GDR's prejudicial treatment of young Christians and stressed that it favored discussion of human rights generally. Bishop Johannes Hempel told a district synod in Saxony in October 1977 that the church would retain a "critical distance" from the SED on the subject of human rights and that the church considered respect for human rights a criterion for assessing the legitimacy of the state and the social order it represented. His colleague Almut Engelien spoke for the church as a whole when he declared in 1980 that "there is an indissoluble connection between the security of peace, cooperation, and the realization of human rights; whatever occurs to the detriment of human rights is at the same time an assault on peace."[37]

A third source for the development of the church-backed peace movement was the GDR government's reaction to events in Poland. After the collapse of the Gierek regime and the series of compromises and retreats made by Stanislaw Kania—during which the independent trade union Solidarity was established—the GDR restricted travel to Poland, tightened controls on correspondence between the two countries, inaugurated a media campaign to revive anti-Polish prejudices among the East German population, and implied that the Evangelical Church wished to follow the example of the Polish Catholic Church. In the autumn of 1980, East German authorities banned reportage of church synods at which peace was discussed; church papers that printed statements on peace were pulped and reprinted with sanitized texts. The SED decided to curtail the number of contacts between the Evangelical Church in the GDR and outside churches, and in mid-November 1980 threatened the church with "administrative measures" unless it desisted from further political criticism.[38] Instead, an April 1981 synod of the Evangelical Church in Berlin-Brandenburg proclaimed its solidarity with the Polish people and deplored the SED's anti-

[31] *Standpunkt* (East Berlin), June 1983, in *DDR Report* (Bonn), August 1983, p. 461. For a report on a two-day symposium on peace, recently organized by the Christian Peace Council, see *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Jan. 31, 1984, p. 3.

[32] Wensierski, "Peace Movement . . . ," loc. cit., pp. 3–6.

[33] Interview with Stefan Heym in *Der Spiegel*, May 31, 1982, pp. 94, 100; *Die Zeit*, Sept. 23, 1982; and Ronald D. Asmus, "Is there a Peace Movement in the GDR?" *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Summer 1983, p. 303.

[34] Theo Mechtenberg, "The Peace Duty of the Evangelical Church in the GDR," *Deutsche Studien* (Bleckede), Vol. 19, No. 74, June 1981, p. 179.

[35] Gisela Helwig, "Regarding the Peace Duty of the Churches," *Deutschland Archiv*, April 1980, p. 350; and Luchterhandt, op. cit., p. 87.

[36] *FAZ*, Dec. 13, 1980, p. 9, trans. in *JPRS-EE*, Feb. 9, 1981.

[37] Quoted in Henkys, op. cit., p. 177.

[38] *FAZ*, May 30, 1981, p. 10; and "Notes on Church-State Relations," *Journal of Church and State* (Waco, TX), Winter 1981, p. 166.

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Polish campaign. The church was able to send some six tons of food for distribution by the Polish Catholic Church, although GDR customs officials frustrated attempts by individual citizens to send food packages to Poles.[39]

Finally, from November 9 to 19, 1980, Protestant parishes throughout the GDR held what proved to be the first of a series of annual "peace decades," during which thousands of youths gathered to hear the clergy speak out on peace and to participate in wide-ranging discussions.

In mid-1981, the church commissioned an East German graphic artist to design a shoulder patch with the scriptural words "Swords into Plowshares" *(Schwerter zu Pflugscharen).* These emblems were distributed by the church at its second annual peace decade in the autumn of 1981. The regime initially tried to give a favorable interpretation to the symbol. The East Berlin periodical, *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie,* commented approvingly on the shoulder patch in its first issue of 1982. A Radio Moscow commentator covering East German affairs also praised the emblem as "one of the outstanding works of Soviet art" and noted that Soviet citizens saw in it a reflection of their own attitudes.[40]

But the benevolent attitude of the communist authorities changed as a nationwide independent peace movement developed and groups of pacifists sprouted in various East German cities, taking the motto "Swords into Plowshares" as their common emblem. At the end of 1981, when some 4,000 East German youth had flocked to a "blues mass" in East Berlin, State Secretary Gysi lambasted the event as "political cabaret." On February 13, 1982, at the urging of grass-roots pacifists, the Church of the Holy Cross in Dresden hosted a public forum to discuss peace and disarmament. Four to five thousand East Germans took part, even though the SED had discouraged such events. There, once again, the demand was raised for obligatory "peace education" in schools. In the months that followed, similar forums were sponsored in Potsdam, Eisenach, and Burg (Spreewald), involving more than 10,000 young people altogether.[41]

By early 1982, it was clear that the Evangelical Church, through its involvement in a peace movement embracing Christians, secular pacifists, environmentalists, and dissident Marxists,[42] was gaining a following among East German youth as a whole—a dangerous development from the vantage point of the SED. The church's ability to draw Catholic youth as well into its activities showed that its influence was also not limited denominationally. Its Biblical slogan, "Swords into Plowshares," appeared to have captured the conscience of an entire generation. Bishop Hempel was repeatedly applauded as he took the regime to task at the peace rally in Dresden:

Why are peace rallies forbidden in the GDR? We should stand up for peace. Is security assured through military balance and strength? We must intro-

[39]DPA Hamburg, Apr. 28, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-EE*, Apr. 29, 1981; and *Keston News Service* (Framingham, MA), No. 127, Aug. 3, 1981, p. 12.

[40]*Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), Sept. 8, 1982, p. 3, trans. in *JPRS-EE*, Oct. 7, 1982; and *Keston News Service*, Nos. 151–54, Aug. 31, 1982, p. 20. The reference by Radio Moscow might have been prompted by the fact that a Soviet memorial with the same words stands before the UN building in New York.

[41]*Der Spiegel*, Feb. 22, 1982, p. 28; *Facts on File* (New York), Feb. 26, 1982, p. 122; *Der Spiegel*, Mar. 29, 1982, p. 35; and *Die Welt*, June 21, 1982.

[42]See Horst Dähn, *Konfrontation oder Kooperation? Das Verhältnis von Staat and Kirche in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1980* (Confrontation or Cooperation? The Church-State Relationship in the Soviet Zone/GDR, 1945–1980), Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982, pp. 167–71.



East German youths at the peace forum held in the Church of the Holy Cross in Dresden on February 13, 1982.

—Evangelisches Publizistisches Zentrum.

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duce an obligatory "peace education." 300,000 persons demonstrated in Bonn against nuclear missiles. I mean they put themselves on the front line so that their missiles would not fall on our heads ... and the question which should follow is: shouldn't we also finally begin to count up our own missiles?[43]

The Evangelical Church, which had seemed to some to be too cooperative with the regime in 1980 when it joined the SED in opposing the modernization of NATO forces and in calling for ratification of the SALT II agreement, had by now not only denounced the SED for its educational policies and for fanning the flames of anti-Polish prejudice, but also expressly called for a reduction in the number of Soviet SS-20's in Eastern Europe.[44] The "Swords into Plowshares" motto was clearly becoming double-edged, and the SED had no patience with criticism of the Warsaw Pact or its policies.

Therefore, at a session of its Central Committee, the SED decided upon a propaganda counteroffensive in late November 1981, with the slogan "Peace must be defended—peace must be armed." This slogan appeared on billboards throughout East Germany in the early months of 1982. To the chagrin of the SED, however, the campaign boomeranged and only served to alienate further those youths who were attracted by the independent peace movement. Moveover, the regime's condemnation of the peace service alternative did not discredit it. On the contrary, the SED's negative reaction aroused outspoken protest.

In April 1982, the SED abruptly decided to suppress the "Swords into Plowshares" patch. State Secretary Gysi explained that the patch had been "misused to proclaim views hostile to the state and involvement in an illegal political movement."[45] Wearing of the shoulder patch in public was declared to be a misdemeanor, and East German police began stopping young people in the streets and compelling them to rip off their patches. Some wearers of the emblem found they could not buy bus tickets or were otherwise harassed.[46] Bishop Krusche fretted that all this was creating a "neurotic atmosphere" in the country, while East Berlin clergyman Manfred Stolpe asked, "Why must you shoot at sparrows with cannons, at butterflies with howitzers?"[47] In Thuringia, Chief Church Councilor Dietrich von Frommannshausen declared: "Whoever attacks the symbol 'Swords into Plowshares' attacks the church itself."[48] And Brandenburg Bishop Gottfried Forck called on the regime to reverse itself, to publish an apology in all newspapers for attacks on the peace emblem, and to rehabilitate it. Gysi's reply: "What we need is for the church to obey the law."[49]

The SED thereupon altered its tactics somewhat. Instead of dealing with the church as a unit, it reverted to the old tactic of trying to drive a wedge between the Church hierarchy and the lower clergy. The SED summoned church representatives to confidential meetings with party authorities in order to pressure them into passivity. At the same time, various pacifist youth were arrested in Dresden and Jena, and a young engineer in Berlin was sentenced to eight months in prison for insisting on being allowed to do his military service in the construction unit.[50] As for the church's concern about the proliferation of "enemy" images in the classroom and in the media, the pro-regime monthly *Standpunkt* argued in its November 1982 issue that since the SED's policy was directed against "imperialism and its most aggressive organizations and forms," it must be viewed as a "good policy" compatible with peace and therefore "compatible with the Christian commandment of loving one's enemy." Besides, the journal continued, "communist policy endeavors to bring about a just, exact, and scientifically founded image of the enemy."[51]

In May 1982, the Evangelical bishops decided to withdraw the emblem and not distribute it at the peace forums, but to retain "Swords into Plowshares" as a slogan for the church's work for peace, and to use that slogan as the theme at the third annual peace decade, to be held November 7–17, 1982. The decision to withdraw the patch, which was announced only in late September at the Halle synod, provoked surprise and criticism. Lower clergy and youth were also dismayed by the church's declaration that the emblem should no longer be displayed in public, even though some 7,000 youth had defiantly worn it at meetings in Brandenburg in June.[52]

But this did not dampen pacifist enthusiasm for the 1982 "decade." Almost every town and village had local clergy and peace groups involved in organizing

[43] Excerpted in *Der Spiegel*, Feb. 22, 1982, p. 30.

[44] *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Nov. 10, 1981.

[45] Quoted in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Sept. 8, 1982, p. 3, trans. in *JPRS-EE*, Oct. 7, 1982.

[46] *Keston News Service*, Nos. 144–145, Apr. 25, 1982, p. 6.

[47] *Der Spiegel*, Sept. 20, 1982, p. 54.

[48] *Rheinischer Merkur*, July 2, 1982, p. 18, trans. in *JPRS-EE*, Aug. 16, 1982.

[49] Quoted in *Der Spiegel*, Sept. 20, 1982, p. 54.

[50] For more details, see ibid., Mar. 29, 1982, p. 35; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Aug. 28, 1982; and *NZZ*, Feb. 24, 1983, p. 3.

[51] *Standpunkt*, November 1982, trans. in *JPRS-EE*, Jan. 17, 1983.

[52] *Rheinischer Merkur*, July 2, 1982, p. 18, trans. in *JPRS-EE*, Aug. 16, 1982; DPA, Sept. 29, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 30, 1982; and *NZZ*, Sept. 30, 1982, p. 4.

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Beating a sword into a plowshare at a 1983 church gathering in Wittenberg, GDR; in the inset, the "Swords into Plowshares" emblem.

—A West German traveler and Bildarchiv Jürgens.

discussions, meetings, and church services. Pacifists from East Berlin collected signatures on a petition calling for a ban on the import and sale of military toys. Clergy once more emphasized that the church's work for peace was a "vital matter of conscience."[53]

Whatever doubts an outside observer might have had regarding the firmness of the various parties in what was unmistakably a major controversy—dividing the regime on the one side from youth and the church on the other—were cleared up in 1983. The SED expelled about 20 East German pacifists from the country early in the year, and arrested several peace demonstrators in Berlin in September 1983.[54] At the same time, the regime mobilized its supporters in the East German CDU to champion military service under socialism as a "peace service . . . which is in complete harmony with one's conviction and faith as a Christian."[55] In early October, Halle Pastor Lothar Rochau, well known for his pacifist work, was sentenced to three years without probation for the "establishment of illegal groupings."[56] Eight more pacifists, all from Weimar, were behind bars by the end of January 1984; and shortly thereafter, 30-year-old theologian Wolf Quasdorf, another active pacifist, was imprisoned, ostensibly for "illegal contacts" in pursuit of emigration.[57] Meanwhile, East German authorities continued their surveillance of unofficial peace rallies, obstructed access to them by pacifist youth, and photographed those attending.

The SED has also discovered that it can maintain good relations with West Germany and whittle down opposition at home through a policy of granting exit visas generously but selectively. Suddenly, after waiting for years to be allowed to leave the GDR, persons who had been fired from their jobs and given work by the church have been allowed to emigrate. For example, in 1983, six East German pastors from Berlin-Brandenburg were allowed to emigrate with their families. Officials began pressuring pacifists and other dissenters to leave the country, so that, by May 1984, more than 20,000 East Germans had settled in the Federal Republic. The church began to become alarmed at this sudden tide. In April 1984, the Church leadership appealed to Christians to stay in the GDR in order to maintain a Christian presence.[58]

The Evangelical Church continues to try to stake out "the narrow space between opposition and opportunism," and has made clear that, despite its willingness

[53] *Der Spiegel*, Nov. 8, 1982, p. 16; and *Keston News Service*, No. 163, Dec. 2, 1982, pp. 5–6.

[54] *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), June 22, 1983, p. 31; and *NZZ*, Sept. 2, 1983, p. 2.

[55] Gerhard Götting, general secretary of the East German CDU, quoted in *FAZ*, Feb. 18, 1983, p. 5.

[56] *Die Tageszeitung*, Nov. 1, 1983, p. 9, trans. in *JPRS-EE*, Dec. 2, 1983.

[57] *Der Spiegel*, Feb. 6, 1984, pp. 29–30; and *Keston News Service*, No. 198, May 3, 1984, p. 7.

[58] *NZZ*, Apr. 13, 1984; *Der Spiegel*, Apr. 23, 1984, p. 44; and *FAZ*, May 5, 1984, p. 4.

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to withdraw the peace emblem as a concession to the government, it could compromise only on form and not on substance. On the last day of its September 1983 synod in Potsdam, the 60 Evangelical delegates present unanimously passed a resolution calling for a moratorium on the installation of new missiles in Europe, whether by the Soviet Union or the United States. The church thus reaffirmed its support for arms negotiations, steadily voiced since September 1979, but now it specifically called on the Soviets to translate into deeds their expressed willingness to destroy some of their existing SS–20's as a gesture for promoting confidence.[59] The synod also submitted a set of concrete proposals to the authorities. These urged the following:

- sign a nuclear freeze agreement;
- promote within the GDR the United Nations disarmament campaign;
- declare that the possession or use of nuclear arms is a crime;
- attempt, within the context of existing treaties, to ban new short-range nuclear weapons from GDR territory;
- strengthen personal contacts between Germans living in the GDR and the FRG in order to reduce mutual fear and promote peace.[60]

Finally, the church accused the SED of hypocrisy in welcoming the church's peace efforts directed at countries in NATO and their allies, while disparaging its peace efforts directed at the GDR and other Warsaw Pact countries. Such a two-faced policy could not enjoy any credibility, the synod added. As if to impress the authorities with its self-confidence, the Church retained the symbol "Swords into Plowshares" for its fourth annual peace decade, November 6–16, 1983.

The regime may well have decided that while it too does not want to compromise on substance, it may have to compromise on form, if its policies are to be effective. At any rate, it allowed the publication in *Standpunkt* of theologian P. F. Zimmermann's endorsement of the church's call for a reduction in "en-

[59] *FAZ*, Sept. 21, 1983, p. 2.
[60] *Keston News Service*, No. 185, Oct. 20, 1983, p. 8.

EUROPA DARF KEIN
EUROSCHIMA WERDEN
CHRISTEN FÜR ABRÜSTUNG IN OST UND WEST
WIR FORDERN EIN ABSOLUTES
ZU BESITZ + STATIONIERUNG

Diversity in East German peace movements in 1983; at left, an official rally in Potsdam opposes "NATO's missile decision" and declares "Europe must not become Euroshima"; at center, peace demonstrators in Lübbenau carry a sign reading, "Christians for disarmament in East and West"; at right, a "decade for peace" opens in a Potsdam church with a banner reading, "We demand an unconditional No *to the possession and deployment of* all *weapons of mass destruction."*

—ADN via Eastfoto; Bildarchiv Jürgens; and Roger Williamson via Keston College.

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emy images" as a prerequisite to peace.[61] In another surprising move, it also allowed publication in October in the party organ, *Neues Deutschland*, of a letter to Honecker which, inter alia, spoke of being

filled with horror at the thought that with the stationing of American nuclear missiles in Western Europe, a move that we all condemn, corresponding nuclear missiles will also be introduced on our territory and that we and our children will have to live with the immediacy of nuclear missiles. You, yourself, have often expressed the view that more arms do not mean more security.[62]

The letter was signed by an Evangelical pastor from Dresden-Loschwitz, two members of the parish executive committee, and five parishioners. As if to make certain that the new tactic was not missed, the SED repeated it with the publication in *Neues Deutschland* (November 3, 1983) of a letter lamenting the spread of hopelessness about peace prospects among both Christians and non-Christians.

Conclusion

The involvement of the Evangelical Church of East Germany in the cause of international and domestic peace has led the church to express more insistently its conviction that there is only one German nation,[63] and only one German Evangelical Church—albeit one organized in two separate institutional frameworks. The church has accordingly called attention to the "complicated and unresolved problem of the German nation," deploring the SED's vilification of the Federal Republic.[64] In January 1982, Magdeburg Bishop Krusche, then chairman of the Evangelical Federation, called for the withdrawal of the both Germanys from their respective military pacts as a prerequisite to political reunification.[65]

The engagement of the Evangelical Church of West Germany in the peace movement there has led to common actions by both churches. In September 1979, the same letter was read at Sunday services in East and West Germany, expressing concern over the deterioration in East-West relations. On March 17, 1980, church officials of the East German and West German branches of the Evangelical Church met with Klaus Gysi, State Secretary for Church Affairs, in the first meeting of any GDR official with West German Evangelical bishops since 1969. After the meeting, the FRG Evangelical chairman, Bishop Eduard Lohse of Hannover, said he hoped that such contacts could be revived, while Bishop Schönherr characterized the meeting as a "sign of the present growing respect" between church and state in the GDR.[66] At that time, the GDR government seemed to welcome cooperation between the two Evangelical branches.

By the autumn of 1980, however, church contacts with West Germany seemed no longer acceptable to the GDR.[67] Travel by East German clergy to West Germany was curtailed; Western correspondents were not allowed to cover East German church synods directly; and the church press was subjected to tougher censorship. Yet on August 19, 1982, the West German Evangelical Church and the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR again issued a joint document, this time setting forth their shared views on the responsibility of the church in working for peace. In a critical passage, the two church organizations spoke out for pluralism and compromise:

In view of the continuous and ongoing rearmament and the increasing threat of the total destruction of human life contained therein, it has now become a question of political rationality to develop concepts to attempt to achieve the safeguarding of peace, and thereby the preservation of life, through other than military means. Security is conceivable today only in the context of a system that takes opposing interests into equal consideration and that requires peaceful compromise.[68]

Although secularization of East German society has steadily reduced the membership in the Evangelical Church,[69] the church has a resilience and qualitative strength that it has not enjoyed in more than a quarter-century. Its services and seminars are well-attended. Those attending appear fired by a sense of

[61] *Standpunkt*, June 1983, in *DDR Report*, August 1983, p. 46.

[62] *Neues Deutschland*, Oct. 22–23, 1983, p. 2.

[63] A point denied by the SED until the late 1970's. See Werner Volkmer, "East Germany: Dissenting Views during the Last Decade," in Rudolf L. Tökes., Ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe*, London, Macmillan, 1979, pp. 116–17.

[64] Bishop Johannes Hempel, quoted in *Die Welt*, Oct. 18, 1982, p. 3, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 20, 1982.

[65] DPA, Jan. 12, 1982.

[66] *CSM*, Mar. 21, 1980, p. 7.

[67] Nancy Lukens, "The Churches in the German Democratic Republic: Notes of an Interested Observer," *OPREE*, Vol. 2, No. 1, February 1982, pp. 5–6.

[68] Quoted in Ronald D. Asmus, "Evangelical Churches in the FRG and GDR Issue a Peace Declaration," *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), Aug. 20, 1982, p. 1.

[69] For membership figures, see footnote 3. Today only 20 percent of the East German population as a whole, and only 10 percent of East German youth, are believers. See Peter Wensierski, "Theses on the Role of the Church in the GDR," *Kirche im Sozialismus*, Vol. 7, No. 10, trans. by Norman C. Robinson in *OPREE*, Vol. 3, No. 4, May 1983, p. 23.

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purpose and look to the church for social and moral leadership rather than for ethical guidance narrowly defined.[70] Increasingly, those who are discontented in East German society look also to the church for protection.[71] At the same time, it should be noted that participation in the church-sponsored events comes more often from white-collar and educated urban circles, or from rural residents, rather than from workers. The church has few roots among the working class today and could not, therefore, replicate the role played by the Catholic Church in Poland, especially since it does not have the linkage with nationalism.

All the same, the church's broad credibility among youth concerned with problems of peace regardless of belief—Protestant, Catholic, agnostic, atheist—poses a threat to the ideological and political monopoly that the SED strives to maintain. The SED gives every appearance of having accepted the church as a legitimate institutional actor, at least for the foreseeable future. By 1980, the party had almost completely abandoned its earlier atheistic propaganda and had adopted a posture of relative openness with respect to religion. The SED had even gone so far as to describe religion as a "necessary" part of socialist society having "objective roots" in the first phase of the construction of communism.[72] To what extent this represents a true change in religious policy, as opposed to a tactical retreat, is not entirely clear. What is clear, however, is that there are frequent shifts by the SED in policy toward the religious bodies.[73]

[70] *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 20, 1980, p. 4, trans. in *JPRS-EE*, June 18, 1980; *Rheinischer Merkur*, May 29, 1981, p. 18, Jan. 15, 1982, p. 18, and Sept. 10, 1982, p. 20.

[71] *FAZ*, Apr. 9, 1984.

[72] Luchterhandt, op. cit., p. 50.

[73] Some are in favor of easing tension and of maintaining dialogue with the church; the majority, however, place priority on social stability and tend to be more concerned about satisfying the Soviets than about considerations of East German interests per se. See Wensierski, "Theses on the Role . . . .", p. 26.

One might have thought that the SED's policy toward the church's alliance with the peace movement would be more clear-cut, that is to say uniformly hostile. But, in fact, this has not been the case. There are several reasons why the situation is more complicated. First, although there is an independent peace movement, it is institutionally amorphous and thus cannot be described as an opposition organization or party. Nor can it be said that the church colluded with the opposition. Second, the church is careful to balance its words. It criticizes the military policies of both East and West, unites occasionally with Western churches to engage in balanced criticism, and generally prefers to talk of its "work for peace" rather than of a "peace movement." Third, an all-out attack on the church and on the peace movement would damage the GDR's image in the Third World and the West, and complicate the GDR's relations with West Germany. And fourth, the SED worked out its modus vivendi with the Evangelical Church because it wanted good relations. Its desire for good relations with the church is not changed by the appearance of the peace movement; it is merely made more complex.

For these reasons, the church feels secure about its "work for peace." Peter Wensierski, then editor of the West German journal, *Kirche im Sozialismus*, speculated in 1981 that the church could develop its peace theology into a liberation theology with considerable "explosive power." Such a theology, he suggested, might enable the church to play a role in a broad range of vital social issues including ecology, women's rights, and North-South relations.[74] The church is in part still groping, responding to pressures from below, unable to be certain of the party's response to changing conditions, and deeply ambivalent about the oppositional role that is being thrust upon it.

[74] Ibid., pp. 28–29.

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Notes & Views

China's Media: Fitting News to Print

Jörg-Meinhard Rudolph

CHINA BOASTS of a vast readership of its state-owned and party-controlled press.[1] Indeed, according to the *Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1983* (Statistical Yearbook of China 1983), in 1982 total circulation of newspapers in the People's Republic of China (PRC) numbered some 14 billion copies,[2] a figure intended to impress the reader. But circulation figures alone are not an indicator of either extent of news coverage or reliability of information. Nor is wide circulation a sign that the Chinese readership is informed on current events, be those events at home or abroad. By their own admission, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders call the press "an important educational medium for the people and a channel to guard against moral pollution."[3] Thus, a guiding principle of Chinese public media can perhaps best be summarized by the Chinese phrase *Bao xi, bu bao you*—"Report the good, not the bad." What then is the primary role of Chinese print media, and how well does it perform that function? How well-informed are the Chinese public and party officials? Do Chinese leaders have access to objective reporting and/or foreign media? This essay attempts to shed light on these important issues by examining the basic pattern of the publications system in the People's Republic of China.

[1]According to official Chinese accounts, since 1956, all publishing houses in the People's Republic of China have been state owned and party controlled. See *Zhongguo Chuban Nianjian 1980* (China Publishers' Yearbook 1980), Beijing, Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1980, p. 20.

[2]See *Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1983*, Beijing, Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1983, p. 531. It should be noted that the 14 billion figure does not include magazines, which totaled some 1.5 billion copies in 1982 (see ibid., p. 530). Actually, when calculated on a per-capita basis total newspaper circulation in China is a bit low. For an interesting though somewhat dated analysis comparing per-capita circulation figures for newspapers in the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, see *Ming Bao* (Hong Kong), March 1982, p. 4.

[3]See, e.g., Christopher S. Wren, "Chinese Press Tries to Mend Soiled Image," *The New York Times*, May 20, 1984.

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PRC Publications System

Printed media in the PRC generally fall into one of three categories of distribution: public (*gongkai faxing*), domestic (*guonei faxing*), and internal (*neibu faxing*).[4] In terms of availability, "public" materials are the least restricted, as nobody is excluded from buying, reading, or subscribing to them. Access to "domestic" publications, which are not for export, is slightly more restricted, and foreigners outside China as well as foreign research institutions generally can not obtain them. Inside the PRC, however, publications in both categories are more or less in the public domain and are available for interested PRC citizens (as well as foreigners) without special authorization. Only the "internal" materials are highly restricted, with access limited to entitled individuals. Foreigners as well as PRC citizens are generally excluded from buying or even reading books and periodicals thus classified.

Comprehensive research on the internal communications system of the PRC has been scarce. For one thing, classified print media invariably bear the imprint *Neibu kanwu, zhuyi baocun* (Internal reading material, deposit carefully) on the front page of each

[4]This analysis deals only with these three categories and does not include, for example, communist party and government circulars *(Zhongfa)* and other similar documents that are classified "secret" *(jimi)*.

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copy; for another, in order to avail themselves of these publications Chinese citizens have to present a "Letter of Recommendation" *(jieshao xin)*, which is usually issued by the Communist party branch of their work units. As a result, little is known of the contents of internal publications, and even less of the structure of the *neibu* system.[5]

Some basic but authoritative information on the distribution of restricted materials can be found in the PRC's 1980 publishers' yearbook. For example, in paragraph 22, Article 6, of "Provisional Regulations for the Work of Publishing Houses," we read:

Publishing houses have to adopt different distribution methods according to the character of the manuscripts, as well as to consider social effects and the intended readership. Most books have to be distributed publicly. This is inadvisable for some books, which should be distributed internally to researchers and personnel in specific fields who need them....[6]

Thus, it seems that at least part of the responsibility for determining the appropriate classification for publications lies with the respective publishing houses.[7] But the yearbook does not detail specific criteria for judging either the "character of the manuscripts" or the potential "social effects" and the "intended readership."

Lacking access to the rules and regulations governing classification, foreign analysts can only speculate about the classification process in China. One useful, though somewhat roundabout, way to help reach an understanding of this process and gain perspective on the function and role of internal publications is to examine coverage of a specific issue in the Chinese press. This essay, therefore, will analyze the contents of public and available internal materials dealing with a topic of high political sensitivity for the People's Republic of China, namely, Taiwan.

Taiwan has been chosen for several reasons. Although reunification is one of the leadership's top priorities, it poses a unique challenge. As the "Republic of China," Taiwan is an explicit and intended denial of the legitimacy of the PRC. Taiwan's socioeconomic system and the prevailing Kuomintang ideology are officially in constant opposition to the PRC and CCP in almost every respect. Moreover, Taiwan is economically much more developed than the PRC, and the standard of living of its workers and peasants is much higher than that in the PRC. Thus, how the PRC's various print media cover Taiwan provides insights into the publications system in China.

Unclassified Print Media

Distribution of unclassified print media, as noted above, is not subject to restrictions in China itself. However, since such publications are divided into "domestic" and "public" components, foreigners not living in China are excluded from reading the rather large share of newspapers, magazines, and books designated as "domestic." As can be gleaned from the Simplified List of PRC Magazines *(Quan Guo Zazhi Jianmu)*,[8] "domestic" magazines generally focus on the practical concerns of scientific, industrial, and technological research. Although some, like *Jiefangjun Huabao* (Liberation Army Pictorial), have since been reclassified as "public"[9] (perhaps owing to their nonscientific orientation), most retain their "domestic" classification. One notable example of the latter is the very useful *Quan Guo Baokan Suoyin* (Newspaper and Magazine Index for the PRC), which lists all articles printed in "public" and "domestic" PRC periodicals according to topic. If available outside China, this monthly index would facilitate foreign research on the PRC communications system. But keeping the index within PRC borders makes this work more difficult for foreign researchers and observers.

The "public" *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), with a

[5]Foreign analysts still do not have a complete list of what is edited and printed as *neibu* material in China. The little that is known, moreover, is limited to a *neibu* sector that deals exclusively with translations of foreign press items. However, the highest level of classification is accorded those periodicals that are concerned with the actual domestic situation in the PRC. Such reports, as well as related speeches of party and government leaders, are regularly printed in internal publications like *Neibu Cankao* (Internal Reference), although there may well be others. For a documented review of internal PRC periodicals, see chapter 4 of Jörg-Meinhard Rudolph, "*Cankao Xiaoxi*—Foreign News in the Propaganda System of the People's Republic of China," *Occasional Papers: Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, Baltimore, MD, University of Maryland School of Law, forthcoming.

[6]*Zhongguo Chuban Nianjian 1980*, p. 626.

[7]According to a recent study, there are some 214 publishing houses in China, 20 of which publish works in minority languages. See John L. Scherer, *China: Facts and Figures Annual*, Vol. 6, *1983*, Gulf Breeze, FL, Academic International Press, 1984, p. 335. In 1980, according to John Howkins, there were ten national-level specialized publishers under the direct control of the State Publications Administration, the senior regulatory body for printing, publishing, and distribution. See Howkins's *Mass Communication in China*, London, Longman, 1982, pp. 83–85.

[8]The Simplified List is published in the 1982 edition of *Zhongguo Chuban Nianjian*, pp. 523–53. For a more recent accounting of publications in the public sector, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Reference Aid: Current Chinese Serial Publications*, distributed by the Joint Publications Research Service (Washington, DC), JPRS 83079, Mar. 16, 1983. According to this document, which is a complete translation of the titles listed in the China National Publishing Industry Trading Corporation *(Zhongguo Chuban Duiwai Maoyi Zong Gongsi)*, 1983 Catalogue of Newspapers and Periodicals Published in China *(Zhongguo Baokan Mulu 1983 Nian)*, there were 103 newspapers and 1,433 periodicals in the PRC in 1983. This constituted a 40 percent increase over 1981, according to the *Reference Aid*.

[9]See, e.g., *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), No. 48, October 1981, p. 2.

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circulation of 5.3 million copies per day,[10] is the best known daily newspaper of the PRC. As the central press organ of the Chinese Communist Party, it is politically the most important newspaper in China. But *Renmin Ribao* is not merely authoritative; it is indispensable, serving the party (in Lenin's words) as the "collective organizer, propagandist, and agitator." Also, as the official party newspaper, it is a constant reminder of the omnipresence of the CCP. Thus, *Renmin Ribao* sets the mark for the public media in the PRC. In principle, no other public PRC publication is entitled to say anything against or depart from the official line established in the party paper.[11]

But this does not mean that *Renmin Ribao* is informative, or even widely read. Its large circulation seems more the result of office and other forms of arranged subscriptions than an indication of an interested readership. News coverage in *Renmin Ribao* is not merely extremely boring; it is at times misleading. Consider, for example, the report on the hijacking by six Chinese of a PRC airliner to South Korea in spring 1983. Although *Renmin Ribao* provided timely coverage of the incident—and therein claimed the right to extradite the hijackers—the paper failed to disclose where the hijackers had wanted to fly: Taiwan.[12]

What does this suggest for China's public press coverage of Taiwan? In the Chinese media during the first 20-odd years of Communist rule on mainland China, Taiwan, the Kuomintang, and Chiang Kai-shek were synonymous with all the evil in the world. Consequently, the CCP repeatedly called for the "liberation" *(jiefang)* of Taiwan, and the Chinese public media focused on reports of ruthless suppression and cruel exploitation of the people on Taiwan by the then so-called gang of Chiang bandits *(Jiang fei bang).* In the course of the 1970's, however, as Sino-American tensions gradually eased, this image changed. On May 3, 1973, for example, *Renmin Ribao* published the first report on the rescue of two Taiwanese fishermen by a mainland team and their medical treatment in Fujian Province. Two weeks later, the paper reported the safe return of the fishermen to Taiwan. Since then, the rescue of Taiwanese at sea has become a regular feature in the public PRC press. Several new rescue stations were built along the coast of Fujian, allegedly to take better care of Taiwanese fishermen.[13] Although the "gang of Chiang bandits" was still attacked from time to time, the public media began to stress contacts between Chinese from "both sides of the Taiwan Straits." On December 17, 1978, shortly after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States had been announced, and two weeks before the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress issued the "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,"[14] *Renmin Ribao* for the last time called the Kuomintang a "ruling clique." Ever since, the PRC public media have used polite language when reporting on the Kuomintang and its officials. Even arch enemy Chiang Kai-shek has sometimes been publicly referred to as *Jiang lao xiansheng,* the polite form for "Mr. Chiang."[15]

Public press coverage of Taiwan, it follows, is aimed at creating an atmosphere appropriate to the prevailing policy of the PRC government. At present, Chinese news stories primarily focus on the need for reunification as well as on the longing of compatriots on Taiwan to see this national task accomplished soon. Most reports can hardly be called informative, and sometimes they even give false information. For example, under the headline "The People's Hearts Think of the Ancient Soil; Hotel Named 'Dreaming of the Native Land'," the April 17, 1983, *Renmin Ribao* carried a report based on an advertisement that had appeared in the Taiwan evening newspaper *Tzuli Wanpao* of March 20, 1983, which the *Renmin Ribao* editors had definitely misunderstood. The hotel in question was actually called "Dreamland" *(Meng xiang binguan),* and this establishment certainly offered its "motor-driven beds" *(diandong chuang),* "luxury mirror palaces" *(haohua jing gong),* and "kind service" *(fuwu qinqie)* for other pleasures than

[10] *Beijing Rundschau* (Beijing—the German edition of *Beijing Review*), May 19, 1981, p. 23.

[11] In practice, of course, such is not always the case. Consider, for example, the article published by army dissident/propagandist Zhao Yiya in *Jiefangjun Bao* (Liberation Army Daily) on August 28, 1982. Zhao's highly critical article was particularly piercing, appearing as it did on the very eve of the12th CCP Congress (held September 1-11), which was meant to legitimate the extensive reforms and leadership changes that had taken place under Deng Xiaoping since the pivotal 3rd Plenum (December 1978) of the previous congress. Although the army paper was eventually forced to publish a lengthy self-criticism, it is quite clear that dissenting opinions do at times find their way into the public print media in the PRC. For a brief account of the Zhao Yiya affair, see Ellis Joffe, "Party and Military in China: Professionalism in Command?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September–October 1983, pp. 58–60.

[12] Consider also *Renmin Ribao*'s July 22, 1980, front-page coverage of an oil-rig accident in Bohai Bay, in which 72 Chinese workers and technicians were killed. The accident, authorities disclosed, was caused by the ignorance of certain high-ranking PRC officials, an admission that might lead one to applaud the candor of the Chinese government. But the accident in question had actually occurred some eight months earlier, on November 25, 1979. Deng Xiaoping apparently seized upon this incident to mount an attack against the rival "petroleum" faction, using the *Renmin Ribao* report to herald a series of dismissals and demotions of his opponents. For an account of this affair, see Parris H. Chang, "Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest," *Problems of Communism*, January–February 1981, pp. 15–16.

[13] According to *Beijing Rundschau*, May 20, 1981, in 1979 there were four such stations in Fujian Province that "rescued or received" 1,147 Taiwanese fishermen (p. 27).

[14] For the English translation of the full text of the "message," see *Beijing Review*, Jan. 5, 1979, pp. 16–17.

[15] The polite form "Mr. Chiang" is used in *Zhongguo Baike Nianjian 1982* (China Encyclopedic Yearbook 1982), Beijing, Zhongguo Baike Chubanshe, 1982, p. 79.

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dreams about reunification with the motherland.[16]

Public coverage of Taiwan's domestic situation is mainly accomplished by *Renmin Ribao*. News items are generally short and, as far as Taiwan's political and economic situation and social conditions are concerned, fairly negative. In place of the former reports on violent suppression and harsh exploitation, however, Chinese public media now stress Taiwan's dependence on the outside world, especially with regard to raw materials. Most news items conclude that these problems could easily be solved if only the "Kuomintang authorities" would agree to cooperate with Beijing.[17]

With regard to the coverage of Taiwan, therefore, public media in the PRC serve as the vehicle by which the CCP propagates its current policies. At present, this means that reports on Taiwan's economic successes are definitely taboo. As a result, neither details on the standard of living nor figures on personal income in Taiwan can be found in the public press. Nor are photographs showing scenes of everyday life in Taiwan (for example, a street in Taipei with all the motorbikes) published in China's public media. Indeed, when such photographs appeared in the January 1982 issue of the internal monthly magazine *Bianyi Cankao* (Editing and Translating Reference), they were accompanied by a note saying "internal material, not to be used for publication!"

Neibu Kanwu (Internal Reading Material)

But if the PRC public media pursue the strategy of "no news" with regard to Taiwan's development, there has to be a fairly objective source of information available for those who are responsible for deciding what is to be published and what is to be deleted. For this task they have to be acquainted with the actual situation on the island, as well as with international events. Thus, a network for the supply of authentic information on all relevant fields is necessary. With regard to the Taiwan issue, this prerequisite is further underlined by the fact that for years the Beijing government has pursued a rather practical policy of maintaining contact with the Kuomintang. Here, at least, the need for access to a substantial amount of information is obvious.

An information system of this kind does, indeed, exist in the PRC. It is classified *neibu*, and is thus generally unavailable to foreigners. The range of the *neibu* sector of the Chinese media is quite extensive and is by no means limited to publications concerned with political issues. Also restricted for internal use are such periodicals as the *Kexue Jishu Yanjiu Chengguo Gongbao* (Monthly Bulletin on Results of Scientific and Technological Research), *Gongzi Fuli Wenjian Xuanbian* (Selected Edition of Documents on Wages and Welfare), *Waimao Diaoyan* (Foreign Trade Survey), and *Gang-Ao Jingji* (Hong Kong-Macao Economy), among others. Universities, research institutes, and specialized institutions such as the Foreign Languages Press in Beijing also compile, edit, write, and print their own *neibu* publications, apparently enjoying a fair amount of independence in what they publish.[18]

An internal publication particularly worthy of note is *Cankao Ziliao* (Reference Material), an information bulletin whose copies have only recently become accessible to some outsiders, usually "foreign experts" working as teachers, translators, or style editors for various PRC institutions. As one of China's most important periodicals responsible for presenting in a nonideological way the flow of international news and public opinion outside the PRC on almost everything of political, economic, military, and cultural significance, *Cankao Ziliao* is published twice a day (morning and afternoon) with an average of 80 to 90 pages per issue. The bulletin, which appears in the same magazine format as the CCP semi-monthly theoretical journal *Hongqi* (Red Flag), is printed in unusually big characters and is distributed to entitled work units and individuals via organizational or official channels. It can be neither bought nor subscribed to. In addition to those assigned to work units that deal with foreign countries, it seems that cadres from the section-chief *(ke zhang)* level upward generally have access.[19]

The contents of *Cankao Ziliao* consists almost exclusively of foreign news agency dispatches and reports from foreign newspapers and magazines, which have been translated into Chinese. From time to time, signed "Reports by our own correspondent" cover nonroutine topics or summarize important world developments. However, it seems highly unlikely that

[16]See *Qishiniandai* (Hong Kong), No. 160, May 1983, p. 8.

[17]See Li Zan, *Jinri Taiwan*, Beijing, Haiyang Chubanshe, 1979, p. 68.

[18]The Foreign Languages Press, for example, houses the editorial board of *Bianyi Cankao*, which carries in-house translations of articles and features published in the foreign press. *Bianyi Cankao* is a good example of what a decentralized classified publication, with the term "reference" in its title, can publish. According to my personal observations, many if not all translations are done on the initiative of Foreign Languages Press translators, who have access to a great number of foreign media publications. Once they find something of interest, they propose it to the editorial board housed next door. Such was the case with some rather critical articles on conditions in northeast China, which had been published in the news magazine *Der Spiegel* in 1981. But *Bianyi Cankao* is not free of censorship. I observed, for example, that a translator himself censored the material he was working on, excising some disrespectful phrases about Stalin from an article in *Der Spiegel*.

[19]*Qishiniandai*, No. 164, September 1983, p. 83.

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Cankao Ziliao employs its own extensive network of correspondents all over the world busily writing "reports" and translating articles from the world press. Such coverage would require an extremely large staff of trained and experienced translators, especially since the bulletin often publishes full translations of lengthy newspaper and magazine reports only two or three days after they appear in other parts of the world. Indeed, although *Cankao Ziliao* does not carry a note identifying its publishing agency, it is almost certainly compiled, edited, and published by the state-owned Xinhua News Agency in Beijing; no other institution in the PRC has the necessary large-scale direct and current access to foreign news items. Thus, either the original articles or a ready-made translation are telexed to Beijing, most likely by a Xinhua correspondent stationed abroad.

If retranslated into English, the current news and background material published in the two daily editions of *Cankao Ziliao* would average some 300 to 400 typed pages. Given the meager coverage of international events found in *Renmin Ribao* (usually a single page of short, factual "news flashes"), it can be assumed that the 150 Xinhua resident correspondents[20] stationed in 85 countries abroad are responsible for carrying out other duties, no doubt one of which is collecting and translating material for this information bulletin, which in turn can be used by party propagandists to shape editorials and commentaries that appear in *Renmin Ribao*.

The first two pages of each issue of *Cankao Ziliao* serve as the table of contents, which is divided into numerous categories. One frequent listing is *Tai/Gang/Ao* (Taiwan/Hong Kong/Macao). Under this heading, and sometimes in the current affairs section (whose index appears in bold type on page 1), reprints and reports on Taiwan can be found (see illustration below).

[20]This figure is given in the 1980 edition of *Zhongguo Baike Nianjian*, p. 603.

内部刊物 注意保存

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更正：本刊十月八日下午版三十五页第十四行中"穆巴拉克宗教狂热"系"穆斯林宗教狂热"之误。

The table of contents of the October 9, 1981, afternoon edition of Cankao Ziliao, *a journal of reprints from the foreign press, not available to the general public.*

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Cankao Ziliao does not adhere to the public media's sacrosanct principle of reporting only "good" news. Indeed, one of its specialties is a feature called "Reflections on China" *(Dui Hua fanying)*, a section devoted exclusively to foreign articles and commentaries on the PRC, including some that are quite critical and pessimistic.[21] Moreover, unlike in *Renmin Ribao*, coverage of Taiwan in *Cankao Ziliao* is sometimes quite unfavorable to the PRC. For example, the August 17, 1981, issue carried a report comparing the economic development of Taiwan and that of the PRC. *Cankao Ziliao* readers were able to find figures not only on the standard of living in Taiwan, but also on the extent of improvement over the past two decades: 39 percent of the farmers owned a washing machine, 89 percent a refrigerator, 24 percent a telephone (11, 20, and 16 times, respectively, as many as in 1959).[22] Also in that month, *Cankao Ziliao* meticulously covered the anticommunist propaganda moves of the Kuomintang, including those that actually revealed the innermost mechanism of certain domestic PRC policies such as the campaign against the writer Bai Hua,[23] which was about to be resumed by the CCP.

But the tremendous undertaking required to publish two issues of *Cankao Ziliao* a day cannot be explained simply as a means to keep upper- and middle-level party cadres informed about topics that most of them will hardly ever have to deal with. Aside from satisfying the desires of cadres to read what foreigners think of them, their policies, and their country, in my opinion *Cankao Ziliao* serves a very practical purpose: it supplies China's propagandists with the basic information they need to write their editorials and commentaries for *Renmin Ribao*. Indeed, for Beijing's propaganda to be truly effective, a thorough and solid grounding in substantive issues is indispensable.[24]

A vivid example of this function of *Cankao Ziliao* can be found in its coverage of Taiwan. The afternoon edition of October 9 and the morning edition of October 11, 1981, for example, carried a "Report by our own correspondent" and two Xinhua dispatches from Hong Kong detailing the reactions and comments of Taiwanese and prominent overseas Chinese to Beijing's Nine-Point Proposal for the "peaceful reunification of the motherland."[25] Together, the three items took up more than five pages of the bulletin. One year later, in October 1982, the China Encyclopedia Yearbook 1982 *(Zhongguo Baike Nianjian 1982)* came off the press. One subsection of the yearbook's chapter on Taiwan, under the heading "Ye Jianying's Nine-Point Proposal Shook Taiwan," was apparently based on the material of the three reports that appeared in *Cankao Ziliao*. But the chapter in the publicly available yearbook aimed at creating the impression that Taiwan's leading figures, especially the academics, had been thrown into considerable confusion simply because of Beijing's proposal.[26] According to the yearbook, in view of Beijing's generosity and flexibility, the head of the Taiwanese Information Office of the Executive Yuan, Sung Ch´u-yü, not only rejected the proposal, he did so rather "hastily" *(jiji mangmang shuo)*. *Cankao Ziliao* readers, however, learned that Sung only "gave an interview" *(fabiao tanhua)*, during which he seems to have remained fairly calm. Moreover, statements that did not fit into the "Taiwanese in confusion" frame, though carried in *Cankao Ziliao*, were not cited in the yearbook. For instance, K'ang Ning-hsiang, introduced in the reference bulletin of October 11 as a member of the "Taiwanese oppositional faction," was quoted as saying that after reunification the people of Taiwan must enjoy the political right to "organize an opposition party." The account in the yearbook, however, quoted K'ang only as advocating reunification on a "democratic basis," a position, according to Beijing, that was clearly stipulated in the PRC's Nine-Point Proposal. Also, whereas the editors of the yearbook chose to overlook Taiwan's derisive response to Beijing's offer of financial aid (point six), the October 11 issue of *Cankao Ziliao* published numerous ironic and sharp statements of those on the island.

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[21] For several examples of critical or pessimistic articles, see Jörg-Meinhard Rudolph, "Media Coverage on Taiwan in the People's Republic of China," *Occasional Papers: Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, Baltimore, MD, University of Maryland School of Law, No. 3, 1983, pp. 38–39.

[22] See ibid., pp. 38–56.

[23] For a brief account of the Bai Hua affair, in which an intellectual in the Wuhan Military Region wrote a play that amounted to a bitter attack on Maoism, see Joffe, loc. cit., p. 58.

[24] It is for this reason that under special circumstances, even quite low-ranking (grade 20) cadres such as translators can read *Cankao Ziliao*, the prerequisite being that they deal with foreign affairs. For these cadres, *Cankao Ziliao* provides raw material for commentaries on many different topics. For example, when martial law was declared in Poland in December 1981, the editors of the bulletin immediately inserted a new category called "Situation in Poland," which supplied needed background material for *Renmin Ribao* commentators who wrote on the Polish crisis. And when, on October 15, 1982, in the "Voice of the readers" column of *Renmin Ribao* a report from the April 1982 *Harper's* (New York) titled "China Stinks" was repudiated, it is almost certain that the commentator used the *Cankao Ziliao* version and not the original.

[25] The three articles were reprinted in *Cankao Ziliao* under the following titles, respectively: "Our Nine-Point Proposal Leads to Heavy Attacks on the Taiwan Authorities"; "Taiwan Authorities and Public Opinion on Our Nine-Point Proposal: Specific Contents and Reactions"; and "Doubts of Some Chinese Scholars in America and of a Noted Figure in Taiwan Regarding Our Nine-Point Proposal for Taiwan." (Among the scholars quoted were Hungdah Chiu of University of Maryland School of Law and Parris H. Chang of Pennsylvania State University. The "noted figure" was K'ang Ning-hsiang.)

[26] See *Zhongguo Baike Nianjian 1982*, p. 106.

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Cankao Xiaoxi (Reference News)

Between the two extremes of the PRC communications system—the public and the internal sectors—there is a special kind of periodical, called *Cankao Xiaoxi*. Although technically classified as *neibu*, this publication is fairly accessible to Chinese citizens, as well as to some "foreign experts." Like *Cankao Ziliao*, it uses exclusively non-PRC sources, relying primarily on foreign press agency, newspaper, and magazine reports for its news coverage. Reviewing the sources from which the editors of the paper selected reprints dealing with the PRC between August 1981 and March 1982, it can be seen that only 3 out of 16 foreign news agencies were of communist origin (TASS, Soviet Union; ADN, East Germany; Tanjug, Yugoslavia). Their share of the total PRC news coverage was only 5 percent. Most reprints were taken from such Western news agencies as Reuters (22 percent), AP (22 percent), AFP (20 percent), and UPI (17 percent). At the same time, in the period under survey, articles from 130 different non-PRC periodicals were reprinted. Heading the list is Japan's *Mainichi Shimbun* with 27 reprints. The most frequently used Western press media were *The Asian Wall Street Journal* (13 reprints), *The New York Times* (13), and Great Britain's *Daily Telegraph* (10).[27]

Such wide-ranging news coverage, alone, makes this small four-page newspaper a unique phenomenon among the PRC press media; in some ways it resembles a Western daily newspaper, especially in its reportage of important international events. On December 16, 1981, for example, the declaration of martial law in Poland was prominently featured in front-page leaders in *Cankao Xiaoxi*, whereas the *Renmin Ribao* of the same day chose to focus on a tree-planting campaign then in progress (see illustration on p. 65).

With a circulation of 8.47 million copies a day,[28] *Cankao Xiaoxi* is the largest daily in the PRC, surpassing *Renmin Ribao* by some 3 million copies. It is printed each day in 25 cities,[29] which is five more printing offices than the party paper. But the most important difference between these two newspapers is in the receptivity of their readerships. Unlike *Renmin Ribao, Cankao Xiaoxi* is read fairly intensively by the people for whom it is mainly published: intellectuals and lower level party and government officials.[30] Its tremendous circulation is the result not of office or other forms of arranged subscriptions but of the decision of the individual subscriber, who spends about one-tenth of his average monthly salary of 60 yuan[31] for the privilege.

In striking contrast to what one might expect given its tremendous circulation, *Cankao Xiaoxi* is classified "internal reading material" and carries the warning "deposit carefully" imprinted on the front page of each copy. While this may enhance its attractiveness for the PRC readership, it obviously does not ensure a highly restricted accessibility.

Ever since foreign scholars and journalists first learned of *Cankao Xiaoxi*, it has caused widespread amazement and given rise to many rumors and much speculation. One foreign observer asked early on: "How well informed are Chinese officials about the outside world?"[32] Another later answered: "Chinese can read foreign reports."[33] Two years ago, one particularly interesting notice was carried by the Hong Kong monthly *Ming Pao*, dealing with "The Freedom of the News." The first of several related articles focused on the situation in the nearby People's Republic. After noting that Beijing's official press media were so boring because they only carried "no news," the author went on:

Maybe just because of that Beijing has published the Cankao Xiaoxi, *which carries news, articles, and commentaries from the foreign press. The contents are not at all garbled or abridged. This is genuine and most up-to-date news.*[34]

This appraisal of *Cankao Xiaoxi* as a valuable source of accurate information amidst a sea of boring and misinforming CCP-controlled media cannot be upheld upon closer examination of the paper's contents.

Analysis of *Cankao Xiaoxi*'s coverage of Taiwan between August 1981 and March 1982 reveals that the newspaper's editors chose to reprint news reports on adverse social and economic conditions on the island. Stories on antigovernment activity were used to demonstrate both the unpopularity of the ruling Kuomin-

[27] For an in-depth analysis of *Cankao Xiaoxi* coverage of PRC domestic affairs, see Rudolph, "*Cankao Xiaoxi*—Foreign News in the Propaganda System in the PRC."

[28] *Beijing Rundschau*, May 19, 1981, p. 23.

[29] This number of printing offices is given in a *Cankao Xiaoxi* subscription advertisement carried in the Dec. 7, 1981, issue.

[30] As noted in the advertisement in ibid.

[31] According to the 1983 edition of *Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian* (p. 22), average annual per-capita income in China in 1982 was 421 yuan (approximately 35 yuan per month). However, the 60-yuan figure used here is based on the average monthly salary of the translators with whom I worked in 1980–82, and is, in my opinion, fairly standard for the intellectuals and lower level cadres who comprise the bulk of the readership of *Cankao Xiaoxi*.

[32] See Henry G. Schwarz, "The Ts'an-K'ao Hsiao-hsi: How Well Informed Are Chinese Officials about the Outside World?" *The China Quarterly* (London), March 1966, pp. 54–83.

[33] This is the headline of an article by David Bonavia in *The Times* (London), July 8, 1975.

[34] *Ming Bao*, March 1982, p. 4.

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tang and the existence of political oppression on Taiwan. Moreover, the editors carefully avoided publishing any information on everyday life on Taiwan and the living standard of the people. Items containing facts and figures from which mainland readers would have been able to get a "taste of life" in Taiwan (as promised in one reprint) were deleted. For example, during this period, figures on average income and references to Taiwan's low rate of unemployment were censored.[35] The following passages from a November 11, 1981, *Daily Telegraph* report were deleted when the report appeared in *Cankao Xiaoxi*:

The 17 million Chinese on Taiwan have almost everything the one billion Chinese on the mainland want—reasonable housing, high wages, televisions, nice clothes, no rationing, no political campaigns, and the freedom to choose their own jobs and where they wish to live....

In sharp contrast to the grimy, grey gloom of the mainland cities, the streets of Taipei are alive with flashing neon lights, endless streams of traffic, thousands of shops, restaurants, coffee bars and beauty salons, symbols of the success of decadent bourgeois values.[36]

On the other hand, from the same *Daily Telegraph* report came details on pollution in Taipei ("so bad it is

[35]Rudolph, "Media Coverage on Taiwan," p. 26. However, the 1983 edition of China's statistical yearbook published an unemployment table for Taiwan that gave the jobless rate for 1981 as 1.3 percent and for 1982 as 2.2 percent (p. 555).

[36]I noted these omissions and discrepancies when comparing Graham Earnshaw's report in the *Daily Telegraph* of Nov. 11, 1981, with the *Cankao Xiaoxi* version of Nov. 29, 1981. A side-by-side comparison was included as Appendix 4 in the original version of this paper, which was presented at the 36th Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in Washington, DC, Mar. 23–25, 1984.

人民日报
RENMIN RIBAO
五届人大四次会议通过决议
开展全民义务植树运动
每人每年植树三至五棵
五届人大四次会议
关于人大常委会工作报告的决议
全国人民代表大会常务委员会工作报告
全国收购新棉四千七百多万担
昌图县提供商品粮超过十亿斤
邓小平会见南通社代表团
每人每年种三至五棵树
民盟中央举行大会纪念民盟成立四十周年

参考消息
CANKAO XIAOXI
外电评塔斯社就波兰实行军管发表的声明
外电报道波宣布进人军事状态后的国内形势
黑格谈美向波兰提供粮食援助问题
波大部分城市局势"看来是平静的"
《东京新闻》述评《将走向"日中经济"新时代》
卡代建就铜厂工人的罢工
波兰驻华使馆称不知道埃辛乔来华事

Front pages of the December 16, 1981, issues of Renmin Ribao *and* Cankao Xiaoxi*—the first featuring China's tree-planting campaign, the second, a Reuters dispatch on the establishment of martial law in Poland.*

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like being in the middle of a sandstorm") and statements on unjust treatment of women ("Prostitution is . . . a massive industry in Taiwan"). Nor did the editors pass up the opportunity to reprint direct comparisons that were favorable to the PRC: "First, life in Communist China [rendered as "Mainland" in *Cankao Xiaoxi*] has less of the tension and strain so common in capitalist society.... Second, the gap between rich and poor is not as great as in Taiwan...."

Apart from this kind of manipulation, incorrect translations could be found so regularly that it is hard to believe that these are accidental mistakes. *Cankao Xiaoxi*'s version of the same *Daily Telegraph* article rendered, for example, the English term "progress" as *biduan* ("malpractice") in Chinese, as the latter fitted much better into the image of Taiwan that is to be conveyed to the mainland's readership ("a warning that progress has its drawbacks"). When the same report referred to bicycles on the mainland as a "more primitive form of transport" as compared to Taiwan's motorcycles, the PRC version changed the word "primitive" into *jiandan* ("uncomplicated"). And the *Daily Telegraph* statement that the Taiwanese were better off than the mainlanders "in almost everything" was rendered by the paper's editors as "in some respects" *(zai yixie fangmian)*.

The aim of the paper's Taiwan coverage was therefore not to inform its readership. *Cankao Xiaoxi* supported, developed, or prepared the groundwork for the official propaganda for which the *Renmin Ribao* set the mark. In August 1981, readers of *Cankao Xiaoxi* were told that Taiwan faced foreign trade difficulties, that conflicts between labor and capital had increased, that no boom for Taiwan's industry was to be expected in the months ahead, that the entire economy was "in a depression" and, finally, that the Taiwan dollar had been devalued (here, of course, a figure was published!). In the following month, the paper reported that trade between Taiwan and the PRC had suffered a "great decline," that Taiwan's construction industry was experiencing difficulties, and that export figures were "on the decline." *Cankao Xiaoxi* also carried reports on spiraling vegetable prices (up by 30 percent due to a flood) and that all vegetables were in "short supply."

All items were taken from Taiwanese news media. All references were clearly indicated. Did not these news reports establish that Taiwan was in urgent need of economic aid? For readers of *Cankao Xiaoxi* it was thus only logical that as Beijing issued its Nine-point Proposal to Taiwan on September 30 of the same year, it also offered financial aid to the island.[37] Thus, point six of the PRC's reunification proposal (the commitment to "subsidize" Taiwan when "local finance is in difficulty") appeared as a mere consequence of the worsening economic situation in Taiwan as reported in *Cankao Xiaoxi*—though it may also have been that the CCP Central Committee fell victim to its own propaganda.

Conclusion

In some ways, coverage of Taiwan in the public media of the People's Republic of China has changed dramatically during the three and a half decades of Communist rule on the mainland. Once the focal point of the PRC's wrath and the object of an armed "liberation," Taiwan has become a partner in the effort to accomplish the "great cause of national reunification and the great goal of making China prosperous and strong."[38] As a result, today public coverage of Taiwan is designed to legitimate the island's incorporation into the political and economic system of mainland China. But this does not mean that the Chinese public will get objective coverage on Taiwan. Indeed, to my knowledge, even though Beijing has on occasion tacitly acknowledged Taiwan's superior economic achievements, the PRC's public media have revealed few (or no) positive facts and figures about Taiwan, especially concerning the standard of living on the island.

Cankao Xiaoxi plays a unique and crucial role in the task of preparing the Chinese public for "peaceful reunification." First, it is the most widely read daily newspaper in the PRC, perhaps reaching as many as 30 million Chinese, assuming three to four readers a copy. Moreover, the bulletin is classified *neibu*, which is likely to enhance its credibility as compared to the public media. More important than this, however, is the source of the material reprinted in *Cankao Xiaoxi*. While it basically presents the same negative picture of Taiwan as does *Renmin Ribao*, it relies exclusively on foreign, even mainly Taiwanese, sources. As a result, even those who normally do not believe a single word in the party paper are induced to believe the reports published in *Cankao Xiaoxi*, which are ostensibly impartial and sometimes even written by "class enemies."

But what effect does using *Cankao Xiaoxi* as a major source of information on Taiwan have on public

[37] See the Xinhua release of Sept. 30, 1981, with the headline "Ye Jianying Explains Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan to Motherland and Peaceful Reunification." The full text of this statement also appears in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), Sept. 30, 1981, pp. U/1–2.

[38] Ibid.

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perceptions? For one thing, it tends to verify the accuracy of the Taiwan coverage in *Renmin Ribao*. For another, it perpetuates the distorted image of Taiwan that is so characteristic of the public media's coverage. It also tends to head off meaningful debate on the subject, since readers no longer have arguments against the image created by the public media, as they will never be able to *prove* that *Cankao Xiaoxi* publishes garbled and thereby manipulative versions of foreign news items on Taiwan (and other politically sensitive subjects). As a result, millions of Chinese, many of them intellectuals, are forced to accept the logic and legitimacy of Beijing's Taiwan policy.

The "Provisional Regulations for the Work of Publishing Houses," quoted at the beginning of this article, stipulates that printed material in the PRC must be distributed according to the character of the manuscripts, taking into account the "intended readership" and the potential "social effects." What these social effects might be is not specified, but it may be assumed that they are bound to be negative if other than the "intended readership" has access. Apparently, simple figures and statistics on the number of motor bikes, washing machines, or per capita income *in* Taiwan fall into this category, since no such figures appear in the public media, or even in *Cankao Xiaoxi*. This information is reserved for the readership of *Cankao Ziliao* or similar *neibu* periodicals.

The classification system of the PRC media, therefore, provides the CCP with an effective means to control public access to information deemed potentially disruptive. But this hierarchical exclusion of the majority of Chinese from such information, in my opinion, is a result of a crisis of legitimation of the present regime. The acuteness of this "crisis of confidence," alluded to as "social effects" in CCP documents, defines the grade of accessibility to information. The role of the different sectors of the PRC publication system can thus be described as follows:

- *Renmin Ribao* propagates CCP policies;
- *Cankao Xiaoxi* legitimates CCP policies;
- *Neibu* sources inform the ruling elite and enable them to direct their propaganda efficiently and effectively.

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Books

Cambodia: Myths and Realities

Kishore Mahbubani

DAVID P. CHANDLER and BEN KIERNAN, Eds. *Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays.* New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1983.

BEN KIERNAN and CHANTHOU BOUA, Eds. *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942–1981.* London, Zed Press, 1982.

IT IS WIDELY known that Cambodia has experienced a great tragedy.[1] Few, however, understand why a nation of such "gentle folk" could have suffered so much in the last 14 years. The tragedy began with the 1970 coup d'état against Norodom Sihanouk by Lon Nol, who then foolishly involved Cambodia in the American struggle against the Vietnamese communists. The North Vietnamese seized this opportunity to invade Cambodia and destroy the main division of Lon Nol's army. This paved the way for the Khmer Rouge to take over Cambodia in April 1975, beginning one of the most horrendous periods of communist rule the world has ever seen.

Disagreements between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese communists, which had simmered for decades because of persistent Vietnamese attempts to dominate the Cambodian communist movement, surfaced soon after 1975. In December 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, setting up the puppet Heng Samrin regime. Despite widespread international and internal opposition, Vietnamese occupation continues. As a result, both countries continue to bleed.[2]

THE TWO BOOKS reviewed here attempt to answer some questions about the nature of the Cambodian tragedy. Both focus on the Khmer Rouge era and its immediate aftermath. Under Pol Pot, Cambodia was one of the world's most closed societies. But now, as the introduction to the volume edited by David Chandler and Ben Kiernan states, "ironically, ... the years 1975–78, which seemed a few years ago to cover one of the most inaccessible periods of Kampuchean history, have now become systematically studied..." (p. 6).

The Chandler/Kiernan volume is a collection of papers presented at a three-day seminar held in Chiangmai, Thailand in August 1981. All, with the exception of a piece by William Shawcross, examine recent Cambodian history. The volume edited by Kiernan and Chanthou Boua has a more eclectic collection. Somewhat disturbingly, the preface to this volume was written by the late Wilfred Burchett, a well-known apologist for Vietnam.

But the Kiernan/Boua book also reprints essays by some Khmer Rouge leaders, such as Hou Yuon and Hu Nim. In some respects, these are perhaps the most useful items in the collection, since they provide a direct insight into the thinking of the Khmer Rouge. (Both men, incidentally, were executed by Pol Pot. Hou Yuon, a jovial, deeply cultured, and popular leader, was killed before 1975. Hu Nim survived a little longer.) Both their essays attempt to suggest that the condition of Cambodia's peasantry had deteriorated in recent decades, setting the stage for an inevitable revolution. Kiernan refers approvingly to these two essays in his introductory remarks. Although he acknowledges, in a

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[1] This essay uses the traditional country name of Cambodia, rather than the official Kampuchea.

[2] For a review of the current situation, see Kishore Mahbubani, "The Kampuchean Problem: A Southeast Asian Perception," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Winter 1983/84.

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footnote, the comments on Hu Nim's essay made in Timothy Carney's *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea,* Kiernan significantly fails to mention that Carney disputed Hu Nim's analysis and concluded that "all in all, the case for a national rural tinderbox [in Cambodia] remains to be proved."[3]

This omission reflects a certain tendency one can find in both volumes under review. In spite of the obviously disastrous effects of the "revolution" in Cambodia, few of the contributors to either book reveal any disillusionment with communist revolutions. Indeed, the term "revolution" (used in its Marxist sense) and other Marxist concepts are used with apparent approval by the editors. Two of the worst catastrophes in Cambodia's modern history—its fall to the Khmer Rouge and its occupation by the Vietnamese—are described early in the Chandler/Kiernan volume (p. 2) as "the two liberations of Phnom Penh" (the word "liberation" appears without quotation marks).

The underlying assumption of both studies seems to be that while Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea (DK) was almost totally evil, what followed in Heng Samrin's People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was a return to a relatively benevolent revolution. Another passage in the introduction to the Chandler/Kiernan volume illustrates this viewpoint:

The pace of change in Kampuchea which transformed the country in the 1970's has slowed somewhat under the PRK regime, which has shown an interest in reviving and strengthening a wide range of pro-revolutionary institutions. Because the PRK sees itself as a revolutionary government, however, it would be imprecise to refer to it merely as an "aftermath" to DK.... Despite the relative flexibility that the leaders of PRK have displayed so far, it is unlikely that they will ever permit the resurgence of confrontation politics, an entrepreneurial economy or allow national elections in Kampuchea to be supervised by outsiders. (p. 7)

Note the interesting pejorative choice of words to indicate disapproval of a democratic, free-enterprise society. Chandler and Kiernan then go on to describe the current relationship between Cambodia and Vietnam:

For the next few years at least and probably longer, a pro-Vietnamese government will remain in Phnom Penh. The regime so far has repudiated the policies of DK; but it will certainly be unwilling to relinquish what it perceives to be its own socialist achievements or the advantages that accrue from continuing patronage from Vietnam. (p. 7)

The simple truth, of course, is that no such autonomous regime exists in Phnom Penh. Five years after the invasion, Cambodia remains under occupation by some 170,000 Vietnamese troops. Quite literally, there is only a puppet regime in place. Vietnamese control over the country is nearly absolute. The editors may be right in suggesting that a pro-Vietnamese government will remain in Phnom Penh; but the PRK leaders will have no choice in the matter. In its short history, the PRK regime managed to produce one leader, Pen Sovan, who tried to steer a course just a little independent of his Vietnamese masters. He was removed with dispatch in December 1981. The PRK regime is now headed by a former Khmer Rouge cadre, Heng Samrin, who does not appear to have any independent following. Even he has run afoul of his Vietnamese masters. In the middle of 1983, his name almost disappeared from the official press. Are these "the advantages that accrue from continuing patronage from Vietnam"?

It is true that the genocidal killings have stopped. However, Pol Pot's radical restructuring of society has by no means been entirely overturned. The state still controls all industry, all property, and all jobs. All the trappings of a communist society are firmly in place. Are these the "socialist achievements" referred to in the passage above?

One of the other contributors to the Chandler/Kiernan book tries to suggest that the Khmer Rouge period was an aberrant form of revolution. Serge Thion notes in the concluding paragraph of his essay on "The Cambodian Idea of A Revolution" that "what happened in Cambodia cannot be described as a 'perverted' or 'traitorous' interpretation of the term; it is just a total misunderstanding of what it represents" (p. 31). Evidently, the genocidal practices of the Khmer Rouge have troubled Thion and many other commentators, particularly those who sympathize with communist revolutions. What these commentators fail to realize, though, is that such practices have been deeply rooted in communist doctrine from the start. As Paul Johnson points out,

once Lenin had abolished the idea of personal guilt, and had started to "exterminate" (a word he frequently used) whole classes merely on account of occupation or parentage, there was no limit to which this deadly principle might

[3]Timothy Carney, *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea,* Data Paper No. 106, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, January 1977, p. 17.

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be carried.... Thus the modern practice of genocide was born.[4]

If nothing else, the contributors' assessments of the Pol Pot regime while it was still in power should have given them reason to pause before praising the Heng Samrin regime—the more so since it too is now dominated by Khmer Rouge cadres, of which more in a moment. Some of the writers who now denounce the Khmer Rouge period so vehemently are the same ones who failed to do so when Pol Pot ruled.[5] In 1977, David Chandler and Gareth Porter were asked to testify before the US Congress on Pol Pot's Kampuchea. In their testimony, one does not find any description of Khmer Rouge atrocities.[6] That same year, François Ponchaud published an impassioned book, *Cambodia, Year Zero,* describing as best as he could what was happening inside Cambodia, in an effort to alert public opinion.[7] Ponchaud was vehemently criticized; he is dismissed as a "sensationalist" by writers such as Michael Vickery (Kiernan/Boua, p. 113, fn. 3), who has contributed essays to both volumes under review. Of all these scholars, only Kiernan has tried to explain how he misjudged the Pol Pot regime.

[4]Paul Johnson, *Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties,* New York, Harper and Row, 1983, p. 71.

[5]See, for example, Gareth Porter and George Hildebrand, *Starvation and Revolution,* New York, Monthly Review Press, 1975; and Ben Kiernan's and Chanthou Boua's contributions to the bulletin *News from Kampuchea,* published in Australia by the Committee of Patriotic Kampucheans. I am indebted to Elizabeth Becker for her remarks on this point at the 34th convention of the Association of Asian Studies, Chicago, 1982.

[6]See US House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *Human Rights in Cambodia, Hearings* before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977.

[7]François Ponchaud, *Cambodia, Year Zero,* trans. by Nancy Amphoux, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978.

CLEARLY, most of the writers in the Chandler/Kiernan and Kiernan/Boua volumes want to draw a sharp distinction between the Pol Pot and the Heng Samrin regimes. The sad truth, however, is that former Khmer Rouge cadres comprise one-third of the Heng Samrin regime's officials—and even occupy the leading posts. Significantly, the regime continues to show a preference for recruiting former Khmer Rouge officials into its ranks, for they can be most easily absorbed into the new communist system. In 1983, the Heng Samrin regime declared May 20 to be a "National Day of Hatred" against the Khmer Rouge [KR]. Yet, as Elizabeth Becker has recently pointed out:

...the regime has continued its amnesty programme aimed at inducing Khmer Rouge to surrender with little penalty to the PRK. Under the PRK reeducation programme, any former Khmer Rouge official is given one to three months of reeducation and then allowed to become a full citizen. Overseas Cambodians who were the victims of the Khmer Rouge, however, are forbidden to return to Kampuchea.... The regime's jails are filled with nationalists or KPNLF [Khmer People's National Liberation Front] people, not Khmer Rouge, the minister of justice said.[8]

The preference for absorbing former KR cadres reveals another important fact that is not highlighted in either volume: the Vietnamese communists, too, feel more comfortable working with Cambodian communists, including even the Khmer Rouge. In fact, if only Pol Pot had not been so foolish as to provoke the Vietnamese at the Cambodian/Vietnamese border, he would probably still be in power in Phnom Penh, with his "revolution" strongly defended by Hanoi. To their credit, Vietnamese officials have themselves admitted in private that they did not invade Cambodia to save the Cambodian people from Pol Pot but to save Vietnam from what they call a "Chinese threat."[9] The real reasons for the split between the Vietnamese communists and the Khmer Rouge were not ideological differences but the latter's refusal to accept the former's domination over Indochina. It is therefore not surprising that the Vietnamese should show a preference for recruiting former Khmer Rouge cadres into the Heng Samrin regime.

Alone among the contributors to these two collections, William Shawcross was written about this truth, in a recent essay for a different publication. Shawcross notes that Hanoi decided to

fill the Heng Samrin Administration with cadres who had previously worked ... for "Pol Pot." Heng Samrin himself, Hun Sen, the foreign minister, even the minister of justice, Ouk Boun Chheoun, were all Khmer Rouge officials....

...it must have been bitter for many hundreds of thousands of ordinary noncommunist Cambodians to realize that their liberators

[8]Elizabeth Becker, "Kampuchea in 1983: Further from Peace," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), January 1984, p. 45. See also Kampuchean Inquiry Commission, *Report of a Finnish Inquiry Commission: Kampuchea in the Seventies,* Helsinki, 1982, p. 43, where one reads that "imprisoned Khmer Rouge are treated with surprising tolerance." In general, this report falls victim to the trap of drawing a black and white distinction between Pol Pot and Heng Samrin.

[9]For example, Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach made this admission in a conversation with US Congressman Stephen Solarz on January 2, 1981. Giving the reasons for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, Thach said: "Human rights was not the question. That was their [i.e., the Cambodians'] problem." Private communication to the author.

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placed more confidence in the torturers than in their victims....[10]

It is a pity, given his view of this aspect of Heng Samrin's Cambodia, that Shawcross chose to confine his essay in the Chandler/Kiernan anthology to a discussion of the positions taken by various Western intellectuals (especially the "mandarin" of the New Left movement, Noam Chomsky) during the Pol Pot era.

The reluctance to acknowledge the reality of the Heng Samrin regime in Cambodia seems to recur on the question of Vietnamese settlement there. For example, in Kiernan's essay, "Kampuchea Stumbles to Its Feet," in the volume edited with Chanthou Boua, the author claims that

extensive travels along the Vietnam-Kampuchean border revealed no evidence whatsoever of Vietnamese coming to settle on Kampuchean land. In both Vietnam and Kampuchea, I was informed by people living along the frontier that such settlement is prohibited, even for former Vietnamese inhabitants of Kampuchea expelled to Vietnam by the Lon Nol and Pol Pot regimes. (p. 380)

Now, however, neither Vietnam nor Cambodia denies that such settlement is taking place. The Heng Samrin regime has been forced by Hanoi to allow it. In a document entitled "The Situation of the Vietnamese Residents in the Kampuchean Community," which is worth quoting at some length, the regime notes that in May 1982,

... the Central Committee of the Kampuchean Revolutionary People's Party issued directive 142 on ensuring adequate living conditions and providing jobs to Vietnamese residents in Kampuchea, and on 13 September 1982, the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee issued a circular giving guidelines for the implementation of that directive. The Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Kampuchea issued directive 38 of 9 October 1982 on the organization and administration of Vietnamese residents in Kampuchea.

In that directive, the Council of Ministers pointed out: "With regard to former Vietnamese residents in Kampuchea who were the victims of pogroms and massacres under the former regimes and who, thanks to popular protection, were able to survive [or] escape to Vietnam and who have now returned to Kampuchea, the local authorities and populations shall give them assistance and create conditions for them to quickly settle down to normal life. (Article 1).

With regard to Vietnamese people who have come to Kampuchea since liberation and are engaged in occupations which contribute to the rehabilitation and development of the economy such as farming, fishing, salt-making, handicrafts ... and who maintain good relations with the people, the local authorities shall create conditions for them to stay in the country and work. (Article 2)[11]

No reliable figures are available on the number of Vietnamese settlers in Kampuchea. Estimates vary from 150,000 to 640,000. Phnom Penh, at any rate, is being flooded with Vietnamese immigrants. Understandably, this trend has created considerable alarm among the Cambodian population.

CAMBODIAN FEARS of being overrun by the Vietnamese are not new. Over time, Cambodia has progressively lost territory to Vietnam; parts of southern Vietnam once belonged to Cambodia. The real nightmare that Cambodians now face is that permanent Vietnamese occupation could lead to the disappearance of their nation.

Some of the most perceptive historical studies of Cambodian-Vietnamese relations have been done by David Chandler, one of the editors of the works under review. In a journal article on "The Tragedy of Cambodian History," Chandler notes that "Cambodians associate periods of powerlessness with periods of Vietnamese control, and periods of nationalist unrest (such as the 1840's, 1970–72 or 1976–78) with killing Vietnamese."[12] In fact, as Chandler aptly remarks in another article devoted to the anti-Vietnamese rebellion in early 19th-century Cambodia, "'non-Vietnameseness' ... has been treated by many Cambodians as an essential part of Khmer identity."[13]

Given this profound understanding of the history of Cambodian nationalism, it is curious that Chandler, like some of the other writers in the collection he coedited with Kiernan, should display such little sympathy for Cambodian fears—fears that seem to have been realized by the stubborn Vietnamese

[10]William Shawcross, "The Burial of Cambodia," *New York Review of Books*, May 10, 1984, pp. 18–19. See also Elizabeth Becker, "The Legacy of Pol Pot," *The Washington Post*, Mar. 1, 1983.

[11]This document was circulated at the United Nations with a letter from the Permanent Representative of the Lao People's Democratic Republic; see UN Document A/38/490/S16029, pp. 10–11.

[12]David P. Chandler, "The Tragedy of Cambodian History," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver, BC), Fall 1979, pp. 411 and 413.

[13]Idem, "An Anti-Vietnamese Rebellion in Early Nineteenth Century Cambodia: Pre-Colonial Imperialism and a Pre-Nationalist Response," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* (Kent Ridge, Singapore), March 1975.

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occupation of their country. For instance, Chandler notes that the PRK regime has "chosen to play down the chauvinistic aspects of Cambodian communism and historiography," which the Khmer Rouge had encouraged in the face of Vietnamese threats (p. 50). Similarly, Michael Vickery (p. 131) criticizes the Khmer Rouge for "the linking of all 'treason' with Vietnam (whose role as hereditary enemy and source of all its ills was emphasized in quite an un-Marxist, petty bourgeois fashion even more than in Sihanouk–Lon Nol days)...."

Undoubtedly, Cambodian nationalism has had its dark side. Thousands of innocent Vietnamese were killed on Cambodian soil in periodic bouts of anti-Vietnamese hysteria. Even in the last decade, there have been such mass killings. There is every reason to point out the ugly features of Cambodian nationalism. Yet, in fairness to the Cambodians, it should also be pointed out that Cambodia has never been a threat to Vietnam; historically, the reverse has been true.

Vietnamese designs on Cambodia result in part from a conviction that Vietnam has a natural right to exercise hegemony over Indochina, a conviction buttressed by the chauvinistic attitude the Vietnamese have toward their Cambodian neighbors. This attitude is well encapsulated in remarks made in the mid-19th century by a Vietnamese minister of state, Phang-Thang-Giang:

The Cambodians are savages of a bad and vicious nature: now they submit, then they rebel, but they constantly forget rules and laws; it is as if they were stupid and devoid of reason.[14]

Against this historical background, it is not surprising that the briefly benevolent Vietnamese conquest of Cambodia in 1979 was soon followed by a harsher occupation, which is progressively alienating the native population. The major weakness of both the Chandler/Kiernan and the Kiernan/Boua volumes is that they fail to reflect this fundamental political reality of Indochina today.

[14] "Nineteenth Century Dynastic Rivalries in Mainland Southeast Asia," in Harry J. Benda and John A. Larkin, *World of Southeast Asia: Selected Historical Readings*, New York, Harper and Row, 1967, p. 154.

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Economic Issues in East-South Relations

Robert M. Cutler

MICHAEL RADU, Ed. *Eastern Europe and the Third World: East vs. South.* New York, Praeger Publishers, 1981.

MARIE LAVIGNE, Ed. *Stratégies des pays socialistes dans l'échange international* (Strategies of the Socialist Countries in International Trade). Paris, Economica, 1980.

ELIZABETH KRIDL VALKENIER. *The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind.* New York, Praeger Publishers, 1983.

E. Ye. OBMINSKIY. *Gruppa 77: Mnogostoronnaya ekonomicheskaya diplomatiya razvivayushchikhsya stran* (The Group of 77: Multilateral Economic Diplomacy of the Developing Countries). Moscow, Nauka, 1982.

CHRISTOPHER T. SAUNDERS, Ed. *East-West-South: Economic Interactions between Three Worlds.* New York, St. Martin's, 1981.

ERVIN LASZLO and JOEL KURTZMAN, Eds. *Eastern Europe and the New International Economic Order: Representative Samples of Socialist Perspectives.* New York, Pergamon Press, 1980.

Ye. A. DANILOV. *SEV i tretiye strany: Yuridicheskiye predposylki i formy sotrudnichestva* (CMEA and Third Countries: Juridical Prerequisites and Forms of Cooperation). Moscow, Nauka, 1982.

V. D. POPOV. *Ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo stran SEV s razvivayushchimisya gosudarstvami* (Economic Cooperation of CMEA Countries with the Developing Countries). Moscow, Ekonomika, 1982.

THE MEMBERS of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) are playing an ever larger role in the global economy. The complexity of their economic relations with the developing countries in particular is increasing. But the international trading behavior of the Council's six East European members over the past decade has diverged more and more from that of the USSR, reflecting quite different perspectives on West-South[1] relations and on the world market. This essay analyzes those differing approaches to economic relations with the less-developed countries (LDC's)[2] from the standpoint of international political economy. Drawing on international law as well as politics and economics, this study also examines how East-South trade affects traditional Marxist-Leninist images of international affairs.

Although East-South trade constitutes only about 2 percent of total world trade, it is quite important to the East European countries—more important, in fact, than it is to the developing countries. For example, whereas in 1982 the import and export shares of East-South trade in all international commerce of CMEA countries were 13.2 and 13.8 percent, respectively, for the LDC's, East-South trade in 1981 composed only 2.5 percent of imports and 5.3 percent of exports. The developing countries' participation in overall East-bloc trade rose strikingly

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[1] In this essay, I follow the standard usage of the terms "West," "South," and "East," which refer respectively to the advanced industrial democracies; to the Third World countries; and to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

[2] The acronym "DC's," sometimes used for "developing countries," is more frequently used to mean "developed countries"; therefore I use "LDC's" in this essay. (The use of "LDC's" to mean "least developed countries"—which in UN parlance are properly called the "least developed developing countries" or "LDDC's"—is likewise confusing and to be avoided.) In the context of the United Nations, the LDC's are sometimes called the "Group of 77" (though they now number over 120), and the East European CMEA countries "Group D." Both these terms derive from usage in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

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throughout the 1970's. In the case of Romania, for example, exports to developing countries jumped from 9.6 to 28.1 percent of the country's total foreign trade between 1970 and 1981.

Far too much of the research on this subject consists of descriptive analyses either of trade ties between LDC's as a single unit and individual CMEA members, or of trade and aid ties between CMEA members taken together and selected developing countries. However, most of the books reviewed here offer other perspectives, treating CMEA-LDC relations from the standpoints of international economics, law, and politics. Such perspectives surpass the usual scope of English-language analyses, which focus on military trade and aid from the CMEA countries to the LDC's;[3] they also shed light on recent developments in East-South trade and provide insights not obtainable from purely political or geostrategic approaches.

Aside from selected chapters in the books edited by Ervin Laszlo and Joel Kurtzman and by Christopher Saunders, only Michael Radu's book devotes considerable attention to the economic relations of individual CMEA members with the Third World. In his introduction, Radu focuses on economic relations through a geopolitical lens, offering a four-fold classification of "Southern" countries and a six-fold classification of "Eastern" ones. This is a legitimate enterprise, but the lens is clouded with jargon. None of the contributors to the book makes use of these typologies, not even Radu himself in his inconclusive chapter on Romanian relations with the Third World (pp. 235–72). Still less enlightening are the chapters on Yugoslavia and Albania. And Radu is not the only contributor who includes in his chapter tables that he does not refer to in the text.

Perhaps it is no coincidence that the quality of the analysis is roughly proportional to the degree to which economic considerations are integrated into strategic analysis. A case in point is Michael Sodaro's solid and well-written survey of the German Democratic Republic's (GDR) relations with the Third World. Sodaro considers trade and aid within a general framework that subsumes GDR–LDC economic relations under the broader question of the country's role in Soviet strategy. His conclusion on this point bears noting:

The GDR's activities in the Third World may be viewed as fulfulling four functions: (1) assisting the Soviet Union's efforts to influence various Third World states or liberation movements; (2) providing the GDR with necessary import goods and export markets; (3) enhancing the international visibility and prestige of the GDR, a goal which assumes special significance in view of East Germany's continuing rivalry with the Federal Republic; and (4) bolstering the internal legitimacy of the GDR. (p. 134)

STILL MORE demonstrative of the virtue of incorporating economic factors into political analysis is Vratislav Pechota's excellent chapter on Czechoslovakia. Pechota, who in 1966 chaired the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, makes good use of his background as an expert in international law and international organization. He judiciously traces the trends in Czechoslovak foreign trade over the last three decades and convincingly demonstrates the crippling effect the 1968 Soviet invasion had on Czechoslovakia's capacity to undertake initiatives to ameliorate its foreign trade situation. Pechota also discusses the influence of legal aspects of commerce on Czechoslovakia's economic interaction with the Third World, particularly that involving technology transfer and joint stock companies. His chapter clearly illustrates how the fields of law and economics can make valuable contributions to the discussion of political relations between developing and socialist countries.

The concluding chapters in the Radu book, by Roger Kanet and by Janos Radvanyi, discuss economic relations not between the Third World and individual CMEA members, but between the Third World and the CMEA countries taken together. Kanet's chapter is particularly rich and synthetic, demonstrating a breadth unfortunately absent in much other work on the subject. The author rightly concludes that most East European states see the Third World as more important for stabilizing and strengthening their own national economies than for anything else; that they nevertheless continue to

[3]Good examples of this approach include Roger F. Pajak, "The Effectiveness of Soviet Arms Aid Diplomacy in the Third World," in Robert H. Donaldson, Ed., *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981, pp. 384–408; John D. Copper and Daniel S. Papp, Eds., *Communist Nations' Military Assistance*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983; and Gu Guan-fu, "Soviet Aid to the Third World, an Analysis of its Strategy," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1983, pp. 71–89. Notable among the relatively few items that take a global-economic perspective are Jürgen Nötzold, "The CMEA States and the North-South Dialogue," *Aussenpolitik* (Hamburg), No. 2, 1979, pp. 192–209; Toby Trister Gati, "The Soviet Union and the North-South Dialogue," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Summer 1980, pp. 241–70; Maciej Kostecki, "The USSR Confronts the System of Multilateral Trade," *Revue d'Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest* (Paris), September 1979, pp. 75–89; Carl H. McMillan, *The Political Economy of Tripartite (East-West-South) Cooperation*, East-West Commercial Relations Research Report 12, Ottawa, Carleton University, Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, January 1980; and Ruben Berrios, "The Political Economy of East-South Relations," *Journal of Peace Research* (Oslo), No. 3, 1980, pp. 239–52.

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provide costly military and other support to Third World revolutionary movements and regimes backed by the Soviet Union; and that there is no contradiction in this approach since military-political support can lead to increased economic relations in the future (p. 325).

Radvanyi provides on overview of patterns in the evolution over three decades of collective socialist foreign economic policy that tends to support Kanet's conclusions. He notes that individual CMEA members pursue "the search for new markets and commercial gains" (p. 343) in different ways and to different degrees. For example, Hungary prefers to use hard currency in its trade with LDC's, conducting nearly two-thirds of its Third World commerce this way. Other East European countries show this preference, though to lesser degrees. The USSR's heavy reliance on barter is an exception. Of course, countries that conduct trade with the Third World in hard currency can use any resulting trade surplus to help offset deficits in East-West trade. Although the amount of surplus varied from country to country, in 1982 the six East European members of CMEA together realized a surplus in their Third World trade equal to 72 percent of their deficit in trade with the West.

Jean Diambou focuses on the LDC side of this issue. His analysis of the financial arrangements available to the developing countries for settling accounts in international trade with the CMEA countries (in the volume edited by Marie Lavigne, pp. 119–32) touches on LDC use of multilateral devices to diversify payments,[4] but he does not mention the transferable-ruble system, the multilateralization of which has long been debated within CMEA. However, the transferable-ruble system has not lent itself to such operations in practice. Indeed, while the transferable ruble may become more convertible into hard currencies through broader utilization,[5] the LDC's might reserve it for trade with the East European countries, and conserve their fully convertible currencies (as the socialist countries themselves now do) for purchasing Western technology and amortizing debts to Western banks. Because the transferable-ruble system as now constituted favors the USSR, Moscow is quite conservative on the issue of multilateralization. But it is no secret that certain smaller CMEA members would prefer to see the transferable ruble multilateralized.

THE DIFFERENTIATION of the foreign trade patterns of the smaller CMEA countries from that of the Soviet Union reflects the evolution of diverse perspectives on global trade generally and on Eastern Europe's role in the world economy in particular. These perspectives arise from differing schools of thought on how to deal with the Third World, and they animate discussion not only in the smaller CMEA countries but in the USSR as well. Principal among these different schools are the ones delineated by Elizabeth Valkenier in her excellent examination of Soviet perspectives on the world economy. Indeed, the most intriguing parts of her study are those where she treats the influence of East European thinking on Soviet views (pp. 59–62, 127–35), the evolution of Soviet views over the last 10 years (pp. 52–59, 62–69, 81–97, 111–21, 147–50), and current Soviet policy concerning particular Third World development issues (pp. 97–103, 122–27, 135–43). Valkenier, who demonstrates an impressive depth and breadth of knowledge of the Soviet literature, shows how Soviet views of the world economy have changed in response to economic realities, forcing the USSR to recognize the impossibility of exercising decisive leverage over the developing countries.

Valkenier distinguishes three groups among Soviet decision-makers and political economists: ideologues, skeptical realists, and globalists. Ideologues, she contends, still believe that Soviet interests are best served by manipulating Third World resentments against the West. Skeptical realists make a different argument. They contend that the Soviet Union should base its policy more on cost-benefit analysis than on ideological precepts, since LDC's tend to act independently according to their perceived self-interests. Finally, the globalists argue against using the developing countries' problems as a lever for tilting the world correlation forces in the

[4] "Multilateralization" of payments refers to balancing accounts with an ensemble of trading partners rather than with any one particular country. For this, a commonly acceptable means of payment is necessary. The transferable ruble is a bilateral device because it is used to settle accounts only between the USSR and other parties. When Moscow is not one of the traders concerned, the device cannot be used to settle accounts, even if the partners involved also trade with the Soviet Union. The discussion of this problem in Sándor Ausch, *Theory and Practice of CMEA Cooperation*, Budapest, Akadémiai kiadó, 1972, has lost none of its currency.

[5] See the lucid analysis of the relation between multilateralization and convertibility in Harriet Matejka, "Convertibility in East Europe," *Annales d'études internationales* (Geneva), 1974, pp. 175–90; also idem, "Compensation, Convertibility and the Volume of East-West Trade," in Giuseppe Schiavone, Ed., *East-West Relations: Prospects for the 1980s*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982. At present the transferable ruble is used only in accounting between the USSR and other CMEA members; it is not used even for settling accounts between, for example, Poland and Hungary. The obstacles to its use as a means for payment between developing countries and East European countries are discussed by Andrzej Bień and Grzegorz Nosiadek, "Improving the Function of the Transferable Ruble as an International Currency," trans. in *Soviet and East European Foreign Trade* (White Plains, NY), Summer 1980, pp. 26–47, esp. pp. 28, 33, 44–45.

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USSR's favor; they assert instead the need for broad cooperation among *all* advanced countries to help solve those problems—overpopulation, food shortages, backwardness—that would otherwise create unrest in the LDC's (pp. 148–49).

Valkenier distinguishes between "globalist" and "bifurcated" approaches in Soviet analyses of the world market. Advocates of the latter approach, in conformity with traditional Marxist-Leninist analysis, maintain that capitalist and socialist world markets exist independently and simultaneously side by side; the globalists assert that these markets are integrated. Valkenier also discusses schools of analysis in the Soviet Union regarding West-South relations. Participants in this debate are proponents either of the "economic liberation" (i.e., from neocolonialism) approach or of the "interdependence" (i.e., of advanced capitalist and less-developed countries) approach.

Figure 1: Soviet Schools of Thought



SOURCE: Adapted from Elizabeth Valkenier's *The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind*, New York, Praeger, 1983. For an example of the "hortatory pragmatists," a new tendency in Soviet thought, see E. Ye. Obminskiy, *Gruppa 77: Mnogostoronnaya ekonomicheskaya diplomatiya razvivayushchikhsya stran* (The Group of 77: Multilateral Economic Diplomacy of the Developing Countries), Moscow, Nauka, 1982.

TO VALKENIER'S three-fold classification we can add a fourth school of thought that seems to be emerging in the most recent Soviet literature on the Third World. E. Ye. Obminskiy's monograph is an example of it. This school of thought continues to see Western exploitation, and the Third World's reaction to it, as the dominant development pattern among LDC's. Because this school urges opposition to such "neocolonialism" while recognizing nonetheless the complexity of current international trade patterns, it is convenient to call its adherents "hortatory pragmatists."[6] (See the typology in Figure 1.)

In her analysis, Valkenier classifies an earlier book of Obminskiy's, published in 1974, as globalist; and in fact it is.[7] But Obminskiy's more recent book, reviewed here, demonstrates how the constraint of ideology may rigidify the globalist viewpoint. The impact of such a constraint can be seen in the author's insistence on associating the economic program of the Group of 77 with the political program of the Nonaligned Movement. Thus, Obminskiy attributes the growth of the influence of the Group of 77 partly to its relations with the latter movement. Discussing various ongoing negotiations at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and summarizing the issues underlying them, he offers an ambivalent evaluation of the LDC program of "collective self-reliance." This the author interprets as comprising chiefly the UNCTAD-sponsored work on economic and technical cooperation among developing countries. Obminskiy ignores the constructive efforts of the developing countries' regional organizations to establish inter-LDC cooperation. Instead, he deplores at length the effects of the "exacerbation of the world capitalist economic crisis" on the Group of 77.

The emergence of the hortatory-pragmatist school seems to have

[6] For other recent statements of the hortatory-pragmatist viewpoint, see O. Bogomolov, "CMEA and Global Problems," *International Affairs* (Moscow), May 1983, pp. 21–31; *Sovremennye mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya i vneshnaya politika SSSR* (Contemporary International Relations and the USSR's Foreign Policy), Moscow, Mysl', 1983, pp. 361–74; and *SEV: Mezhdunarodnoye znacheniye sotsialisticheskoi integratsii* (CMEA: The International Significance of Socialist Integration), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1979, pp. 254–91.

[7] Of his *Razvivayushchiyesya strany i mezhdunarodnoye razdeleniye truda* (The Developing Countries and the International Division of Labor) Valkenier says: "The first book to offer the new [i.e., globalist] interpretation of the international division of labor frankly admitted that the 'perfect' system of Soviet–Third World exchanges was not an operative but only a hypothetical situation" (pp. 83–84).

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paralleled a shift in the locus of decision-making in the international commerce bureaucracy in the Soviet Union. Indeed, in recent years the work of the various Soviet ministries involved in such activity has been increasingly supervised by the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations and the State Committee for Science and Technology. This has reduced the ministries' relative autonomy in foreign trade decision-making and insinuated into Soviet foreign trade planning a conservative tendency that complements the hortatory-pragmatist school. For example, when Oleg Bogomolov, director of the Economics of the World Socialist System Institute in Moscow, had the opportunity to specify the nature of Soviet participation in realizing the New International Economic Order (NIEO), he offered only the prospect of intensifying existing East-South economic relations, not that of transforming them. In particular, he envisioned continuing East-South economic cooperation in mineral prospecting, extracting and processing raw materials, industrial construction, and activities that would increase CMEA imports of labor-intensive manufactures and products of LDC national industries (see the collection edited by Christopher Saunders, pp. 246–56, esp. p. 254). These are typical features of the division of labor between North and South.

ONE OF THE most striking aspects of the evolution of East-South trade over the last 10 years is the CMEA countries' failure to establish strong commercial relations with the newly industrializing countries (NIC's). As a result, imports by CMEA countries of manufactured goods from the Third World actually decreased in the 1970's. During this decade as well, the NIC's were rapidly becoming the most dynamic manufactures market in the South. This was probably what Hungarian economist Tamás Szentes had in mind in his discussion of the question that Bogomolov shunted aside, namely, how new forms of technical cooperation might help not just quantitatively to redistribute economic goods along existing patterns, but instead qualitatively to restructure economic relations in general and the international division of labor in particular. Szentes, a true globalist according to the typology in Figure 1, suggests, for example, that imports of primary products from LDC's could be linked with the development of those countries' manufacturing industries: the importing country could export appropriate machinery to the LDC's concerned, and then progressively increase its proportion of imports of finished or semifinished products, as against raw materials, from that sector (Saunders, pp. 303–08).

Hungary's trade with the developing countries is not only more varied and wide-ranging than that of any other CMEA member, but also more important to the country itself. Mihaly Simai's chapter in the book edited by Ervin Laszlo and Joel Kurtzman (pp. 64–83) mentions both the use of convertible currencies and the innovative incentive structure for encouraging foreign trade at the enterprise level.[8] These have enabled Hungary to engage in cooperation agreements with Western firms to construct "turnkey" plants[9] in developing countries or to engage in joint ventures there. In the late 1970's, Csepel (Hungary) agreed with Volvo (Sweden) on the establishment of joint ventures in the automotive industry; Chemokomplex (Hungary) with Vereinigte Edelstahlwerke (Austria) on turnkey plants; Babolina Agricultural Combinate (Hungary) with Protinas (West Germany) on turnkey farms and agricultural equipment; and so forth.

OF COURSE, Hungary is not the only CMEA country to engage in tripartite cooperation. Indeed, every CMEA country has taken advantage of this new practice. Thus, CMEA members' growing reliance on transfer of technology to encourage foreign trade has increased the centrality of this issue in East-South trade relations. A comparative analysis of East-South and West-South technological transfer could help to clarify the future role of the CMEA countries in the emerging international economic order.

It would also be important to determine how successful recipient countries have been in controlling the social and economic effects of technologies transferred to them.[10] Carefully framed research on this question could even touch on whether Eastern and Western technologies are ideology-free or

[8]Simai draws on the excellent Hungarian contributions to an UNCTAD-sponsored seminar: I. Dobozi et al., "Economic Cooperation Between Hungary and the Developing Countries," and T. Szentes, "The Development of Economic, Technical, and Scientific Relations Between Hungary and the Developing Countries," both in I. Dobozi, Ed., *Economic Cooperation between Socialist and Developing Countries*, Budapest, Hungarian Scientific Council for World Economy, 1978, pp. 87–138 and 139–60 respectively.

[9]A "turnkey" plant is one that the contractors agree to build and install to the point of readiness for operation, and then turn over to another party for occupancy. Training of personnel is sometimes also part of the turnkey agreement.

[10]If features of the technology transfer project are treated as independent variables, then economic and social structures in the recipient countries become dependent variables. In this framework, the developing country's machinery for controlling the effects of technology transfer projects is an intervening variable. Matched-case comparisons of East-South, West-South, and East-West-South ("tripartite") projects would be appropriate.

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whether they in fact motivate different social and economic changes in the recipient country. But research on the more general problem would certainly help clarify how various centrally planned economies may contribute to the development of the global economy, illuminating, in turn, the nature of their participation in it.[11]

Specialists in the CMEA countries disagree on what the nature of that participation should be. A particularly instructive contrast on the subject is offered in the Saunders volume. Marian Paszyński (Foreign Trade Research Institute, Warsaw) and István Dobozi and András Inotai (Institute for World Economics, Budapest) differ over the basic role of foreign trade in socialist planning. For Paszyński, "the main function of exports in a socialist economy is not to provide for the most effective resource allocation and to optimize capacity but to secure revenue to cover indispensable import requirements" (p. 39). For Dobozi and Inotai, however, the merging of the CMEA countries "into the international division of labor [is] an essential precondition for the improvement of their economies' efficiency and viability" (p. 49). Both these perspectives are "interdependentist" in Valkenier's terms, but Paszyński appears locked in a bifurcationist approach to the world market, whereas Dobozi and Inotai emerge as globalists.

Such nuances of difference among the CMEA countries' approaches to issues of the strategies for Third World development are analyzed by Barbara Despiney. She also outlines the guarded responses of the CMEA countries to a series of demands made to them by the Group of 77 at UNCTAD (in Lavigne, pp. 116–17).[12] In the same book, Jocelyne Decaye (pp. 133–52) points up differences of interest between countries in the East and South, notably the increasing competition between these two parts of the world for Western markets for their manufactured goods.[13] It is precisely in conditions of such increasing competition that the differences among national commercial policies of the individual CMEA countries become especially significant.

This East-South competition is becoming particularly acute in labor-intensive manufactured goods and material-intensive semimanufactured products. Additional areas of competition include attempts to entice foreign firms (mainly Western transnationals) to invest in local manufacturing for export, and to attract Western capital. Tripartite industrial cooperation (TIC) constitutes an innovative possibility for surmounting some of this conflict. Patrick Gutman, who is probably the world's leading authority on TIC, defines that phenomenon as "the joint construction by Eastern Europe and the West of industrial complexes in . . . Third World countries" (Saunders, p. 337). According to Soviet specialist Leon Zevin (Economics of the World Socialist System Institute in Moscow), TIC offers LDC's three advantages: it is coordinated by the developing country; it enables the developing country to overcome excessive reliance on the West for economic development; and it helps to oppose "the self-seeking activities of the transnational corporations" (Saunders, p. 301). However, Gutman's empirical study of TIC involving French companies suggests that in reality these advantages may not be realized:

> *It seems necessary to distinguish between the merits of TIC as a particularly appropriate means of international industrial marketing for the Eastern and Western partners and its real value for the development of third countries. In this respect current studies of TIC generally tend to treat it as an autonomous phenomenon, . . . [but] TIC is at the same time a manifestation of the dynamics of the system—both East and West—and consequently one factor in the interplay of their competition and perpetuation.* (p. 349)

Indeed, Gutman's analysis shows that in "France-East-South" TIC's between 1965 and 1975, third-country firms did not even participate in the construction of two-thirds of the projects. Moreover, "the average share of the South in the work is less than 10 percent of the global value of the projects" (p. 343).[14]

THE GROWTH of East-South cooperation, with or without the West's participation, is hampered by the absence of adequate institutional machinery. For example, technol-

[11] For a statement of the dominant view, which may now apply more to the Soviet Union than to some of the smaller CMEA members, see Richard Portes, "East, West, and South: The Role of Centrally Planned Economies in the International Economy," *Revue d'Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest*, September 1979, pp. 31–73. Compare Josef Pajestka and Jan Kulig, "The Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe and the New International Economic Order," *Trade and Development: An UNCTAD Review* (Geneva), Spring 1979, pp. 78–81. Further, see UNCTAD, "Legislation and Regulations on Technology Transfer: Empirical Analysis of Their Effects in Selected Countries," UN Document TD/B/C.6/55, Aug. 28, 1980.

[12] Compare Robert M. Cutler, "East-South Relations at UNCTAD: Global Political Economy and the CMEA," *International Organization* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1983, pp. 121–42.

[13] See further Annette Robert, "East-South Competition in the Western European Markets," in István Dobozi and Péter Mándi, Eds., *Emerging Development Patterns: European Contributions*, Budapest, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Research Institute of World Economy, 1983, pp. 467–88.

[14] Even Leon Zurawicki's otherwise hopeful projection for TIC in the long run envisions the South's inability to participate in other than a "residual" manner. See his *Multinational Enterprises in the West and East*, Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979, pp. 176–77.

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ogy transfer from the socialist countries of Eastern Europe to the developing countries occurs within the framework of bilateral intergovernmental agreements or joint ventures. However, despite increasingly frequent exchanges of trade delegations, contacts between ministries and enterprises in the respective countries have not been regularized. Here again one encounters the question of trade instruments, including means of payment. Polish economists Jerzy Klerr and Lech Zacher suggest that the creation of a regional CMEA institution might help to surmount obstacles to the broader use of the transferable ruble by protecting its members' national economies from possible domestic effects of multilateralization. They contend that "quasi-supranational socialist enterprises ... [which] would not be directly and continuously connected with the domestic economic plan" could facilitate East-South technology transfer through arrangements whereby LDC's use Soviet industrial techniques to manufacture products for export to the East European countries (in Laszlo/Kurtzman, p. 26). Not only could such a mechanism increase the level of East-South trade; it could also help to rectify chronic imbalances in payments between the USSR and other CMEA members. But under international law the status of such "quasi-supranational" enterprises would have to be defined; at present, even joint ventures involving two CMEA members in a third country are established under one of the national systems of law.[15]

Legal aspects of the CMEA countries' foreign economic activities have by and large been overlooked by Western scholars.[16] This is so because legal forms and formalities frequently seem removed from the actual practice of international affairs. Ye. A. Danilov's chapter on "the participation of non-CMEA countries in the Council's work as observers" (pp. 91–123) typifies this disjunction. After giving a general account of what observer status in international organizations means in light of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, he then asserts that the Convention does *not* regulate CMEA, since the latter "is not an international organization of the universal type in the sense of the [Convention]" (p. 104). He further implies that while CMEA is not covered by treaty law, its practice nevertheless contributes to customary international law.

Danilov's commentary is entirely uninteresting, but his argument has significant implications.[17] He argues that CMEA is not subject to the international law generally governing international organizations, because it lacks full juridical personality.[18] This position tends to limit the law applicable to CMEA to inter*state* treaty law, with the result that its member-states tend to become responsible for the organization's obligations.[19] CMEA is then left to enjoy the rights of being an international organization without responsibility for the concomitant duties.

In his discussion of CMEA institutional links with developing countries, Danilov never resolves the issue of bilateral intergovernmental agreements, because CMEA's executive organs are competent to sign agreements with third parties exclusively when its member-states specifically empower it to do so. This occurs on a case-by-case basis only.[20] However, this issue is addressed in V. D. Popov's series of essays on economic cooperation between LDC's and different CMEA members. Although the author's enumeration of the various agreements and projects is rather long (pp. 61–123) and quite unorganized, his specification of diverse types of economic arrangements—and of what those arrangements mean in practice for the terms on which such cooperation proceeds—is very useful.[21]

Popov provides an excellent outline (pp. 8–60) of the framework of international law in which East-South economic relations take

[15] CMEA lacks not only financial instruments for reconciling trade balances among countries but also institutions capable of reconciling divergent national aims and interests. For discussions of this, see Ausch, op. cit., pp. 155–90; and UNCTAD, *Multilateralization of Payments in Trade between Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe and Developing Countries: Selected Documents*, New York, United Nations, 1978 (UN Document TD/B/703).

[16] See F.J.M. Feldbrugge, "The Untapped Potential in the Study of Soviet and East European Law," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Winter 1982, pp. 384–90.

[17] Anita Tirapolsky's excellent study, "CMEA and Its Privileged Partners of the Third World: Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Yemen, Afghanistan," *Courrier des pays de l'est* (Paris), June 1983, pp. 3–34, shows that observer status is anything but a halfway-house to full CMEA membership.

[18] See the Soviet doctrine of the law of international organizations, in the textbook written by the Soviet judge at the International Court of Justice, G.I. Morozov, *Mezhdunarodnye organizatsii: Nekotorye voprosy teorii* (International Organizations: Some Questions of Theory), 2nd ed., Moscow, Mysl', 1974, pp. 276–87.

[19] The 1973 agreement between CMEA and Finland, a developed country, exhibits precisely this feature. See Henryk de Fiumel, "The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in International Relations," *Studies on International Relations* (Warsaw), 1976, pp. 60–78; and W. E. Butler, "COMECON and Third Countries," *Co-existence* (Glasgow), April 1981, pp. 41–52.

[20] Danilov contends that this is in the nature of CMEA as an "interstate" organization that is not "supranational." His reasoning complements the Soviet claim that the European Economic Community (EEC) is unique as a "supranational" organization and that, being an exception, it cannot form the basis for any rule concerning the law of international organizations. In this he overlooks, as does the whole Soviet doctrine of international law, the actual existence of a body of EEC law that has evolved over time. For further analysis, see Cutler, loc. cit., pp. 137–40.

[21] Parts of the book read like a handbook for negotiators from CMEA and Third World foreign trade ministries and for project directors in East-South industrial cooperation. The last essay (pp. 124–39) develops mathematical criteria for evaluating different projects of East-South cooperation, particularly enterprise construction.

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place, including the relevant structure of international organizations. Legal issues will continue to play a role in the evolution of CMEA cooperation with developing countries, including tripartite industrial cooperation.[22] However, legal problems remain. Either they will be resolved, and East-South cooperation will expand; or the refusal to address such issues (including the payments problem) will further alienate the socialist countries' international-legal doctrines from the LDC experience with international commerce. This in turn will affect which of the four tendencies in Figure 1 will predominate in the global trading behavior of the various CMEA member countries.[23]

[22]See *Mezhdunarodnaya nauchnotekhnicheskaya i proizvodstvennaya kooperatsiya: Pravovyye aspekty* (International Scientific-Technical and Production Cooperation: Legal Aspects), Moscow, Nauka, 1982, pp. 93–108, 285–88; István Dobozi, "Technology Transfer between Developing Countries and Eastern Europe: Mechanisms, Obstacles and Prospects," in Dobozi and Mándi, *Emerging Development Patterns*, pp. 441–66; and Peter B. Maggs, "The Legal Structure of Technology Transfer in Eastern Europe," in Gordon B. Smith, Peter B. Maggs, and George Ginsburgs, Eds., *Soviet and East European Law and the Scientific-Technical Revolution*, New York, Pergamon Press, 1981, pp. 272–94.

[23]Those behaviors may differ so much from country to country that East European scholars may find it useful to develop the field of comparative CMEA law, the study of which does not exist at present.

[24]See the special issue of *International Organization*, Spring 1982, on international regimes.

IT IS USEFUL to conclude by asking what research program will encompass questions of international law and economics, as well as politics, within the scope of East-South trade and development relations. Viewing East-South economic relations as one leg of the East-West-South commercial triangle, we may enumerate a series of issue areas within the evolving international economic order. A rough list would have to include development financing, international trade, industrialization and technology transfer, food and natural resources, institutional and organizational policies, and social issues. Each of these areas may serve as a conceptual focus for elaborating an analysis of the prevailing international regime (or competing regimes). The implications of various development approaches ("self-reliance," "basic needs," "rural development") for those regimes could then be specified.[24]

The increasingly scarce and expensive labor force in the CMEA countries, growing East European imports of Third World natural resources and manufactures, the acute debt of the East European countries, and the increased politicization of East-West trade—all these changes must be included in any comprehensive assessment of the CMEA countries' place in international affairs. The perspective of international political economy is particularly useful in research into trade and aid relations between CMEA and developing countries. It is complemented by the international-law approaches, which provide a necessary point of reference in the study of so rapidly developing and diversifying a domain as East-South interactions.

Profitable insights into such interactions may be gained from examining data on military assistance, financial arrangements for settling debts, and legal doctrines affecting international trade. Political scientists, economists, and international lawyers, respectively, excel at analyzing these issues. But such analysts working together may also learn a great deal about such a significant topic as how Marxism-Leninism as an ideology influences the norms underlying the world trade system or how clashes among the national commercial policies of CMEA members reflect the differentiation of their interests. After all, members of all three disciplines contend that they are concerned with the allocation of scarce resources.

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Russian Culture in Western Trust

Maurice Friedberg

SIMON KARLINSKY and ALFRED APPEL, JR., Eds. *The Bitter Air of Exile: Russian Writers in the West 1922–1972.* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1977.

VICTOR ERLICH, Ed. *Twentieth-Century Russian Literary Criticism.* New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1975.

SHEILA FITZPATRICK, Ed. *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931.* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1978.

KATERINA CLARK. *The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual.* Chicago, IL, The University of Chicago Press, 1981.

GRIGORY SVIRSKI. *A History of Post-War Soviet Writing: The Literature of Moral Opposition.* Trans. and ed. by Robert Dessaix and Michael Ulman. Ann Arbor, MI, Ardis, 1981.

JOSEPH FRANK. *Dostoevsky: The Seeds of Revolt, 1821–1849.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976.

JOSEPH FRANK. *Dostoevsky: The Years of Ordeal, 1850–1859.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1983.

TWICE IN THIS century has the United States been cast in the role of custodian for a literature that was endangered in its homeland, its practitioners hounded or worse, and its future (in the prophetic words of Yevgeniy Zamyatin, the Russian forerunner of George Orwell) limited to its glorious past. In one, happier instance, the custodianship was to be relatively brief, and after a decade or so of generally comfortable exile in New York, in California, and throughout academic America, the anti-Nazi German exiles were free to return home. Some left with warm memories of their hosts. Others, such as the dramatist Bertolt Brecht, politically a left-winger, defiantly moved to communist East Germany. At least one, the novelist Stefan Heym, is now, decades after his return from the United States, an *internal* émigré in the German Democratic Republic, a country not noted for tolerance of nonconformist authors.

The second, and far longer, American custodianship of a foreign literature and culture—indeed, one that shows no signs of ending—is, of course, the asylum that the United States offered, in effect, to that very significant part of the culture of Russia that proved, in one way or another, incompatible with political restrictions on art and scholarship in the USSR. Although the Soviet regime has now been in power for nearly seven decades, it has never fulfilled Lenin's solemn promise to lift, once political conditions stabilized, the tight censorship controls imposed on all publishing within days of the Bolshevik coup d'état. Not only can the censor's number still be seen on most Soviet publications, informing the curious when and where authorization has been given to allow the book to see the light of day. Just as important, if not more so, are the various levels of thought control that range from reviewers and editors to the single and most pernicious of them all—the fact that, conditioned by decades of experience, Soviet artists and scholars, as well as poets, dramatists, and novelists, have all learned to censor their own work, thereby obviating much of the need for *formal* censorship intervention.

True, Soviet thought control has proven far from watertight. Time and again, even the more docile of Soviet writers and artists have rebelled against such restrictive censorship, seeking wider latitude in content and form. A chronicle of

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these attempts reflects the swings of the pendulum of the Soviet political and intellectual atmosphere from "thaws" to "freezes," periods of relatively benign neglect inevitably producing periodic surges of strict censorship inspired by Soviet communist fervor. Yet nothing attests so eloquently to the fear and insecurity felt by even conformist Soviet authors and artists as does the steady stream of émigrés from the USSR that began in 1917 and continues to this day, despite keen awareness on the part of most exiles of the loneliness and hardships that they are bound to face abroad.

It goes without saying that this prolonged hemorrhage of talent contributes to the anemia of Soviet cultural life, even as it inadvertently enriches intellectual and artistic creativity in the West. The United States now functions as a rival center of Russian culture—one that, however much smaller in size, challenges that in the USSR itself if only because of the stimulus to creativity afforded by freedom of expression in a democratic society. Moreover, the cultural activity of the émigrés themselves has gradually awakened an interest in Russian culture among the American intelligentsia (much, though not all of it, academic). As a result, the United States is today beyond doubt the world's leading center of scholarship on Russian history and literature outside of Russia proper.

THE MIGRATION of independent-minded Russian culture across the Atlantic—undertaken largely after the Nazi advent to power in Germany—was actually the second leg of the journey. Originally, most of the expatriate Russian authors, publishing houses, and literary journals had established themselves in Western Europe (France and the Weimar Republic, above all), in democratic Czechoslovakia, and in the still independent Baltic republics.

Russian émigré writers in the 1930's, including Nobel Laureate Ivan Bunin, experienced considerable economic and emotional hardships. For one, the USSR did not allow then, and still does not permit, the sale of *any* Russian books printed abroad. (With minor exceptions, that also holds true for *all* books manufactured outside the Soviet Union.) More important, as Simon Karlinsky demonstrates in the anthology of Russian émigré literature that he edited with Alfred Appel, Jr.,

> *it was during that decade of Stalinist purges and proliferating forced labor camps that large numbers of American, British and French intellectuals (including such men as George Bernard Shaw, Theodore Dreiser, André Gide, and Thomas Mann) came to regard the USSR as the finest example of a free and just social organization that humanity had so far been able to devise. A Russian writer who preferred to live abroad rather than contribute to the glorious experiment that was unfolding in his native country was automatically seen as a reactionary.... In 1936 a major British literary journal rejected a story by Vladimir Nabokov* because it had a policy against publishing any work by Russian émigrés. (pp. 6–7. Emphasis added.)

The Bitter Air of Exile is a generous sampler of the writings of the first "waves" of Russian émigrés (that is, those preceding such recent arrivals as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Sinyavsky, Vasili Aksyonov, and Vladimir Voinovich). The anthology wisely omits altogether some of the better known authors of prose, such as Bunin or Mark Aldanov, and emphasizes the more controversial and experimental poets, such as Boris Poplavsky, Georgy Ivanov, and Igor Chinnov. Pity no similar work is likely to appear in the USSR in the original Russian.

THE GREAT variety and vitality of Russian writing during the early decades of this century extended also to literary criticism and theory. That is clearly evident from an excellent anthology edited by Victor Erlich, professor of Russian literature at Yale University and author of a definitive study of Russian Formalism, a school in literary theory that anticipated in many ways America's New Criticism. Not unexpectedly, the Formalists' contributions (Viktor Shklovsky and Boris Eichenbaum each on Pushkin and Tolstoy, Yuriy Tynianov on Dostoevsky and Gogol, and Viktor Zhirmunsky on Blok) are the most provocative and original.

One cannot help wondering whether this scholarship (and also such Symbolist essays as Andrey Bely's and Innokentiy Annensky's on Gogol) did not also contribute, however indirectly, to the polemical brilliance of *Marxist* criticism of the 1920's, which is represented here by Trotsky's essay on the poet Vladimir Mayakovsky and Russian Futurism, and by Aleksandr Voronsky's on Isaac Babel. Both stand in sharp contrast to the bulk of uninspired Soviet Marxist literary commentary of later decades that is so painfully monotonous as to be often unreadable.

The lively, iconoclastic quality of Soviet cultural polemics of the 1920's is also evident in the wealth of material from that decade cited in the volume edited by Sheila Fitzpatrick, professor of Russian history at the University of Texas. Paradoxically, *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931* is easier for

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Western nonspecialist readers to understand now than it was when it appeared six years ago, because of the information that has since become available on the excesses of another "cultural revolution," namely, that in China. In both cases, concerted efforts were made not merely to smash social customs and institutions considered inimical to the revolutionary cause, but to overhaul, in effect, the human psyche itself. Many of the more outlandish experiments related here in a dozen essays by as many scholars have since been repudiated or quietly abandoned by the Soviets. The volume, however, is of more than purely historical interest, if only because every so often yet another impatient Marxist society is tempted to embark on a "great leap forward," with results that Fitzpatrick's book helps predict.

KATERINA CLARK's *The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual* is an excellent specimen of the "revisionist" American scholarship that was rather fashionable in the 1970's, but is now considered a bit passé. The "revisionist" creed was (and is) grounded in the assumption that traditional Western studies of the USSR had been hopelessly biased and ridden with cold war clichés. For example, Clark, an Indiana University professor, writes:

Soviet Socialist Realism is virtually a taboo topic in Western Slavic scholarship. It is not entirely taboo, for it can be discussed, but preferably only in tones of outrage, bemusement, derision, or elegy. Three main arguments underpin this collective judgement. First, it is felt to be intellectually suspect—or simply a waste of time—to analyze what is patently bad literature.... Second, it is argued that it is virtually immoral to devote attention to a tradition that has developed at the cost of so many violations of intellectual freedom and integrity, of so much human suffering. Finally, it is felt that Socialist Realism is itself so lifeless and dull that any study of it would of necessity be hopelessly pedestrian (unless, of course, enlivened by tales of infamy or by acerbic comments). (pp. ix–x)

I must confess that in my more than three decades of reading, and writing about, Soviet Socialist Realism, I have never come across the latter two arguments, and only very rarely the first. What Professor Clark is erecting here is a straw man, which she then proceeds to demolish. Our failure to understand Soviet Socialist Realism (and, as we all know, *tout comprendre, tout pardonner*), she believes, derives from "applying Western 'high-brow' literary criteria in studying a literature *that was not intended to meet them*" (p. xi, emphasis added). Instead, she suggests that we scrutinize Soviet writing with "the arsenal of analytical tools developed for treating folkloric texts and other formulaic genres, such as serial novels and hagiography...." This is why, according to the author, her book "has something of an anthropological bias and contains several quasi-structuralist studies of the Soviet novel" (p. xii).

What an irony! In trying to salvage Socialist Realism's richly deserved tarnished reputation, Professor Clark resorts to what most of that method's practitioners would surely indignantly reject as an ultimate insult. When all is said and done, her thesis boils down to the claim that Soviet literature does not really even *aspire* to the status of sophisticated writing. Such, however, is decidedly not the case. Soviet Socialist Realism emphatically views itself not merely as legitimate—indeed, the *only* legitimate—heir to great literary traditions of the past. It emphatically proclaims itself *the* most refined, *the* most subtle body of modern writing. It is, I submit, both patronizing and methodologically unjustified to refuse Socialist Realism the dignity and the right to be judged on terms of its own choosing.

If Katerina Clark is concerned with Soviet literary esthetics, Grigory Svirski, a recent émigré from the USSR, centers his attention on the ethics of postwar Soviet authors who have, in his view, created a "literature of moral opposition." Unfortunately, Svirski's study is marred by a failing that is all too common to monographs of this kind. In an effort to demonstrate that "moral opposition" did, indeed, exist in the Soviet literary community even during Stalinism's darkest years, Svirski, himself once a Soviet novelist, tends to use the term so broadly as to make it virtually meaningless. Almost anything fits the label of "moral opposition": criticism of social injustice, as well as of ordinary bureaucracy; appeals for tolerance; and denunciations of vulgarity and bad taste. The book, however, contains a wealth of factual material, much of it not readily available elsewhere, which helps compensate for some of its failings.

A MAJOR EVENT in American scholarship on Russian culture is currently in progress. Joseph Frank's projected five-volume study of Dostoevsky, of which the second volume has recently appeared (with the third close to completion), may well be unique. Never to my knowledge has there been a study quite as ambitious in scope as this: a scholar of one country undertaking a massive ex-

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amination of a literary figure of another nation and writing in a language other than that of its subject.

Frank, a professor of comparative literature at Princeton, has undertaken to integrate the Russian novelist's life and work into a broad literary and intellectual chronicle of 19th-century Russia. He is particularly successful in discussing Dostoevsky's novels as part and parcel of the man's biography, discerning in the writer's prose reflections of observed or experienced events as refracted and focused through an artist's imagination. Judging from the first two volumes, Frank's endeavor will influence for decades our view of Russia and its culture, to say nothing of Dostoevsky himself.

Unlike Soviet studies of the writer (who has, of course, traditionally been viewed in the USSR with much distrust for his politically conservative views and his direct attacks, as in *The Possessed*, on articles of the radical creed), Frank's work examines closely the impact on young Dostoevsky of religious teachings and church rituals. Soviet readers of the book (or, more exactly, the counted few with access to works of American Slavic scholarship) may also be interested to discover that a "bourgeois" scholar finds little merit in some of the traditional Freudian interpretations of the novelist's life and work.

In another departure from earlier scholarly interpretations, Frank minimizes the sharpness of the break between the writer's views before and after his arrest and Siberian exile. Even while a member of the Petrashevsky Socialist circle, Dostoevsky professed nationalist Russian and religious views. At the same time, he never renounced his hatred of social injustice, in particular his obsession with the evils of serfdom in his country.

THE MENTAL SERFDOM from which many Russian writers have fled during the Soviet era shows little sign of abating, and one therefore cannot expect this major cultural diaspora to return soon to its motherland as did the exiled German writers after World War II. The de facto American custodianship over a significant portion of contemporary Russian literature and scholarship will therefore continue. It is good to know that this trusteeship is exercised with a minimum of interference and that a maximum of artistic and ideological diversity is not merely tolerated, but actively encouraged. An account of this custodianship will one day, surely, inspire a chapter in a history of Russian-American relations. Its impact may well prove more durable than the vicissitudes of Soviet-American diplomatic squabbles.

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Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors
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FUDGING CP FIGURES

TO THE EDITORS: In his article in the July–August 1983 *Problems of Communism* (p. 12) Professor Yaroslav Bilinsky mentioned a discrepancy in party membership figures in Ukraine in the early 1970's. To amplify his brief comments, I wish to point out that the data published during these years indicate clearly that membership figures were being juggled by the leading Ukrainian political factions. The question is whether it was Petro Shelest or Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi who falsified the figures and why.

Whereas Shelest claimed at the March 1971 Ukrainian party congress that as of January 1, 1971, the Ukrainian CP had 2,534,561 members and candidates (*Radyans'ka Ukraina* [Kiev], Mar. 18), other sources—including his successor Shcherbytskyi—subsequently asserted that there were only 2,378,789. Shelest's figures were repeated by Ukrainian publications while he remained first secretary (for example, in *Kommunist Ukrainy* [Kiev], May 1971, p. 56; August 1971, pp. 36 and 94; and February 1972, p. 46).

But Moscow sources—for example, the yearbooks of the *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya (BSE)*—credited the CPU with only 2,378,789 for January 1971 and used Shelest's 2,534,561 figure for a year later, January 1972 (see the 1971 and 1972 yearbooks). The 1971 yearbook figures for all republic party organizations except that of Ukraine were virtually the same as those given at early 1971 republic party congresses; only the Ukrainian figures were contradicted. Later Ukrainian sources usually used the lower figure. At the 1976 Ukrainian party congress, Shcherbytskyi gave the membership figure for that year as 2,625,808 and said that this was up 247,000 from 1971—indicating a figure of approximately 2,378,000 for 1971. A 1976 book published in Kiev also used this figure for 1971. (See *Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Ukrainy—Boyevoy Otryad KPSS* [The Communist Party of Ukraine—a Fighting Unit of the CPSU].)

Shelest's figure is suspect since it signifies a huge jump in membership just before the congress. Thus, membership in early 1970 (according to Shelest himself in the April 1970 *Kommunist Ukrainy*) was only about 2,300,000; *Kommunist Ukrainy* in December 1970 claimed 2,361,000, and in February 1971, 2,370,000. Yet, in March 1971, Shelest claimed 2,534,561, an increase of over 230,000 in one year—about double or triple the normal annual increase for the later 1960's. Moreover, this suggests that many persons were rushed into membership without serving even a full year as candidates for membership, since there were only 88,670 candidates listed in January 1970 (according to the 1970 *BSE* yearbook). If Shelest's figure were correct, this would mean that Ukrainian membership rose almost 29 percent between the 1966 and 1971 congresses—much more than the increase of membership in other republics, which averaged 18 percent.

The only motivation that comes to mind for boosting the membership would be to increase the CPU's weight in the CPSU and in its representation at the 1971 CPSU congress. Shelest's figure—143,000 more than the 2,378,000 figure—meant 49 more delegates at the set rate of one delegate per 2,900 members.

Before convicting Shelest of concocting a later-day variant of "Dead Souls," however, we must raise the possibility that Shcherbytskyi's citation of the lower 1971 figure may also have been prompted by political motivations, since it enabled him to disguise what may have been a substantial purge of party ranks following Shelest's ouster as first secretary in May 1972. Indeed, at the 1976 Ukrainian congress, Shcherbytskyi spoke of a 247,000 increase since 1971, but said nothing about extensive expulsions. However, figures given in the *BSE* yearbooks show a drop of almost 55,000 members during 1972, indicating a big purge during Shcherbytskyi's first year. Figures given in the 1976 Ukrainian book cited above give a very different picture, revising downward the January 1972 figure so that the CPU appears to have grown normally year by year. The only discrepancy in these figures is for 1972. If the CPU had 2,534,000 members in 1971 as Shelest claims and 2,625,000 in 1976, it grew only by a little more than 3.5 percent between congresses—much less than any other republic party organization. If Shcherbytskyi's figures are correct, the CPU grew by more than 10 percent—i.e., at a faster rate than did the party organizations of three other republics, Kirgizia, Armenia, and Georgia.

This disagreement over membership figures may have played a significant political role—even though the sins publicly charged to Shelest after his fall did not include manipulation of membership figures or improper acceleration of admission to the party. Nonetheless, at the 1971

Table 1: Membership Figures for Ukrainian CP

			BSE Yearbook	
	Shcherbytskyi	1976 book	Yearbook figures	Change from prev. year
Jan. 1971	2,378,000	2,378,789	2,378,789	+77,132
Jan. 1972		2,439,691	2,534,561	+155,772
Jan. 1973		2,479,636	2,479,636	−54,925
Jan. 1974		2,520,032	2,520,032	+40,396
Jan. 1975		2,565,110	2,565,110	+45,078
Jan. 1976	2,625,808	2,625,808	2,625,808	+60,698

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CPSU Congress, Brezhnev had complained that some party organizations were still "carried away by admission of new members" and were not being selective, and he proposed holding a verification of party membership cards. This may have been prompted by Shelest's big boost of Ukrainian membership, since Ukraine was the only republic with such a big increase during this period. By coincidence, Shelest—the only other Politburo member during 1971 to mention the proposed exchange of party cards—subsequently stressed the need for extensive preparation for this campaign, as if arguing for delay (*Kommunist* [Moscow], August 1971). The party card exchange campaign was finally adopted at the May 1972 CPSU plenum—at the very time that Shelest was being ousted as CPU first secretary.

Another sign that membership figures involved political controversy can be seen in the strange fate of Ukrainian party cadres chief A. A. Ulanov, who rose as a protégé of Shcherbytskyi. As Dnipropetrovsk city first secretary (1966–70), he had helped lead the Shcherbytskyi faction's attacks on Oles Honchar's 1968 novel *Sobor* (The Cathedral)—which was accused, among other things, of defaming Dnipropetrovsk but which was initially defended by Shelest's men. In an apparent victory for Shcherbytskyi over Shelest, Ulanov was appointed head of the Ukrainian CC Party Organizational Work Department in mid-1970. But for some reason, he publicly went along with Shelest on the membership issue, repeating Shelest's membership figure in his speech as head of the Mandate Commission at the March 1971 Ukrainian congress. In July 1972, shortly after Shelest's May 1972 ouster, Ulanov was removed and demoted to a secretary (not first secretary) of the Voroshilovgrad Oblast Party Committee. Moreover, he was even dropped from this post by 1976 and not reelected to the Ukrainian CC at the 1976 republic congress. Except for the question of membership, there was no other apparent reason why Shcherbytskyi would fire his own protégé immediately upon succeeding Shelest as republic first secretary.

WERNER HAHN
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MR. BILINSKY RESPONDS: I would like to thank Mr. Hahn for pointing out the pitfalls in analyzing Ukrainian Communist Party (CPU) membership figures for 1971-76. The truth does appear to be more complicated than I first thought—when I concluded that Shcherbytskyi fiddled with the membership figures to disguise the true extent of the purges after Shelest's ouster (see my article "The Communist Party of Ukraine After 1966," in Peter J. Potichnyj, Ed., *Ukraine in the Seventies*, Oakville, Ontario, Mosaic Press, 1975, pp. 242-43, and pp. 256-59). Mr. Hahn, too, is properly skeptical of some of Shcherbytskyi's figures.

But Mr. Hahn's real contribution is in showing persuasively that Shelest, Shcherbytskyi's predecessor and political adversary, also falsified CPU membership figures. The most damning piece of evidence is the editorial in *Kommunist Ukrainy* of February 1971, which was signed *for the printer* on February 2, 1971. The editorial gives the number of CPU members and candidates at that time—or so it is implied, for no precise date is given—as more than 2,370,000. The responsible editor of this top journal of the CP of Ukraine obviously must have meant January 1, 1971, since the beginning of the year is the usual date for presentation of CP membership statistics. Yet, on March 17, 1971, in his Central Committee report to the 24th Congress of the CPU—his last—Shelest stated that on January 1, 1971, the CPU had 2,424,350 members and 110,211 candidate members. Was the editor of *Kommunist Ukrainy* incompetent, or did Shelest "improve" the figures, retroactive to January 1, 1971?

The story becomes curiouser and curiouser. I hope to be able to solve these riddles in the not too distant future. If I do, major thanks will go to Mr. Hahn's eagle eye.

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DÉTENTE AND DISSENT

TO THE EDITORS: Peter Reddaway's interesting and informative article on "Dissent in the Soviet Union (*Problems of Communism*, November–December 1983) paints a gloomy but realistic picture of the present situation. What interested me most, however, about Mr. Reddaway's analysis of dissent was his admission that détente in the 1970's had not only encouraged the opposition, but had also afforded it some degree of protection. I would agree entirely. It is a pity, however, that critics of détente (amongst whom I would have once included Mr. Reddaway) did not say this 10 years ago, when they were arguing that détente was simply a new form of appeasement that could only lead to more (not less) repression.

There is no question in my mind that one of the crucial factors that undermined the intellectual credibility of détente in the West was the argument that it encouraged rather than discouraged the Soviet regime to act in a brutal fashion against the human rights movement. This view was advanced with particular vehemence by journals like *Encounter* and *Survey*, not to mention certain of Mr. Reddaway's professorial colleagues at the London School of Economics.

Those who argued with such vehemence against détente in the past now bear some responsibility for the current impasse. By weakening détente and encouraging the sort of hard-line strategy pursued by Reagan since 1980, conservative opponents of Kissinger and Brandt have made life more—not less—difficult for the opposition. Moreover—and it is a pity that Mr. Reddaway did not explore the point—Reagan's present approach toward the USSR has not only weakened the opposition but actually strengthened the regime internally, as Seweryn Bialer noted in his recent *New York Review of Books* article ("Danger in Moscow," Feb. 16, 1984, pp. 6–10). "Getting tough with Russia" will help nobody, least of all the dissidents whose cause Mr. Reddaway has so skillfully championed and whose ideas he has been monitoring and discussing for over a decade.

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MR. REDDAWAY RESPONDS: I have never argued, as Mr. Cox suggests, that "détente was simply a new form of appeasement which could only lead to more (not less) repression." Nor, to my knowledge, either "with particular vehemence" or otherwise, did my late friend Leonard Schapiro, whom Mr. Cox probably includes among my professorial colleagues. My own view is that détente as practiced by the West did contain some elements of appeasement, but also afforded

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dissenters some degree of protection.

Although my article was not primarily about the effect of East-West relations on the fate of dissenters, I did point out that the oft-postponed Soviet turn toward the suppression of all public dissent occurred in 1979–80, when Mr. Carter, not Mr. Reagan, was the US president, and that a crucial factor was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (which, probably more than any other factor, undermined détente in the West) and the world response to it.

In the short term, "getting tough with Russia" will probably, indeed, not help the dissidents. But the long-term effects—both for détente and for the Soviet regime's popularity—may be quite different. Only time will tell. What can easily be documented now is that the overwhelming majority of dissidents who have expressed views, publicly or privately, about the invasion of Afghanistan and the general line of Soviet foreign policy snce 1979 have taken positions similar to those of mainstream opinion in the West. With characteristic courage and intellectual integrity, they have not called on the West to compromise its overall position on their behalf. They believe, rightly in my opinion, that any such compromise would, in current circumstances, be a dangerous form of appeasement, and as such—apart from probable wider damage—would not achieve even its own narrow aim.

Almost all dissidents—and notably Andrey Sakharov—have simply wanted the West to be true to the humanitarian and liberal values which it professes, and which also permeate various international agreements signed by the Soviet government. When, therefore, the latter government violates human rights on a far more drastic scale than previously, as it has since 1979, they hope that the West will raise the level of its protests and sanctions correspondingly sharply. The Soviets will then have to pay a high and continuing price for their brutality, and thus also have a powerful incentive to put an end to it. Meanwhile, the dissenters will at least receive intensified moral support to help them survive the dark times which they have always known they risked.

PETER REDDAWAY
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KREMLIN CURRENTS

TO THE EDITORS: There is no doubt that Professor Jerry Hough is a most inquisitive reader of Soviet political literature, a superb "miner," whose capacity for extracting relevant information is awesome. My argument with his most recent article in *Problems of Communism*, "Andropov's First Year" (November-December 1983) is not with his ability to extract information, but with his interpretation of it.

Hough's interpretation seems designed to reject any "hard-line" argument that the military exercises considerable influence over Soviet political life. His bête noire is Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, whose influence Hough tries to discount as much as possible.

But Hough's argumentation is not persuasive. First, he suggests that as soon as someone (be it Andropov, or now Chernenko) becomes general secretary of the CPSU, he can make every important appointment as a personal decision. I do not find this proposition as self-evident as does Hough. Second, he seems to view the political struggle among Soviet leaders as a purely personal competition and does not acknowledge the existence of political coalitions that make the position of an individual leader less significant or decisive.

Hough is most vulnerable, however, in his approach to the Soviet military, which he seems to take as being prima facie more aggressive and expansionist than the party. However, this extremely important point needs fuller argumentation. The possibility is not to be excluded that at least some military circles might be more isolationist than the ideological branch of the party, which strives for communist expansion. Moreover, the army may not necessarily be united politically, and indeed may be split into various coalitions closely linked to various coalitions in the party.

Let me be more specific. Contrary to Hough's claims, the most important political nominations since November 1982 have been granted to people who in the past had links to the Soviet military and to heavy industry—controlled from 1957 to 1973 by Dmitriy Ustinov, who was an important link in the coalition led by the late Frol' Kozlov. One must remember that during World War II, Kozlov, as Izhevsk party secretary, supervised a huge armament plant, which was a part of the ministry directed by Ustinov.

Indeed, one can argue that many of the new Soviet political stars in the Andropov era (which was the subject of Jerry Hough's article) have their political roots in the Kozlov-Ustinov coalition, and that Ustinov was not a military figure, but a military-industrialist par excellence. Take, for example, Nikolay Ryzhkov, a new party secretary, whom Hough links to Andrey Kirilenko. Actually, Kirilenko left Sverdlovsk in 1962, eight years before Ryzhkov was appointed director of Uralmash. Hough also fails to take into consideration that the nomination of the director of such a huge plant is not a matter for the provincial nomenklatura. It is a Central Committee level appointment. Kirilenko was thus not the only one in the CC who might have been responsible for Ryzhkov's appointment; Ustinov was the CC secretary responsible for the entire Soviet machine-building industry at the time.

The example of Mikhail Solomentsev, who was promoted to full Politburo membership in December 1983, is even more dramatic. During the war, he was the director of a huge military factory in Chelyabinsk (though not one under Ustinov's ministry). The oblast party first secretary in Chelyabinsk just then was Nikolay Patolichev, the political godfather of Andropov. Whether or not Solomentsev was promoted by Patolichev is difficult to judge, but since the former's political career was so brilliant thereafter, he was presumably on good terms with the latter—who in turn was a committed enemy of Nikita Khrushchev. It is quite certain that Solomentsev was a Kozlov favorite and part of a powerful coalition that opposed the massive "invasion" of the party heights by the Ukrainian coalition brought about under Khrushchev and then under Brezhnev. Also, when Ustinov was deputy premier of the USSR and chairman of the all-Union Sovnarkhoz in 1962, Solomentsev was chairman of the sovnarkhoz in Patolichev's old district of Chelyabinsk.

In addition, Vitaliy Vorotnikov, promoted to candidate and then full Politburo membership in 1982-83, was *not* the nominee of Kirilenko, whose committed enemy he was, notwithstanding Hough's claim to the contrary. One of Kirilenko's last public speeches or official appearances was in Krasnodar Kray on May 8, 1982, in the presence of Krasnodar party secretary Sergey Medunov. Despite this signal of Kirilenko's protection, Medunov was dismissed two months later. It was Vorotnikov who was sent to Krasnodar to wrap up the local purge. As we now know, Medunov's arrest and

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Kirilenko's dismissal from the Politburo were the first major personnel changes after Brezhnev's death. Where does Hough come up with his view that Andropov showed some favor to Kirilenko?

The whole Kirilenko connection seems too tenuous. Hough cites the circumstantial evidence that Andropov and Kirilenko studied at the same time in Rybinsk. But Kirilenko was eight years older than Andropov and was a student in a prestigious aviation institute, whereas Andropov was a student in an obscure river-transport technical school. Everybody who knows Soviet reality understands that this created a virtually unbridgeable social and generational gap. Even without this gap, the argument is tenuous. Imagine claiming that since Lenin and Kerensky studied in the same gymnasium in Simbirsk they must necessarily have been friends.

I also question Hough's argument that Andrey Gromyko's appointment as first deputy premier was a sign of Ustinov's weakness. It is conceivable that Ustinov aspired to more, namely the office of premier (as he had after Kosygin's departure), and that Gromyko's appointment might have been the result of a larger political bargain. It seems that both Ustinov and Gromyko maintained their political influence after Andropov's death as well.

For these reasons, Hough's article should be viewed as an extremely valuable basis for discussion, but not as the final word.

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MR. HOUGH RESPONDS: It is very difficult to discuss Dr. Agursky's very detailed letter without writing an entire article. Several points can, however, be made.

First, Agursky in no way challenges my major thesis—that the military is not particularly strong in times of succession (including the one after Brezhnev's death) and that Andropov was not basing himself primarily on the KGB and the military as institutions. Agursky is saying that Andropov based himself on persons appointed from the heavy industry–defense industry section of the party apparatus—precisely the point I made.

Second, Agursky is right that Dmitriy Ustinov's experience was in defense industry rather than the military. Perhaps Ustinov did support the new appointments, but in those cases where the new men had been in defense industry, they had left it early in their career and had been under the direct supervision of Andrey Kirilenko for a long time. The probabilities seem strong that this latter pattern is more important than more tenuous personal connections with Ustinov, although it is not impossible that Ustinov and Kirilenko were allied. (However, if Ustinov was a dominant figure under Andropov and sought the chairmanship of the USSR Council of Ministers, it is very strange that he did not insist on the first deputy chairmanship as a first step.)

Third, any speculation about Kremlinological connections is just that. Agursky is correct about the speculative nature of my analysis of the Andropov-Kirilenko connection (although I still firmly believe in it), but he should be more cautious about his own speculations. It is by no means "quite certain" that "Solomentsev was a Kozlov favorite." On the contrary, Solomentsev, as secretary of the Chelyabinsk obkom for industry, was appointed chairman of the Chelyabinsk sovnarkhoz in 1957, when Kozlov was still in Leningrad and when Brezhnev was the Central Committee secretary for heavy industry and defense industry. In addition, Solomentsev was named Karaganda party obkom first secretary in 1959 after the Temir-Tau riots, while Kozlov was on the Council of Ministers and Brezhnev seemed to be overseeing Kazakhstan.

Similarly, there is no evidence that Ustinov was in "the Kozlov coalition." In fact, Ustinov probably avoided factional politics at that time. It is certain that, as the top industrialist overseeing the space and rocket program, Ustinov worked closely with the Central Committee secretary in charge of the space and rocket program, i.e., Leonid Brezhnev (See Marshal Tolubko's biography of Marshal Nedelin, *Nedelin: Pervyy glavkom strategicheskikh* [Nedelin: First Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops], Moscow, Molodaya gvardiya, 1979, p. 183). Ustinov's success after 1965 suggests a very friendly relationship with the General Secretary, and Brezhnev's praise on Ustinov's 70th birthday was especially warm.

In conclusion, I would stress that Kremlinological analysis carries no guarantee with it, and we should continually reexamine old assumptions in the light of new evidence. (For example, Brezhnev and Kozlov may not have been as antagonistic as thought at one time.) Indeed, we probably have a general tendency to overemphasize the neatness of factional alignments, since in the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, the secret of success in politics often lies in getting along with a broad range of persons.

In recent years there has been a strong tendency to rush to various judgments—that Andropov was put in power by the military and the KGB, that Andropov tried to kill the Pope, that Chernenko was a murderer in Dnipropetrovsk during the purges, or that the Soviet Union is now controlled by the "Stalinist" Gromyko—all on little basis other than that such assertions serve a political, emotional, or sensational purpose. If ours is to be a profession, then we must insist on professional standards and fight for them.

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PROBING RUSSIAN REALITY

TO THE EDITORS: Edward L. Keenan is undoubtedly right when he says in his polemical essay on my book *The Origins of Autocracy* (*Problems of Communism*, January–February 1984) that the Russians have developed their intellectual endeavors in "pathetic isolation from what has taken place in Western social science thinking in this century." But should an American scholar be so self-righteous not even to notice the other side of the same coin: that Western thinking has developed in this century in an equally pathetic isolation from Russian intellectual endeavors?

To be sure, if one depicts the Russian intellectual world as a bunch of Dostoevskian characters, dreamers, and chatterboxes engaged in a "seemingly eternal monologue [which] deals with questions intellectuals ask but cannot answer," then the loss in negligible. Is it fair to forget, though, that there were laborers and thinkers, sometimes first-rate thinkers, among Russian intellectuals, of whom Sir Isaiah Berlin reminded the world so pointedly? Is it fair to forget that Russian intellectual endeavors, although sometimes excesively sweeping, are nevertheless so often iconoclastic and thought-provoking,

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so challenging of conventional wisdom, so ready to ask the basic questions? There were after all Lunin and Chaadayev, Herzen and Kluchevsky, Leontiev and Trubetskoi. What about Chicherin, Miliukov, or Pavlov-Silvanskii, on whom modern historians of Russia still depend in their generalizations? Were all these people dreamers or chatterboxes?

True, the contemporary Russian intellectual world was brutally decimated by Stalin's terror. It was further suffocated by Brezhnev's regime of political stagnation, censorship, and prosecution. And still there were Vladimir Bazarov, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Leonid Pinskiy. There are Grigoriy Pomerants, Fëdor Burlatskiy, Tatyana Zaslavskaya, and Sergey Averintsev. And who but servile journalists would dare to depict Andrey Sakharov as a pathetic Dostoevskian character? I am proud that two of those thinkers were my teachers.

Among other things, these people harbor a naive but noble dream about some universal brotherhood of intellectuals helping them to withstand the pressures of ignorance, including police pressures. They are helpless against the attempt by an alleged brother to excommunicate them from the modern intellectual world. They cannot defend themselves from such high-handed treatment on the other side of the globe. I have to do it for them; I owe it to them.

No doubt, the world of Dostoevskian characters so condescendingly presented by Keenan does exist in Russia today, as it always has. But it shows only the fundamental dualism of the Russian intellectual tradition, which I have attempted to trace through four centuries of *Ivaniana* and which Keenan neglected to convey to the readers. Instead, he pitied the poor devils for not having "any inkling of how modern social scientists treat such subjects."

If Keenan prefers to speak in terms of Western scholarly and intellectual superiority, let us follow his lead. Let us take a brief look at how social scientists in the Russian/Soviet field have benefited from their alleged superiority. Keenan cited three names (Solzhenitsyn and the two Medvedevs); I will cite three—taken from the entire front of the Russian/Soviet field, from Ivan the Terrible to Peter I, to Konstantin Chernenko, i.e., in both "Russian History and Soviet Politics," to use the title of Keenan's essay.

Here is a senior historian, Marc Raeff, declaring in the Winter 1982 issue of *Slavic Review* (p. 613) that Muscovy before Peter's revolution from above in the 1690's was "in the throes of a crisis without alternative." On October 22, 1721, Russian Chancellor Golovkin expressed essentially the same view, that Peter I led Russia "out of the darkness of nonexistence into being and joined us to the society of political peoples." Since then, it has become a commonplace in every conventional textbook. Just how such repetition of commonplaces testifies to scholarly superiority is for the reader to judge. If it comes to that, Keenan's own general ideas on Ivan the Terrible were expressed some two decades ago by "one of the most honest and bold (but, alas, not one of the most profound) of Soviet historians, D. P. Makovskii," as I observed on p. 208 of my book. Last but not least comes Jerry Hough, a highly respected student of Soviet politics, with his peremptory prediction—entirely in "the spirit of steamy, congenial [Russian] soirées," to use Keenan's words (p. 72)—that in the succession to Andropov, "Gorbachëv has a 90 percent chance of selection (I would give 10 percent of the 90 to Grishin as a front man to Gorbachëv), Romanov 8 percent, and someone from the rest of the field 2 percent" ("Andropov's First Year," *Problems of Communism*, November–December 1983, p. 61). Much good indeed has the above-mentioned superiority done to all these writers (and the subjects they treated) if their very assumptions are either hopelessly trivial or hopelessly wrong.

The Western isolation from Russian intellectual endeavors may well be at the root of these tiresome repetitions of commonplaces, of the fragmentation of the Russian/Soviet field, of the narrowing of its philosophical horizons, of its lack of major new ideas—in a word, of its general stagnation. Hough is talking about a new reform in the USSR in the 1980's without giving a thought to the general problem of the reformability of the Russian empire—which, in view of an as yet unbroken pattern of failed and reversed reforms over more than four centuries, should have been of primary interest to anyone thinking about a reform in Russia. Raeff is unwittingly justifying one of the cruelest Russian counter-reforms which, as many of even the most faithful of Peter's lieutenants acknowledged, led the country to the brink of ultimate ruin. Keenan is, as I note on page 128 of my book, trying to substitute "pathology for despotology."

Both worlds seem to suffer from this intellectual division. There remains something important that each can learn from the other. Hence, we should be seeking possible ways of reunification rather than boasting of scholarly superiority.

"In the centuries since Ivan's time," Keenan says with the same unfortunate air of condescension, "they [the Russians] have done all the correct 'European' things: they have developed a nation-state, industrialized and urbanized it, got the bomb, learned to dance on their toes, sing in Italian and write novels." One can add to this list a few more things that this curious species has learned since Ivan's time: in particular, not to review books in which one's own work is explicity challenged, or if one does, to honestly acknowledge it instead of camouflaging one's polemics as dispassionate scholarly expertise.

Keenan's own major work on Ivan the Terrible is discussed in *Origins* more than once, and I am afraid not in the most favorable terms (pp. 128, 145, 207, 208, 222, 230, and 235). I quoted the late Cambridge historian N. Andreev, who called Keenan's book *(The Kurbskii-Groznyi Apochrypha)* "a fantastic pyramid of speculation," and also cited the conclusion of a leading Soviet expert that "the attentive reading of the sources promised by Keenan is reduced to an inaccurate and arbitrary interpretation of them and the laws of probability serve as a bridge to unproved and fantastic speculations." My own conclusion, although not expressed in such strong words, was that "as soon as Keenan goes beyond the limits of pure textology and addresses himself to the analysis of the content, his whole construction suddenly begins to sound somehow less than professional." Whether to respond to it or not was, of course, Keenan's choice. But not to mention that the criticism which he levels at my book is just a mirror image of what was said in that book about his own work seems, indeed, somehow less than professional.

Let me note in conclusion one more thing that Russians have learned since Ivan's time: to thoroughly read the books they review. Scholars who are so bored with the theoretical core of the book under review that they "find themselves skipping large parts of this section" always have the choice of watching the Russians dance on their toes. The consequences of such an approach are not surprising. For example, in his review Keenan attributes to me the view that

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CORRECTION

Johannes Zabel, a reader in West Germany, was kind enough to draw our attention to an incorrect translation of the acronymn "DKP" in the "Legend of Acronyms" on page 47 of "Checklist of Communist Parties in 1983" in the March–April 1984 issue of *Problems of Communism*. The translation should read, "German Communist Party."

the Oprichnina was more "absolutist than the previous government" or that "it created the conditions in which Muscovite absolutism became inevitable." Since my argument was precisely the opposite—i.e., that Ivan the Terrible's Oprichnina was the *end of Russian absolutism* (see pp. 27–59, 123–211, and 269–79 of my book), what is one to make of his statement? That the temptation "to skip large parts" of my book proved so irresistible to him that he also skipped its conceptual key? However it may have been, "the result is what Russians call kasha—a jumble," if I may borrow Keenan's own picturesque expression.

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MR. KEENAN RESPONDS: I regret that Mr. Yanov has seen in my review implications that I did not, and would never, intend.

Some of his objections appear to have been occasioned by passages of my review in which I may have been insufficiently circumspect or cautious in diction; of these, more in a moment.

Yanov's central thrust, however, appears to be directed at a false image projected by the optics of the regrettable expectation that non-Russians are congenitally ignorant or scornful of Russia and its culture, or, if superficially competent and sympathetic, are ineluctably unable in some unspecified but profound sense to "understand." This complex of notions sooner or later perplexes all non-Russians who attempt to become less ignorant about Russia, and unless they indeed are scornful of Russians (some are), it confronts them with a dangerous snare and a seductive delusion. A snare, because it can entangle them in the impossible and distracting task of trying to prove that they love Russia more than the next man (a trap, by the way, not always avoided by Russians themselves), and a delusion, because it implicitly credits the pernicious notion that *umom Rossiyu ne ponyat'* (Russia cannot be understood with the mind), which denies the secular and rational foundations of all proper social and cultural analysis.

Having myself struggled for many years with these impediments to understanding, I shall not be lured into protestations of my admiration for Russians and their culture. And I consider it supererogatory to demonstrate that Russia is to be understood by the same poor devices of the rational intelligence that we apply, without triumph or despair, to the analysis of other cultures. What I do think appropriate, however, are a few remarks about Yanov's letter, and some clarifications of points made in my review.

I certainly do not believe that the "Russian intellectual world" is or has been populated exclusively by a "bunch of Dostoevskian characters, dreamers, and chatterboxes." I readily acknowledge the contributions to our common heritage made by bearers of the Russian cultural tradition, especially, but not only, in the sadly fructifying first great emigration. And I am moved by the "naive but noble dream about some universal brotherhood of intellectuals" that is shared by many Russian and non-Russian intellectuals, a dream whose sad confrontation with reality I tried to analyze in a recent article ("The Correspondence of Two Corners," *Studies in Soviet Thought* [Hingham, MA], No. 4, 1979, pp. 275–83).

I had no intention, in my criticism of Yanov's views, to imply that all Western intellectuals have everything right about Russia. As it happens, one of the examples he adduces in order to disprove that imputed claim—Mr. Raeff's article—I have myself criticized in print, singling out the very words that Yanov quotes (*Slavic Review*, Winter 1982, p. 620).

I particularly regret that Mr. Yanov mistook the intention of my comments about Russians having done all the correct "European" things. I was trying in that passage to make three points: (1) it is indeed sadly paradoxical that Russian culture has achieved so much in so many spheres, but has not yet devised for itself political institutions that would permit, while maintaining social order, the fuller expression of Russians' individual talents and productive energies; (2) the painful realization of that paradox seems to have led many Russian intellectuals to see Russia's past too much in terms of her unhappy present, and to search for fated wrong turnings, ominous early expressions of a deficient national character, and general morbidity of development; and (3) the notion that something in Russia's history deprived her of a "decent European future" is doubly wrong—because one must reject the assumption that a decent future is excluded by a particular past, and because it is not necessarily demonstrable that Russia's future must be "European" in order to be decent.

Having made these declarations, acknowledgments, and restatements, let me conclude with an attempt to reformulate the central idea of my review. *The Origins of Autocracy*, in my view, is ultimately unsuccessful because Yanov does not demonstrate the correctness of the interpretation of Ivan and his time that underlies the book's general conception; because that interpretation is too heavily influenced by Yanov's desire to make arguments about recent Soviet history; and because it is, consequently, primarily a book about the mythology of Ivan and an example of the uses to which that mythology has been put.

One final remark: I did not, in my review, go into Yanov's comments about my own work on the Ivan-Kurbskii apocrypha. I refrained from discussing them because they were derivative and not central to his own argument, and because to do so would have required specialized argument of little interest to the general reader. Those interested in my current views on this matter can consult my review of Niels Rossing and Birgit Roenne's book on the controversy ("Aprocryphal—Not Apocryphal?—Apocryphal!" in *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, [Tempe, AZ], No. 1, 1982, pp. 95–112).

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MOSCOW AND CUBA

TO THE EDITORS: In his article "Ideology and Politics in Latin American–USSR Relations" (*Problems of Communism*, January-February 1984 p. 35, fn. 1), Augusto Varas states that "the focus will be on USSR relations with South America—excluding discussion in depth of current Central American and Caribbean issues."

He has made a solid contribution to his main topic; less so to the rest of the area, in particular with respect to Cuba. He writes, e.g., about the USSR "suspending deliveries of oil to Cuba in January of 1968" (p. 40) and again, of Moscow's "going so far as to suspend petroleum shipments to Cuba" (p. 41). What actually happened was Soviet denial of Castro's request for an *increase* in the supply of oil. The Soviets had no interest in jeopardizing the survival of the regime, which suspension might have entailed. Refusal to increase the supply was intended to put meaningful, but not lethal, pressure on Castro as a signal that Moscow was not prepared to tolerate his erratic behavior indefinitely.

Then again, in connection with the oil deliveries, Varas writes: "... this did not prevent Fidel Castro from criticizing the [Soviet] decision taken against Czechoslovakia" (p. 40). Perhaps Varas was misled by the expression "qualified support" of the invasion, coined at the time by a careless commentator and frequently repeated since then by those who did not study the text of Castro's statement. What may have contributed to this confusion was Castro's admission that the invasion of Czechoslovakia violated the country's sovereignty (a subject avoided by Brezhnev). However, Castro went on to say that the violation was entirely justified. Fidel Castro's approval of the USSR invasion was, indeed, without reservation.

Elsewhere (p. 41), Varas wrote: "Stepped up Soviet support to Cuba in the 1980's ... reflects ... the need to protect the island against military invasion—a possibility that was suggested recently in Grenada." The analogy between Cuba and Grenada is misleading. It has been recognized for a long time, in fact since the missile crisis of 1962, that an invasion of Cuba would be a long and very costly undertaking, involving major American and Cuban casualties.

As for Cuban involvement in Africa, Varas states (p. 40): "Soviet support for the Angolan-Cuban military forces in 1978 [sic] appears to be a response to a fait accompli, rather than a result of joint Soviet-Cuban planning." The year was 1975, and the "military forces" could be more appropriately described as Cuban-MPLA, since the Cubans bore the brunt of the fighting, and their opponents were also Angolans. In any event, his explanation of Soviet support is a conjecture and corresponds to the official Cuban position. There were plausible reports to the contrary (see, e.g., Maurice Halperin, "The Cuban Role in Southern Africa," in John Seiler, Ed., *Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1980, pp. 35-36, fn. 24; p. 43). Soviet buildup of military equipment, in both neighboring Brazzaville and in Angola itself (with the consent of the Portuguese authorities) began in April 1975, six months before the Cubans landed in Luanda. In view of the longstanding support of the Marxist MPLA by both Cuba and the USSR, it would have been normal for military aid to be synchronized early in 1975, in anticipation of the civil war that would follow the scheduled departure of the Portuguese in November of that year.

As for Cuban military intervention in Ethiopia, it was clearly prompted, managed, and coordinated by the USSR. Prior to the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, there had been no contact between Cubans and the group that took power in Addis Ababa. When Fidel Castro met secretly with Ethiopian and Somali leaders in Aden in March 1977, it was in connection with Soviet, and not Cuban, objectives. At the time, the two African neighbors were both clients of Moscow and at loggerheads with each other. Castro's mission was to promote a Soviet proposal for a compromise solution of their quarrel that would keep both parties in the Soviet orbit. He failed, and the USSR opted to support Ethiopia against Somalia. Castro did likewise.

The question raised by Varas as to whether Cuba was acting as a Soviet "proxy" in Africa must be considered in the light of the bonds that have linked the two parties after the great Soviet-Cuban reconciliation at the time of the Czech crisis, in late August 1968. In the years that followed, and until the current time, the Cuban economy and military capability have been overwhelmingly dependent on the USSR. Cuba's close ties with the Soviet bloc have been underscored by Cuban membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Cuban institutions and domestic policy are now based almost completely on the Soviet model. The record shows that Cuban foreign policy for more than a decade has not deviated one iota from Soviet policy—in contrast, e.g., to Romanian foreign policy.

There would thus appear to be something more than "convergence," the word used by Varas on p. 40, to account for Cuban-Soviet collaboration, however acceptable or profitable Castro may find this arrangement. Viewed in a global perspective, what is significant about Cuban military intervention in Angola and Ethiopia is that it served Soviet geopolitical interests. In both cases, a conspicuous Soviet military presence would have been counterproductive. Thus the Cuban armies, which alone made possible the victory of the pro-Soviet insurgency in Angola and the Soviet-backed Ethiopian regime, in effect played what may reasonably be defined as a "proxy" role in securing Soviet hegemony in two strategically important African countries.

At the same time, Varas is correct in rejecting the view that Cuba is merely a Soviet pawn in its relations with Latin America. Yet, a word of caution with respect to Cuban political and military activity in this region would be appropriate. Even in the case of Central America, where Cuban stakes are vital—as they were not in Africa—Cuban initiative is inevitably subject to Soviet constraints. That there is probably considerable Cuban input into the on-going consultations with the Soviets—given Cuban expertise and exposure in the area—would be a fair assumption. Nevertheless, Cuba remains the junior partner even in this venture.

In some situations, a junior partner may risk trying to impose his will on the senior partner, as Fidel Castro tried, and failed, in the 1960's. At the present time, given the escalation of tension and the mood in Washington, Castro can have neither the incentive nor the leverage to risk challenging Soviet primacy in determination of their joint response to the Central American crisis.

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TO THE EDITORS: Professor Varas's article "Ideology and

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Politics in Latin American—USSR Relations" contained several inaccuracies that warrant correction. Varas alleges that Cuba's Fidel Castro persisted in criticizing the Soviet action against the Dubček regime in Czechoslovakia despite suspension of Soviet oil deliveries to Cuba in late 1967 and early 1968. While it is true that Soviet-Cuban relations were at their nadir during that period, the reasons behind Soviet-Cuban tensions were Cuba's support for guerrilla wars in Latin America that Moscow opposed; Cuba's criticism of the USSR over the mild Soviet response to increased American bombing of North Vietnam; and Soviet displeasure over Cuba's economic strategy.

Cuba not only did not criticize the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia but actually enthusiastically supported it. In a speech on August 23, 1968, Castro accepted the justification of the Warsaw pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia as a defense of the integrity of the Communist system, which is a "sacred law" (see K. S. Karol, *Guerrillas in Power,* New York, Hill & Wang, 1970, p. 507). In fact, historians generally agree that the August 23 speech was the pivotal event that marked the reorientation of Cuba's foreign policy from one of constant tension with Moscow to one which was and remains in accord with the USSR's foreign policy more often than are the foreign policies of Eastern Europe's socialist states.

Varas asserts that Cuba maintains an independent foreign policy and that the Cuban-Soviet cooperation in Africa is merely a "convergence of interests." While something of a case might be made regarding the Cuban intervention helping the MPLA in Angola, given Cuba's long-rooted relationship with the MPLA dating to the early 1960's, no such case can be made regarding Ethiopia, where the Cubans had no historic relations with the Mengistu regime and where Cuba—by its support for Addis Ababa—was forced to abandon its support for the Eritrean independence movement, a cause that Cuba had supported almost as long as it had supported the MPLA in Angola.

In fact, if one reviews Cuba's global policy, one cannot but notice how "Sovietized" it became after Castro's speech in August 1968. In the Arab-Israeli crisis, Cuba (which had ridiculed the Soviet Union's break of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967) joined the Soviet camp in August 1973 and adopted almost an identical policy to that of the USSR in that region. (See Yoram Shapira and Edy Kaufman, "Cuba's Israel Policy: the Shift to the Soviet Line," *Cuban Studies* [Pittsburgh, PA], January 1978, pp. 22-34).

The "Sovietization" of Cuba's foreign policy has become so complete that Havana feels compelled to toe the Soviet line even when it undermines Cuba's status in the Third World. Thus, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Cuba broke ranks with almost the entire membership of the Nonaligned Movement (of which Castro was then the chairman) and voted against the censure of the Soviet invasion at the United Nations. It is commonly assumed that Cuba's refusal to criticize the Soviet Union at this time alienated a sufficient number of Third World countries to deny Cuba a seat on the UN Security Council during the subsequent UN session.

Finally, Varas states that the USSR has always supported "peaceful resolutions of regional conflicts," noting as an example, Soviet support for the Contadora group. Yet, the author fails to mention that the USSR strongly supported the guerrilla warfare waged by the Communist Party of El Salvador, led (since 1979) by Shafik Handal, and tacitly supported the shipment of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador—hardly a "peace-loving" policy. Furthermore, the sale of a large number of T-55 tanks to Peru in late 1973 induced an arms race between Peru and neighboring Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia.

ILYA PRIZEL
Washington, DC

MR. VARAS RESPONDS: The commentaries by Mssrs. Halperin and Prizel both reflect the same ideological bias, i.e., that the USSR is an aggressive superpower. I disagree with this posture, and would argue that in recent time this has not been the case. Read, for example, the outstanding analysis by Stanley Hoffmann in his book *Dead Ends* (Cambridge, MA, Ballinger, 1983).

I differ with both readers on the interpretation of the Cuban position vis-à-vis the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. I think that in international and diplomatic language it is enough to condemn by saying that the action violated Czechoslovaakia's sovereignty. From my point of view, this represented a frontal rejection of the Soviet move.

On the Cuban involvement in Africa, I was referring to the supplementary contingent of 2,600 Cuban troops delivered on November 7, 1978, to Angola as a consequence of a previous bilateral agreement between the two countries.

If convergence of interest is called "Sovietization," the Contadora group, and almost all Latin American countries are currently "Sovietized," since they converge with the Soviet Union in their positions on several world issues. Only Chile seems "independent."

The analogy between Cuba and Grenada is not misleading. For example, in Congressional testimony in December 1981 regarding the Cuban/Soviet threat, Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, spoke of contingency plans for responding "as required and appropriate to further military threats and acts of aggression" in the hemisphere (see US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Central America,* Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemispheric Affairs, Dec. 14, 15, 1981, Feb. 1, 1982, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 46). Although I have yet to see convincing evidence from US officials that Grenada constituted a military threat to the hemisphere, forces of the US and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States invaded that island in October 1983. Considering this, Cuba would seem to face a real danger.

Regarding peaceful transition to socialism, the evidence of some declarations of a secretary general of a Latin American communist party as in El Salvador (one of the moderate factions in the guerrilla war) is misleading. It does not involve the Soviet Union in this strategy. There is no evidence that can convincingly demonstrate support for a military takeover in Latin America as an official posture of either the Soviet government or party.

On factual information, Soviet deliveries of Weapons to Peru in 1973 did not initiate an arms race in that subregion. This delivery was a consequence of the Peruvian fear of a military escalation of the conflict with Chile due to the seizure of power in Santiago by one of the bloodiest military dictatorships in the continent. Chilean military expenditures increased by 36 percent in real terms from 1973 to 1974. It is not possible to blame the Peruvian military or the Soviet Union for this escalation of the arms race in the area.

Finally, I thank Mr. Halperin for his elaboration on the issue of oil supplies to Cuba from the Soviet Union.

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